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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 11, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 80-06 - RII:JPO
50-259, -260, -296

Enclosed is progress report number 3 for work related to IE Bulletin 80-06 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This report reflects the progress of work to date since our letter dated July 11, 1980, from J. L. Cross to you. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please get in touch with Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 1st day of August 1980.

Bryant M. Lowery
Notary Public

My Commission Expires 4/4/82

Enclosure
cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Enclosure)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

IE BULLETIN 80-06
PROGRESS REPORT NO. 3

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1-3
(DOCKET NOS. 50-259, -260, -296)

In our progress report dated July 11, 1980, we reported that we had completed the drawing review for four systems. In addition, the drawing review has been completed for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. Those items that can or will change mode upon reset of an ESF signal for each system reviewed are tabulated below.

A. Primary Containment Isolation System

With the exception of the Traversing Incore probe system these devices remain in their emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal. The isolation valve associated with the probe tube can change state on containment isolation reset if the system is in the manual mode and the drive mechanism is in forward drive.

Evaluations regarding potential administrative, procedural, or equipment changes to resolve this situation are being conducted on an expedited basis. The results of these evaluations will be included in the next monthly report, to be submitted approximately September 10, 1980.

B. Reactor Protection System

1. Groups 2 and 3 pilot scram solenoids for systems A and B (92 valves).

2. Scram discharge volume vent and drain pilot valve for systems A and B (2 valves).

3. Backup scram valve for systems A and B (2 valves).

Upon receipt of an ESF signal, the solenoids tabulated above move from their normal position causing the control rods to be rapidly inserted. These solenoids return to their normal position upon reset of the ESF signal; however, the control rods remain in their inserted position. Withdrawal of the control rods requires operator action on the reactor manual control system.

C. Residual Heat Removal System

Valve 10-25A - (FCV-74-53) and valve 10-25B - (FCV-74-67) can change from emergency mode. However, we have determined that their changing does not constitute a safety problem.

D. Core Spray System

The core spray pumps can change modes under certain conditions. It has been determined that if these devices change modes, it does not constitute a safety problem.

E. High-Pressure Coolant Injection System

The following valves could change state on reset of signal:

1. Valve 23-25 (FCV-73-30)

2. Valve 23-57 (FCV-73-27)

3. Valve 23-58 (FCV-73-26)

4. Valve 23-17 (FCV-73-40)

The following items will change state on reset:

1. Turbine trip solenoid (PCV-73-18B)

2. HPCI gland seal condenser blower

3. HPCI turbine auxiliary oil pump

The changing state of these devices has been reviewed by TVA. It has been concluded that if these devices change modes it does not constitute a safety problem.

F. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems

Two devices could change the state upon reset of signal.

1. Valve 13-27 (FCV-71-34)

2. Turbine trip solenoid (XY-71-9)

The changing state of these two devices has been reviewed by TVA. It has been concluded that if these devices change modes, it does not constitute a safety problem.