

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 GA E I H 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5

CON'T REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 7 2 6 8 0 8 0 8 2 5 8 0 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With the reactor in shutdown mode following performance of a manual
03 scram on 7-26-80, per IEB 80-17, scram discharge volume hi level switch-
04 es 2C11-N013A and D were found to be inoperable. Redundant switches
05 2C11-N013B and C were operable. There were no effects on public health
06 or safety due to this event. This is a nonrepetitive event for the
07 described mode of failure.

09 SYSTEM CODE I A 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE S 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 IER/RO REPORT NUMBER 18 0 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN A 18 Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT C 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 22 0 0 1 8 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER M 0 4 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Magnetrol model 751 switches 2C11-N013A and D were opened for inspection.
11 The floats were found to be crushed on both switches. New Magnetrol
12 model 751 switches were installed, and all 4 level switches satisfactor-
13 ily functionally tested. GPCo and GE are investigating the problem to
14 determine the cause of failure. Results will follow in an update report.

15 FACILITY STATUS X 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Inspection 32

16 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

20 ISSUED DESCRIPTION N 44 8009030 461 NA 45

LER #: 50-366/1980-113  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-366/1980-113

On 7-26-80, at 0710 CDT, Hatch Unit 2 performed a manual scram per IEB 80-17. Following the scram it was noted that 2 of the 4 scram discharge volume (SDV) level switches, 2C11-N013A and D, failed to function properly. Subsequent investigation of the switches showed that the floats were crushed. The 2 switches are both Magnetrol model 751.

Further investigation followed and showed that the switches could last be verified to properly trip and reset during a scram on 5-15-80, (based on Process Computer alarm edits) and were found to not trip during scrams on 6-2, 6-14, and 7-11-80. The most probable time of failure was hypothesized to be the scram that occurred on 5-21-80; however, the process computer was not functional for approximately 21 minutes immediately following that scram, and therefore, complete alarm edits were not available. The switch 2C11-N013A had last been satisfactorily functionally tested on 4-9-80, and 2C11-N013D had last been satisfactorily functionally tested on 5-11-80. Subsequent monthly testing had been performed on the switches but did not include functional testing by water injection to the float bowl to verify float actuation.

An investigation of the switch failures was initiated on 7-28-80, and included representatives of GPCo, GE, Bechtel, and Magnetrol. Replacement level switches (Magnetrol model 751) were procured and installed, and the remaining Unit 2 level switches, 2C11-N013B, C, E, and F were radiographed and satisfactorily functionally tested by float chamber water injection to verify proper operation and integrity of the switch float. In addition, all Unit 1 SDV level switches were radiographed and satisfactorily functionally tested by float chamber water injection. All Unit 1 switches and the remaining Unit 2 switches were found to be functioning properly, and no indications of float damage were seen.

Following replacement of the failed switches and testing of the remaining switches, Unit 2 started up on 7-31-80, and performed an automatic scram per IEB 80-17. All SDV level switches performed properly during the test, and pressure transmitters were hooked up on both sides of the 4 scram level switches to observe and record any pressure transient occurring either during the scram or reset. The data from the pressure transmitters was inconclusive, and investigation into the switch failures is continuing. Results will follow in an update report.