



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

MAY 21 1980

Report No. 50-327/80-15

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
 500A Chestnut Street
 Chattanooga, TN 37401

Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Docket No. 50-327

License No. CPPR-72

Inspector:

L. Modenos
 L. Modenos

5/19/80
 Date Signed

Approved by:

A. R. Herdt

A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch

5/14/80
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 23-25, 1980

Areas Inspected

This special, announced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours on site in the area of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).

Results

Of the one area inspected, one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - Failure to follow procedures on safety-related supports - paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent
- *C. R. Brimer, Outage Director
- *D. O. McCloud, QA Supervisor
- *R. C. Miles, Construction QCRU Supervisor
- *U. R. Bynum, Assistant to Superintendent
- *J. A. Ellis, Civil Engineer
- *C. R. Bryant, Mechanical Engineer
- *J. W. Doty, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, and QC inspectors.

NRC Resident Inspector

- *W. T. Cottle
- *S. D. Butler

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. (Open) Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IE Bulletin 79-14)

On a previous inspection, IE Report 50-327/79-52, the NRC inspector verified that Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) had established procedures and a program of verifying the proper installation of safety-related piping and supports. The purpose of this inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the implementation of SNP's program that would meet the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-14.

Portions of the following safety-related systems were selected by the inspector together with detailed support drawings and pipe stress isometric drawings and a walk down performed of the system to verify compliance with the drawings:

- a. 12" & 8" UHI Lines from penetration CPNX-109 to Reactor Vessel Head. Drawing No. 0600102-15-01 Rev. 5.

EDS Nuclear Stress ISO Metric Drawing.

- b. 6" CCW from containment liner penetration to R. C. Pumps No. 1 and 4 Oil Coolers. Drawing No. 0600102-04-03 Rev. 4.

EDS Nuclear Stress Isometric Drawing

- c. 14", 6", 2" RHR from Hot Leg No. 4 to penetration X-107. Drawing No. 0600102-03-01 Rev. 4.

EDS Nuclear Stress Isometric Drawing

- d. 10", 8", 6" From Accumulator 1 and 4 to Cold Leg 1 and 4. Safety Injection System. Drawing No. 0600102-09-01 Rev. 4.

EDS Nuclear Stress Isometric Drawing

- e. Aux. FW Piping - Turbine and Motor Pump Discharge Drawing No. 47K427-53 Rev. 2.

TVA Stress Isometric Drawing

From the above systems and .. some other safety-related lines the following supports were identified to have one or more discrepancies:

1RHR-H-2 Bolted head on clevis clamp around pipe was cut severely.

1RHR-H-4 Vertical support had at least a 3/8 inch gap.

AFW-H3-407 Missing vertical support - Pipe not in contact with support member, about one inch gap.

SIS-1-H20-9 Base plate had a gap between plate and concrete walk of about 1/2 inch on one side.

AFW-H3-413 Isometric and detail drawings did not agree on location of support.

1-CSH-2 Support located about 3 feet off marked isometric.

1-CCH-386 Shock suppressor assembly - missing cotter pins

1-CVCH-163 Shock suppressor assembly - missing cotter pins

1-BIH-423 Shock suppressor assembly - missing cotter pins

6" line on Auxiliary Feedwater line at Floor Elevation 714 feet has an extra support not identified in stress isometric.

Inspection of the QA documentation on these supports revealed that the sign out cards had been signed and supports had been accepted with the discrepancies. The failure to follow procedures and to properly identify the discrepancies during the inspection of these supports, appears to be in noncompliance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and is identified as an infraction, 327/80-15-01.

Discussions were held with the licensee's representatives and due to the plant status, low power license, it was pointed out that IE:Region II will issue an Immediate Action Letter (IAL) describing the requirements the licensee had to meet prior to initial criticality. The inspector informed the management that additional inspections would be required to satisfy the requirements of the Bulletin and IAL.

The 6" line identified above in the Auxiliary Feedwater line was a point of concern to the inspector on how SNP inspection system would detect additional supports in the system. This issue was discussed with the licensee and they agreed to follow up on this item. This will be identified as Inspector Followup Item No. 327/80-15-02.

This IE Bulletin 79-14 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the NRC.