

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
ATLANTA, GA  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

TIC

20 JUL 18 A 8:46 15, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - BULLETIN IEB 79-27 - LOSS OF  
NON-CLASS IE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM BUS DURING  
OPERATION

Enclosed is TVA's response to IEB 79-27 dated November 30, 1979, for  
the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant unit 1. TVA's review of this matter has  
found no deficiencies as a result of this review.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch  
with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN IEB 79-27  
LOSS OF NON-CLASS IE INSTRUMENTATION  
AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM BUS DURING OPERATION

Item 1a: We have identified all class 1E and nonclass 1E buses which supply power to safety- and nonsafety-related instrumentation and control systems that are required to achieve cold shutdown.

As a result of this review, we believe that, for each bus identified, the system design is more than adequate to ensure that at least one source of power is available to each bus at all times.

As a part of this review, we examined in detail the alarm and/or indication provided in the control room which alerts the operator of the loss of power to the bus. No deficiencies were discovered as a result of this review.

Item 1b: We have performed an analysis of each bus identified in item 1a and have evaluated the effects of a sustained loss of power to the instrument and control system loads supplied by each bus required to achieve cold shutdown. No deficiencies were discovered as a result of this evaluation.

Item 1c: At the present time, no design modifications are being proposed as a result of the reviews and analysis undertaken for items 1a and 1b.

We are continuing our review of the results of the analysis. Should deficiencies or design-related defects be discovered as a result of the review process, the appropriate design modifications will be scheduled and implemented.

Items 2a,  
2b, 2c:

As of July 9, 1980, the appropriate emergency procedures have been prepared to include the information requested in items 2a, 2b, and 2c. These emergency procedures are presently being reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and will be approved and issued for use before the issuance of the full power operating license. There are no design changes or administrative controls to be implemented as a result of the preparation and review of these emergency procedures.

Item 3: We have reviewed IE Circular 79-02, "Failure of 120-V Vital AC Power Supplies," dated January 11, 1979. As a result of this review, we have determined that there are no deliberate time-delay circuits utilized in the vital and preferred 120-V ac power supplies for unit 1 at Sequoyah. The inherent response times of the circuits are adequate and acceptable, and proper undervoltage settings have been verified. No modifications to the design or administrative controls are required as a result of IE Circular 79-02.