MRC FORM 366 (7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: -
PATMIT 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CON'T REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 7 0 6 1 8 8 0 8 0 7 1 8 8 0 9
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During Recovery Mode of Operation (cold shutdown, decay heat removal) the Unit 2
Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was removed from service on June 18, 1980. June 19 it was real-
o 4 ized that Unit 1 Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was not aligned to the fire suppression header.
This resulted in having only 2 fire pumps aligned to the header in violation of
O 16 Tech. Spec. 3.7.10.1 which requires 3 of 4. The event is considered reportable un-
ol7 der Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.9.b. The event had no effect on the plant, its operation,
or the health and safety of the public.
SYSTEM CAUSE CODE SUBCODE SUBC
17 REPORT 8 0
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (22) STAMITED FORM SUB. SUPLER SUPLE (25) Z 9 9 9 9 26
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [1 10] Before removing Unit 2 FS-P-1 from service, the Unit 2 control room assured opera-
ment to the fire suppression's header. This resulted in not having Unit 1 FS-P-1
religioned to the header when needed Unit 1 FS-P-1 was aligned to the header. Sub-
sequently, procedures are being revised to reflect a permanent valve lineup change.
STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 1 5 X 28 0 0 0 29 Recovery Mode C 31 Operator Observation 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 11 44 45 46 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A 45
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 N/A
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES (AT)
NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 N/A
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43
PUBLICITY AS MANAGER 19
ISSUED DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION BOOK 32 TO 8 N/A
NAME OF PREPARER Steven D. Chaplin PHONE (717) 948-8461

NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-II

LER 80-026/03L-0 EVENT DATE - June 18, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

The Unit II River Water Intake Diesel Fire Pump (FS-P-1) was removed from service at 1030 hours on June 18, 1980, for the safety of divers that were cleaning sludge from the Unit II screen house intake. At 1630 hours on June 19, 1980, it was discovered that a Unit II valve (FS-V5) was closed, isolating the Unit I Circulating Water Flume Diesel Fire Pump (Unit I, FS-P-1) from the fire suppression header. FS-V5 is a bypass valve around a checkvalve which dedicates the Unit I pump FS-P-1 to the Unit I cooling towers portion of the Tire protection system. This resulted in having only two (2) of the three (3) remaining Operable pumps aligned to the header. This was a violation of Technical Specifications 3.7.10.1.a which requires that three (3) fire pumps be Operable and aligned to the header.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Before removing FS-P-1 from service, the Unit II control room did not adequately communicate with the Unit I control room as to both the Operability and alignment to the fire suppression header of the three (3) Unit I fire pumps. Inquiry was made about the three (3) pumps Operability but not specifically their alignment.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit II facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the A steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

Valve FS-V5 was opened to align the Unit I pump (FS-P-1) with the fire suppression header.

LONG TERM

The valve (FS-V5) position has been changed from a normally closed to a normally open position to eliminate the necessity of cycling the valve every time a fire pump is removed and returned to service. Applicable Unit I and Unit II procedures are being revised to reflect this change. NOTE: This change does not affect Unit to Unit notifications of changes in fire pump Operability.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA