U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/8/1/4/8/0/ (8) /0/8/2/7/8/0/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / During Mode 5 operation, a pressurizer power operated relief valve was declared/
/0/3/ / inoperable when the nitrogen gas supply required for overpressure protection /
/0/4/ / dropped below 1775 psig. The reactor coolant system was placed in a vented /
/0/5/ / condition through a > 2.07 square inch vent line in accordance with T.S. /
/0/6/ / 3.4.9.3. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected. /
/0/7/ / This item is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
/0/8/ / /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/C/J/ (11)	/B/ (12)	/A/ (13)	/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14)	/Z/ (15)	/Z/ (16)

	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)		/8/0/	/-/	/0/4/3/	/ \ /	/0/3/	/L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/X/ (18)	/F/ (19)	/C/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/S/4/2/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The PORV was made inoperable due to low nitrogen pressure. Nitrogen is re- /
/1/1/ / quired to cycle the valve during conditions wherein overpressure protection is /
/1/2/ / required. The reactor coolant system was vented through a > 2.07 square inch /
/1/3/ / vent line to provide a bleed path for RCS water inventory control. /
/1/4/ / /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/B/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA /	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

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Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #2 Attachment: Page 1 of 1
Docket No. 50-339
Attachment to LER 80-043/03L-0

Description of Event

On August 14, 1980, during Mode 5 operation, the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV's) were required to be operable for over-pressure protection in accordance with T.S. 3.4.9.3. In this condition, nitrogen is used as the cycling medium for the PORV's. The nitrogen supply pressure dropped to below the pressure necessary to maintain the PORV's in an operable status.

Probable Consequences of Event

Overpressure protection for cold shutdown condition is required to prevent pressurization, from water injection, in the non-ductile range exhibited by the materials used in the reactor coolant system. With the PORV declared inoperable, an alternate bleed path is required. In this event, the PORV was placed in the open position thereby providing the > 2.07 sq. in. vent line required by T.S. 3.4.9.3. With a vent line of this size, overpressurization of the RCS is prevented. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of the PORV becoming inoperable was due to the nitrogen supply tank pressure dropping below the pressure necessary to provide this protection function. The low nitrogen supply in this system was created by excessive usage of nitrogen throughout the station and an inadequate method for replenishing this supply.

Immediate Corrective Action

The vent line established by opening the PORV provided an immediate resolution to the event. The nitrogen supply tanks were subsequently recharged and the system returned to normal.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The nitrogen supply system has been investigated and recommended corrective actions have been proposed. Future corrective action will be taken based on the review and acceptability of these proposals.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.