


ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY



U-0163

L14-80(07-28)-9

500 SOUTH 27TH STREET, DECATUR, ILLINOIS 62525

July 28, 1980

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Director, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Clinton Power Station Unit 1  
Docket 50-461  
Construction Permit CPPR-137

On June 25, 1980, Illinois Power Company verbally notified Mr. H. M. Wescott of a potential reportable deficiency concerning deficient welds on containment spray piping (RHR) hangers. We have determined that this deficiency is reportable per 10CFR50.55(e)(iii). We have completed an investigation of this matter. This is the final report.

Investigation of Deficient Welds on Hangers Supporting the RHR  
Spray Piping in Containment Dome

1. Statement of Reportable Deficiency

It was found that some component support welds for the RHR spray piping in the containment dome section did not meet acceptance criteria. This was discovered during a routine surveillance performed by IP QA.

2. Investigation

The defective welds had been final inspected and accepted by Baldwin Associates (BA) inspectors. Consequently, a complete reinspection of the entire fifty-nine (59) welds on the RHR hangers was performed by BA. It was found that twenty-nine (29) welds were unacceptable because of excessive undercut, incorrect weld size, and slag.

It was determined that two welding inspectors were involved with the final inspection of these welds. These inspectors had failed to adhere to the acceptance criteria for visual inspection. Nonconformance Report 3402 was written to document this matter. Corrective Action Request 055 was then initiated to ensure proper and complete corrective action.

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3. Corrective Action

Upon identification of the two welding inspectors, BA immediately suspended them from the inspection program. After further evaluation of these inspectors' performance, one inspector was terminated. The other inspector was retrained and recertified.


A reinspection of all welds previously inspected by the two inspectors was performed by BA. The results were documented on Nonconformance Report 3463. The additional defective welds found during this reinspection were repaired.

A periodic inspection verification program has been implemented for the inspector who was retrained to ensure compliance with inspection criteria. Training sessions have also been conducted to instruct all other BA welding inspectors on the requirements of proper visual weld inspection. Welding inspection supervisors have been instructed to closely monitor welding inspection activities in the future.

The actions taken, as described herein, are considered to be sufficient to avoid recurrence of this condition. The corrective action taken by BA has been verified. Corrective Action Request 055 has been closed out.

We trust that the information provided in this final report submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(iii) is sufficient for your analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and the corrective action.

Sincerely,



L. J. Koch  
Vice President

dl

cc: Director, Office of I & E, NRC, Washington, D.C.  
H. H. Livermore, NRC Resident Inspector