LICENSEE E	VENT REPORT
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (1)  During support and hanger inspection, in accordance with NRC
Confirmation of Action letter, several discrepancies were discovered
between the as-built and the as-analyzed configurations. Preliminary
analysis from Division of Engineering Design showed that these supports
could cause a failure in the piping during a seismic event.
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TO REPORT YEAR REPORT NO.  17 REPORT NO.  18 101 11 14 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
TAKEN ACTION FUTURE ON FLANT SHUTDOWN NETHOD SUBMITTED FORM SUB SUPPLIES MAUGACTURES TAKEN ACTIONS 31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
[ A complete report was provided to NRC prior to initial criticality.
[ All deviations which could cause pipe failure during a seismic event
were modified as required.
STATUS OTHER STATUS TO METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
3 4 2 13 13 14 45 46 .
1 8 2 3 Z 2 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 9 PERSONNEL PROPRIES
N/A
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (1)
TI Z O N/A
STATE OF CHAPTER STATE OF STAT
NAME OF PREPARED James D. Swearingen PHONE 615-842-6967

Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

#### LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SORO-50-327/80114

Technical Specification Involved: 6.9.1.13.0

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.C

Date of Occurrence: 7/3/80

Time of Occurrence: 0830 EDT

Unit 1

# Identification and Description of Occurrence

During support and hanger inspection in accordance with NRC Confirmation of Action Letter, the following supports were found to be improperly installed: 1-AFDH-6, 1-FPCH-526, 1-UHIH-31, 1-CVCH-458, 1-CVCH-460, 1-CVCH-461, 1-CCH-45, 1-AFDH-345, 1-RHRH-456, 1-AFDH-355, 1-AFDH-296, 1-RHRH-460, 1-CVCH-542, 1-AFDH-322, 1-SIH-77, 1-SGBH-80, 1-UHIH-91, 1-UHIH-115, 1-CVCH-145, 1-CVCH-84, and 1-SGBH-262. Preliminary analysis from the Division of Engineering Design showed that these supports could cause a failure in the piping during a seismic event.

## Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor was in mode 3, 4, or 5.

Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Met Due to Inoperable Equipment

N/A.

### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Improper design, installation, or modification of various supports.

### Analysis of Occurrence

Supports could cause failure of piping during a seismic event. See response to Confirmation of Action Letter for details on each individual support.

#### Corrective Action

Supports were modified or reworked as required.

#### Failure Data

N/A.