

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I! 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUL 3 1980

Report Nos. 50-424/80-10 and 50-425/80-10

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303

Facility Name: Plant Vogtle

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos. CPPR-108 and CPPR-109

Inspection at Vogtle site near Waynesboro, Georgia

Inspectors:

M. W. Hunt

M. Dones

Date Signed

7-1-80 Date Signed

Approved by:

K. Rausch, Acting Section Chief, RCES Branch

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 10-12, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 46 inspector-hours on site in the areas of noncompliance, concrete placement, material receipt and storage, reactor vessel nozzle inspection, concrete lab and batch plant, licensee identified items, and inspector followup items.

Results

Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in six areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency - Receipt Inspection Procedures, paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*K. M. Gillespie, Project Construction Manager

*H. H. Gregory, III, Assistant Project Construction Manager

*C. R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor

*W. R. Rountree, Mechanical QC Supervisor

*M. H. Googe, Assistant Manager, QC

*R. Osborne, Mechanical QC

*D. Pittman, Mechanical QC Inspection Supervisor

*E. L. Palmer, Drawing Control Supervisor

*D. A. Klinger, Senior QA Field Representative

*D. B. Ray, Mechanical Project Section Supervisor

*F. C. Warren, Electrical QC

J. McDonald, Assistant Warehouse Supervisor

Óther licensee employees contacted included ten technicians, and five office personnel.

Other Organizations

Bechtel Power Corporation (BCP)

*J. E. Mahlmeister, Project Engineer

*Z. Yazdani, Geotech Engineer

Walsh Construction Company (WCC)

*F. R. McCarty, Project Manager

*G. S. Wisen, QC Coordinator

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 12, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the noncompliance noted in paragraph 5. Fully approved documentation including revised procedures were presented by the licensee assuring that drawings required for the material receipt inspection will be made available. The inspectors informed the licensee that the actions taken were adequate and no response would be required.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Deficiency, 424/425/79-17-01, Failure to report deficiency in backfill - The licensee's response dated December 27, 1979 outlined the

corrective actions taken to insure reporting of deficiencies as defined in 10 CFR 50.55(e). The inspector also reviewed Field Procedure GD-A-06, Rev. 3, which reflected a complete rewrite to insure adequate reporting.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors performed a walk-through inspection of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings, the auxiliary building, concrete lab and batch plant, level D storage yards, and levels A&B storage in warehouses. Areas inspected included construction activities, calibration of laboratory scales and testing equipment, aggregate sampling, concrete placement A-08C-003, and QA audits.

The inspectors conducted an inspection of level D storage yards and levels A&B storage in warehouses. Areas inspected included proper assignment of storage levels, control of hold and/or nonconforming items, receiving inspection records, and identification of stored material. Items placed on hold (due to either lack of documentation, a nonconforming condition, or item inspection) are clearly marked and tagged as such, and then recorded in the Hold Tag Log. While reviewing the Hold Tag Log and receiving inspection reports, the inspectors found safety-related equipment was on "hold" (up to six months) for lack of inspection in order to verify compliance with vendor drawings. In each case the drawings had not been received on site, which prevented completion of the receipt inspection. Following further review by the inspectors, it was learned that an "open report log' is maintained by each Quality Control (QC) section and a monthly status is given on open receiving inspection reports, along with an explanation of why the report is open. The following are examples of open or incomplete receiving inspection reports due to lack of vendor drawings:

Report	Nos.			Date	Material	Received
5293R					01-23-	80
5295R					01-25-	80
6091R,	6092R,	, 6093R,	6106R	01-08-80		
6891R,	6893R				12-21-	79

After discussions with site personnel and review of Plant Vogtle Procedures DC-A-O1, Drawing Control, DC-A-O6, Document Control, and GD-A-30, Receipt, Receipt Inspection, Storage and Kandling, the inspector found that the aforementioned procedures do not establish responsibility for obtaining vendor drawings. This item is a deficiency identified as 424/425/80-10-01, "Receipt Inspection Procedure". The inspectors discussed this finding with responsible licensee personnel and immediate action was taken to correct the problem. Procedure DC-A-O1 has been revised delineating responsibility to Document Control personnel for obtaining vendor drawings, after notification by appropriate QC and/or Field Operations Engineering personnel. No

written response is required. This item is opened and closed in this report.

The inspectors reviewed receipt inspection, storage, and maintenance inspection records for the following safety-related pumps:

 Centrifugal Charging Pump
 Mark Tag # 2-1208-P6-001

 Centrifugal Charging Pump
 Mark Tag # 2-1208-P6-002

 Safety Injection Pump
 Mark Tag # 2-1208-P6-003

 Safety Injection Pump
 Mark Tag # 2-1208-P6-004

Records for storage and maintenance show that inspections are being performed regularly and in accordance with procedure GD-T-09, Inspection of Items in Storage and Storage Areas. While reviewing receipt inspection records for pump 2-1208-P6-001, the inspector found that the pump and motor arrived coupled together on May 6, 1980. The mechanical QC section performed the receipt inspection on the pump. However, records showed that receipt inspection had not been performed on the motor by electrical QC. This shows a lack of coordination and interface between mechanical and electrical QC when equipment arrives either coupled together or on the same shipping order, which requires receipt inspection by both sections. After further review and discussions with site personnel, the inspectors found that this problem area was also identified in QA audit WH01-80/15, "Audit of Warehouse and Storage Activities". This item is identified as inspector follow-up item 424/425/80-10-02, "Receipt Inspection Interface".

6. Licensee Identified Items (LII), 10 CFR 50.55(e)

(Closed) LII 425/80-04-01, Undermining of the Unit 2 control building electrical tunnel foundation. The licensee submitted a final report April 30, 1980. The repair work in this area has been observed by several inspectors during the various stages of repair. The damaged area was at elevation 150' 6". Backfill has now been placed in this area and the surrounding area to an elevation of 156' and service water controls have been established.

(Open) LII 424/425/80-10-03, Potential for centrifugal charging pumps to self distruct. The licensee reported that they are investigating this condition as the result of notification by the NSSS vendor that a Part 21 report had been filed with the NRC.

7. Reactor Vessel (RV) Nozzle Safe End Inspection

During this inspection representatives for the NSSS supplier (Westinghouse Electric Corporation (W)) and the vessel fabricator (Combustion Engineering (CE)) were examining the reactor vessel (RV) outlet nozzles. The examination consisted of etching the outlet nozzles weld preps to determine the thickness of the weld safe end. All etching and examination was performed by the W and CE representatives in accordance with procedures supplied by W. All work was observed by the licensee. Documentation of the inspection was prepared and will be maintained by the licensee.

The inspectors were advised that the least acceptable thickness was 1/2". The least thickness measured on any safe end was 17/32" on one section of nozzle identified as B-8310-4 on RV1. The inspectors were advised that 1/4" was actually acceptable but would require reevaluation to determine the welding procedure to be used.

In the areas examined, no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

8. IE Bulletin (IEB)

(Closed) IEB 79-13, 79-21, 79-27, 80-04 and 80-06. The listed IEBs either do not apply to Plant Vogtle or do not require an answer due to the phase of construction.

(Closed) IEB 80-03. The licensee advised RII on April 20, 1980 that the charcoal filters listed in this bulletin will not be used at Plant Vogtle.