U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/80-15

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Nuclear Power Station

Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH

Inspection Conducted: May 12-16, 19-23, 28-30; June 2-6, 9-10, 1980

Inspector: L. A. Reyes for D. E. Boyd 6-24-80

Approved By: T. H. Tambling, Acting Chief for D. E. Boyd 6-24-80
Reactor Projects Section 2-2

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 12-16, 19-23, 28-30, June 2-6, 9-10, 1980 (Report No. 50-346/80-15)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of followup on previous inspection findings, long term shutdown, IE Circular followup and licensee event report. The inspection involved 129 inspector-hours during regular shift and 29 inspector-hours during offshifts by the resident inspector.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in three areas; one item of apparent noncompliance was identified in the other area (Deficiency - failure to notify the NRC Operations Center as required by 10 CFR 50.72 - Paragraph 3)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*T. Murray, Station Superintendent
B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer
G. Wells, Administrative Coordinator
D. Miller, Operations Engineer
D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist
J. Hickey, Training Supervisor
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
*C. Daft, Operations QA Manager
G. Grime, Nuclear Security Manager
*D. Huffman, Administrative Coordinator

*Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 10, 1980.

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and health physics staff.

2. Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved item (50-346/80-06-01): The inspector reviewed the approved copy of procedure ST 5061.01 and determined that appropriate guidance had been included for containment sample, volume change corrections and data rejection.

3. Inspection During Long Term Shutdown

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of May 12 through June 10, 1980. The inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity. Tours of the containment, turbine and auxiliary buildings accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper/bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and

verified the implementation of radioactive waste system controls. The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

3. Inspection During Long Term Shutdown

During the review of the control room 1065 the inspector determined that during the implementation of FCR 79-0421 on May 13, 1980, an accidental release of 3.7E-04 curies of xenon-133 occurred when maintenance personnel cut on the wrong side of the tagged and isolated relief valve. The NRC Operations Center was not notified.

The inspector also determined that on June 2, 1980, a tornado warning was in effect at the Davis-Besse station. Procedure AD 1827.06 "Tornado Emergency Procedure" is an implementing procedure of the emergency plan and was being implemented at the time. The NRC Operations Center was not notified. 10 CFR 50.72 requires nuclear power reactor licensees to notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of any accidental release (normal or expected releases from maintenance or other operational activities are not included) and of any event requiring the initiation of any section of the licensee's emergency plan. This is an item of noncompliance of the deficiency level.

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

79-18 "Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves.

79-25 "Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference".

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

LER's 79-62, 79-74, 79-89, 79-94

LER 80-40

On May 13, 1980, the licensee determined by underwater TV camera that the holddown spring on a fuel assembly in the core was broken. In a more detailed inspection conducted May 16, and May 17, a total of 11 broken, cracked or potentially broken holddown springs have been identified out of 112 fuel assemblies inspected. There are 65 fuel assemblies that have not been inspected yet. These assemblies have control rods or neutron sources in them. The holddown spring located in the upper end of the fuel assembly provides a positive holddown margin to oppose hydraulic forces in the up direction.

Two broken springs and two good springs have been removed from fuel assemblies located in the spent fuel pool. These removed springs were shipped to B&W in Lynchburg, Virginia on May 21, 1980, for analysis. B&W has stated that all holddown springs in Davis-Besse first core were from the same metal heat. Underwater TV inspection of a fuel assembly with a broken spring and two control rods removed from fuel assemblies that had broken springs showed no degradation.

The inspector witnessed the underwater TV inspection performed on May 20, 1980, and reviewed procedure MC 7500.10 used for the removal of the holddown springs.

A meeting was held on June 10, 1980 when B&W and the licensee presented their findings to NRR. The inspector will continue to follow the licensee corrective action for the removal and replacement of the holddown springs.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 10, 1980 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.