MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

August 1, 1980

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

80-266-000

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
PRD-80/26, 10CFR21 Report,
Defective SB-12 Switches
AECM-80/173

References: 1) AECM-80/128, 6/12/80
2) AECM-80/152, 7/12/80

On July 10, 1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company sent your office a final report under 10CFR50.55(e) of a deficiency concerning GE Type SB-12 switches. We have since determined that this deficiency is applicable to 10CFR21. A supplemental report containing additional information to the report previously filed under 10CFR50.55(e) is attached.

Yours truly,

For J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
Assistant Vice President,
Nuclear Production

WDH:mt
Attachment

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Victor Stello, Director
Division of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR PART 21 REPORT

1. Identification of individual(s) informing the NRC:

Name(s):

T. E. Reaves

Telephone call to Virgil Brownlee, NRC, Region II 8/1/80.

Address: Mississippi Power & Light Company, P. O. Box 1640, Jackson, MS 39205

2. Identification of entity failing to comply or containing a defect (check appropriate blocks):

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION

Unit 1 [X]

Unit 2 [ ]

Other [ ] _____
(Specify)

3. Supplier: General Electric
Switchgear Division
Burlington, Iowa

4. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:

See paragraph I & II of Attachment A to MP&L letter AECM-80/152 (attached)

5. Date information obtained for this report: 8/1/80

6. Additional information for defective components incorporated in other facilities, as applicable:

Facility/Location	Number in use, supplied for, or being supplied
(Not known to MP&L)	

7. Corrective Action: See paragraph III of Attachment A to AECM-80/152 (attached)

Responsibility: Mississippi Power & Light Quality Assurance Section
(Name of individual or organization)

Time Required To Complete Action: Began 11/14/79; Complete at close of MCAR-GGNS #80 (estimate 9/80)

8. Advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

NRC IE Circular No. 79-17 was issued 8/14/79. Also, GE, Installation and Service Engineering Division forwarded Service Advice SBD(073) No. 330.1 to Bechtel Power Corporation, AE for GGNS, on 1/14/80.

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY (PRD) PRD # 80/26

I. DESCRIPTION: (Include nonconformance document)

See Paragraph I, QA Form 16.20(A), Rev. 3, attached.

II. DETERMINATION OF EFFECT ON SAFE OPERATION OR SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD:

See Paragraph II, QA Form 16.20(A), Rev. 3, attached

_____Could have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant or is a substantial safety hazard.

_____Unable to determine within one working day of receipt

Signature_____ Date_____ Organization_____

III. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY:

_____Not Reportable

_____Reportable

_____Potentially Reportable or Unable to Determine

Signature_____ Date_____ Quality Assurance

See Paragraph II, QA Form 16.20(A), Rev. 3, attached

IV. NOTIFICATION TO NRC:

Person Notified: How Notification Was Made:

Notified By: Date:

See Paragraph III, QA Form 16.20(A), Rev. 3, attached

V. EVALUATION OF REPORTABILITY: Reportable Under _____10CFR50.55(e) _____10CFR21

10CFR21 Use Only-Senior Vice President

Signature_____ Date_____

VI. RECEIPT OF INFORMATION: Date Time

Signature_____

VII. REPORT TO NRC:

Due Date	6/11/80	7/10/80
Submittal Date	6/12/80	7/10/80
Letter Number	AECM-80/128	AECM-80/152

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION VERIFICATION:

Quality Assurance Form 16.20(A), Page 1 of 1, Revision 4, 6/2/80

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY (PRD)

PRD NUMBER 80/26

I. DESCRIPTION:

As a result of investigation based on IE Circular 79/17, Bechtel has identified eight (8) switchgear units containing defective SB-12 switches. Each switchgear is furnished with two (2) SB-12 switches. The switches contain an intermittent contact problem which will cause a lack of continuity through the contact of the switch used to energize the trip coil of the circuit breaker. The switchgear units are used in the 6.9 KV system used for controlling the recirculating pumps.

for W. E. Edge

Initiated By: T. E. Reaves, Jr. Organization: MP&L Date: 5/12/80

II. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY:

Rationale:

The potential exists that, should the condition remain uncorrected, it could adversely affect the safety of operations of the Nuclear Power Plant.

See Attachment "A"

Concurrence:	Yes	No	Initial	Date
Manager QA	X		WEE for TER	5/12/80
Project Mgr.	X		J&R for LFD	5/12/80
+ Dir. of Pwr Prod.				

III. NOTIFICATION TO NRC: Person Notified: M. Hunt How Notification Was Made: Telephone

Notified By: A. Ramey Date: 5/12/80

IV. EVALUATION OF REPORTIBILITY:

Rationale:

Concurrence:	Yes	No	Initial	Date
Manager QA				
Project Mgr.				
+ Dir. of Pwr Prod.				

V. REPORT TO NRC:

Due Date: 6/11/80

Submitted Date:

Letter Number :

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTION VERIFICATION:

By: Date:

+ Required should agreement not be reached between Mgr QA and Project Mgr.

QUALITY ASSURANCE FORM 16.20(A) Page 1 of 1 Revision 3, 5/11/79

Attachment "A" to PRD 80/26

The use of SB-12 switches in this particular application would have no adverse impact on plant safety since they are used in non-safety related switch gear. Therefore, this specific deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). However, since adverse impact may result from other applications, as yet unknown, this deficiency is considered to be potentially reportable and requires evaluation of its generic implications, if any.

Jerald Richardson for L.F. Dale.
5/12/80
W. E. Edge for T.E. Reaves
5/12/80

Logged 7/11

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

July 10, 1980

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-80/26, Final Report, Defective SB-12 Switches (Ref.: AECM-80/128, June 12, 1980)
AECM-80/152

On May 12, 1980, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. M. Hunt of your office of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns CE Type SB-12 switches.

We have since determined this deficiency to be reportable within the meaning of 10CFR50.55(e). Details are described in the attached final report. We are evaluating the applicability of 10CFR21 and will submit a report upon completion.

Yours truly,

For J. P. McGaughy, Jr.
Assistant Vice President,
Nuclear Production

ATR:mt
Attachment

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Victor Stello, Director
Division of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

bcc: Dr. D. C. Gibbs
Mr. J. P. McGaughy
Mr. J. N. Ward
Mr. A. Zaccaria
Mr. J. W. Yelverton
Mr. L. F. Dale
Mr. C. K. McCoy
Mr. W. L. Nail
Mr. T. H. Cloninger
Mr. R. A. Ambrosino
Mr. C. L. Tyrone
PRD File
File

Dupe 8007170396

FINAL REPORT, PRD-80/26

I. Description of Deficiency

Defective SB-12 switches identified in IE Circular 79-17 were found to be installed in switchgear supplied by the vendor. The defect is an intermittent contact problem which will cause lack of continuity through the "a" contact of the switch that is used to energize the trip coil of the circuit breaker.

II. Safety Implications

The SB-12 switches are used in the circuit breakers of the 6.9 KV switchgear units which control the reactor recirculation pumps. The safety function of the breaker is to trip on a signal from the Reactor Protection System. The postulated failure of the SB-12 switch would prevent the energizing of the trip coil thereby preventing the breaker from fulfilling its intended safety function.

III. Corrective Action Taken

The vendor will furnish new SB-12 switches to correct the condition and preclude recurrence.