NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	O H D B S 1 (2)	Ø Ø - Ø Ø N P F - Ø 3 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
	LICENSEE CODE (9–14)	LICENSE NUMBER (15–25)	LICENSE TYPE (26–30)	CAT (57–58)

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE	L (6)	Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6 (7)	Ø 8 Ø 6 7 9 (8)	Ø 8 1 7 7 9 (9)
		(60)	DOCKET NUMBER (61–68)	EVENT DATE (69–74)	REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During a review of Facility Change Request 79-259, it was determined that a reportable
0 3 event may have occurred. The containment air coolers service water outlet valves
0 4 failed to meet the response time specified in T.S. Table 3.3-5. Since these valves are
0 5 automatically regulated by inlet air temperature they may at times have been closed
0 6 enough to preclude operation within the specified time. The coolers were functional;
0 7 only the service water outlet valve may have been affected. Also, the redundant con-
0 8 tainment spray systems were fully operable. There was no effect on public or personnel safety.

(NP-32-79-10)

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S B (11)	B (12)	A (13)	V A L V O P (14)	D (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	Ø 8 4	/	Ø 1	T	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
F (18)	F (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	X (25)	H Ø 3 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The valves pneumatic actuators were designed with an undersized air opening. The valves
1 1 have now been forced full open by changing controller setpoints from 120 to 50°F.
1 2 The valve actuating mechanisms redesign will be implemented to correct the stroke
1 3 time.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	1 Ø Ø (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Test

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	Ø Ø Ø (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	Ø Ø Ø (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

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VR 79-126 NAME OF PREPARER James P. Rudolph PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 299

GPO 917-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-79-10

DATE OF EVENT: August 6, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Slow response on containment air cooler service water outlet valves

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2772, and Load (Gross MWE) = 920.

Description of Occurrence: During a review of Facility Change Request 79-259, it was determined that a reportable event may have occurred in that the containment air coolers service water outlet isolation valves failed to meet the response time requirements of 45 seconds from Table 3.3-5 of Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 requires two operable coolers in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Since the valves in question are automatically regulated by the cooler inlet air temperature, the valves may have been throttled to the extent that at times they would not have opened within the allowable time. Therefore, this incident is being reported as per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The valve actuating circuit has a design deficiency. The long response time of the valves is due to the slow bleedoff of air from the valve's pneumatic actuator.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The containment air coolers were functional in all modes of operation; only the response time of the service water valves may have been somewhat degraded.

Corrective Action: Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-259 had been previously written and implemented on June 25, 1979 to change the setpoints on the air cooler service water outlet valve controllers from 120°F to 50°F. This forces the valves to remain in a full open position thereby eliminating the response time requirement.

FCR 79-280 was initiated to modify the valve actuating apparatus on SW 1356, 1357, and 1358 to bring their response times within the required limits.

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Failure Data: There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences.