NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

SUPPLEMENTARY LER

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	V A S P S 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 3 0 6 7 9
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 8 0 4 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During refueling shutdown, while performing PT-39.2 (Snubber Functional Test), nineteen

0 3 of the first thirty snubbers failed to meet the acceptance criteria stipulated in the

0 4 PT. This is contrary to Technica Specification 3.20 and is reportable in accordance

0 5 with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The snubbers failed such that unconstrained pipe motion would

0 6 still have been prevented in the event of a severe transient or earthquake. There are

0 7 no consequences and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	Z Z	E	B	S U P O R T	D	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	0 1 0	/	0 3	L	—	1

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
D	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	A	I 2 0 7

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 During all previous functional tests, the snubbers tested as acceptable were not readjus-

1 1 ted to optimum design conditions prior to reinstallation. This, in combination with

1 2 setting drifts, cause the snubbers to fail in the conservative direction. Those snub-

1 3 bers that failed were either readjusted, repaired, or replaced.

1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	H	0 0 0	NA	B	Routine test

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

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L. L. Wilson (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT (PAGE 1 OF 1)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 79-010/03L-1
EVENT DATE: 3/6/79

SUPPLEMENTARY LER

TITLE OF EVENT: INOPERABLE SNUBBERS

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During refueling shutdown, while performing PT-39.2 (Snubber Functional Test), nineteen of the first thirty snubbers failed to meet the acceptance criteria stipulated in the procedure. This is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6. 2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF EVENT:

Snubbers are installed to limit or prevent pipe movement during a seismic event. The mechanism for performing this function is through a lockup and bleed system in the snubber valve block. The failures experienced have resulted from lockup and bleed rates falling below the minimum levels stipulated in the acceptance criteria. However, since these rates are in the conservative direction, the snubbers would still perform their intended function. Therefore, there are no consequences from this event and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

During all previous functional tests, the snubbers tested as acceptable were not readjusted to optimum design conditions prior to reinstallation in the system. This, in combination with setting drifts, has caused the snubbers to fail in the conservative direction. The number of functional failed snubbers in Unit 2 was 40 of 121, and 17 failed by less than 0.5 in./min.(which is the minimum additional allowable expected from a re-evaluation of acceptance criteria)

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The snubbers that failed were reset to design conditions. Those that could not be reset were repaired or replaced.

5. FUTURE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

In light of data supplied by snubber manufacturers, VEPCO, in conjunction with Stone & Webster is reevaluating the existing acceptance criteria for possible excessive conservatism. Based on this evaluation, the PT will be modified accordingly. This study is still on-going.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

A test program was run to find the reason for snubber drift. Two rebuilt snubbers and two new snubbers (one 1½ inch and one 4 inch rebuilt and one 1½ inch and one 4 inch new) were tested ten times each at the station and at an independent laboratory. The results from the laboratory were more consistant than ours (i.e., within a tighter band). The conclusion is that the instrumentation on our snubber test machine must be refined. This should allow more consistent test results which will result in a higher pass/fail ratio.

The improvements needed in the instrumentation are expected to be identified and corrected prior to the next testing of snubbers.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

The changes in test procedure will apply to Unit 1 snubbers.