(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: O H D B S 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T

01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6 (7) | EVENT DATE: Ø 8 1 3 8 Ø (8) | REPORT DATE: Ø 8 2 6 8 Ø (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(NP-32-80-14) On August 13, 1980 at 1320 hours, I&C personnel, while working in Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 4 cabinet, were resetting the trip point for bistable BA 413 for FCR 77-391 when Decay Heat (DH) Isolation Valve DH 11 began closing. DH Pump 1-2 was stopped, placing the unit in violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. DH flow was restored in five minutes, and no increase in core temperature was noted.

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
C F (11)	A (12)	B (13)	I N S T R U (14)	S (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 Ø	—	Ø 6 Ø	/	Ø 1	T	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The cause was personnel error in that the mechanic thought he had defeated the automatic closing of DH 11 per the instructions in ST 5031.01. At 1321 hours, DH 11 was re-opened and by 1325 hours DH Pump 1-2 was started and flow re-established. Under Technical Specification Amendment 28, station personnel will now be able to de-energize DH 11 and DH 12 while running decay heat.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
H (28)	Ø Ø Ø (29)	NA	B (31)	Facility Change Request 77-391

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
Ø Ø Ø (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
Ø Ø Ø (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
N (44)	NA	

TR 80-134 NAME OF PREPARER Thomas Isley PHONE 419-259-5000, Ext. 230

8009020061

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-80-14

DATE OF EVENT: August 13, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inadvertent loss of decay heat flow

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 13, 1980 at 1320 hours, Instrument and Controls personnel were in Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 4 Cabinet performing work under Facility Change Request (FCR) 77-391. Their actions caused Decay Heat Isolation Valve DH 11 to begin closing. Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was immediately stopped to prevent possible damage due to loss of suction. At 1321 hours, DH 11 was reopened. At 1323 hours, Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was vented, and at 1325 hours the pump was started and flow re-established to the Reactor Coolant System.

This occurrence placed the unit in violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1 which requires a decay heat pump to be in operation while the unit is in Mode 5. This incident is being reported in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b. At 1407 hours, the NRC was notified via the "red phone". Luis Reyes (NRC Resident Inspector) was notified at 1430 hours on August 13, 1980.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was personnel error. Instrument and Controls personnel were resetting the trip point for bistable BA 413 for FCR 77-391. The mechanic thought he had defeated the automatic closing of DH 11 per the instructions in ST 5031.01, SFAS Monthly Test. As he opened the slide link, he experienced some difficulty in getting it fully opened. Without having a positive position verification, the bistable was placed in test. The interlock actuated and DH 11 closed.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Decay heat flow was restored in five minutes and no increase in core temperature was noted. During monthly testing of ST 5031.01 when the station is at power, the interlock does not cause a problem since the valve it closes is already closed.

Corrective Action: At 1321 hours on August 13, 1980, DH 11 was reopened and by 1325 Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was started and flow verified to the Reactor Coolant System. The station was now in compliance with Technical Specification 3.4.1. A check of the slide link and its physical location in the cabinet shows that although possible, it is difficult to verify positive positioning of the link. Therefore, during the remainder of this facility change request work, the slide link will not be used to defeat the interlock. Instead, station personnel are now aware of special permission to de-energize DH 11 and will do so to complete the resetting of the trip point for bistable BA 413.

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When all of the work for FCR 77-391 is complete this outage, the station will be able to operate under Technical Specification Amendment 28 which eliminates the requirement of always maintaining power on DH 11 and DH 12.

Failure Data: Previous loss of decay heat flow due to personnel error was reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-32-77-05, NP-32-77-09, NP-33-80-54 (80-044) and NP-32-80-12 (80-058).

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