
-	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
2	NOCLEAR REGULATORI COMMISSION
3	BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
4	(Closed to Public Attendance)
5	
6	Chairman's Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.
7	Washington, D. C.
8	Tuesday, July 10, 1979
9	The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m.
	Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
10	
11	PRESENT:
12	Chairman Hendrie
	Commissioner Gilinsky
13	Cormissioner Kennedy Cr. missioner Bradford
14	Commissioner Ahearne
15	ALSO PRESENT:
16	J. Boright, DOS G. Helfrich, DOS
17	L. Nosenzo, DOS
10	T. Pickering, DO J. Merzel, ACDA
18	H. Bengelsdorf, DOE
19	J. Ebetino, DOE R. Liimatainen, DOS
20	NRC: J. Becker, R. Burnett, K. Cohen, J. Devine
21	W. Dircks, G. Eysymontt, T. Gibbon, V. Harding D. Hassell, M. Peterson, I. Rothschild, J. Shea,
22	T. Sherr, J. Stephens.
23	
24	(NOTE: This transcript was produced from a tape recording, July 24, 1979.)
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PROCEEDINGS

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2	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I have now started the tape
3	machine.
4	This is a meeting of the Commission, a briefing by
5	the Executive Branch on International Safeguards. It is a
6	closed meeting of the Commission, and the classification level,
7	so far as I know is Confidential.
8	Is that adequate, Tom?
9	MR. PICKERING: I think, at this point, Joe, that would
10	be adequate. We would like to signal if it becomes inadequate.
11	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, please. People keep in mind
12	if the classification level should go up, stop and say so before
13	you get some material on the record beyond the Confidential level.
14	I guess our purpose here is to provide us all an
15	opportunity to discuss what NRC conceives to be its information
16	needs with regard to IAEA safeguards as they relate to U.S.
17	exports, and in particular, matters in countries, specific
18	information, and in general, unresolved items associated with
19	the proposed format for Executive Branch analysis, which we have
20	been creating a certain amount of discussion on over the last
21	weeks.
22	Jim, if I stop there, can you provide us with the
23	balance of any preface that we need.
23	MR. SHEA: Right, if I might just say a little bit
	about the scope here today.
25	I believe we want to focuse primarily on the question

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1	of safeguards information needs, and the exchange of letters
2	that you had with Tom. If possible, I think it might be
3	desirable to talk a little bit about the question of technical
4	economic justifications for high-enriched uranium and plutonium
5	exports, although I think we have made a good deal of progress
6	in talking to Lou on that issue an on the other stems in the
7	format, in a meeting we had yesterday, which if time permits
8	I think we can discuss these at the end, the proposed approach
9	that State had on that and where we stand in relation to the
10	format.
11	I think basically, we should focus on safeguards and
12	cover that as far as you can and let the others fill in at the
13	end.
14	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay. Tom.
15	MR. PICKERING: Thank you, Joe.
16	I would just like to say we appreciate the opportunity
17	to come back and talk to you further about this question. I hope
18	that as a result of this discussion, we might all end up, both
19	on our side and your side, with a clear sense of what are the
	pieces of information which are prepared and exchanged or
20	provided to you, and what are the limitations and our capacity
21	to acquire information.
22	I want to address first, what we provide you, the answer
23	to which is essentially very simple. It is encompassed in
24	the one word, "all". Then talk to you about our limitations
25	on the acquisition of information, which I think has some

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1 concerns both on our part and your part that we need to clarify
2 and get out on the table.

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Finally, talk to you a little bit about how we see
the statute and its relationship to information in terms of
the jobs both of us have to do with respect to foreign licensing.

Jim mentioned, and I should say initially, the question of economic and technical data in connection with the highlyenriched uranium shipments. We are prepared to address that.

9 I should say as a matter of introduction that my 10 expertise in the area of safeguards is a great deal more 11 superficial than my expertise in other areas, which, in this particular range of activity is also superficial. I brought 12 13 Lou and John, and Hal Bengelsdorf from the DOE, together with Jorge Menzel from ACDA to handle the indepth questions, which 14 I know you are going to want to get into which will go far 15 beyond my own competence. I expect probably to learn a great 16 deal more in the next hour or so than ,I can impart. 17

Nevertheless, I have put down some initial ideas and want to run over those with you as a way of introduction, and perhaps we can move from there, if you want, to specific questions that we have.

The first question that I think we should address is the issue of provision of information to the NRC by the State Department and the Executive Branch. As I indicated in my opening remarks, I frankly, don't think we have an issue here, but we have been advised through staff that there is still some uncertainty in the Commission.

3 As I stated in my letter to Joe, guote: "... all of 4 the information obtained through these various routes is 5 available to the NRC," unquote. I want to make it clear 6 that the NRC ought to have, in our mind, and does have access 7 to all information. I want to catalogue for you want we mean by "all information," because I think we ought to put, clearly 8 on record, what it is that we conclude is the corpus of 9 information from which we derive the word "all". 10

First, we would put confidential briefings such as this one and discussions with the Executive Branch, and all matters of interest to the NRC, and I repeat again, we are always prepared to come and discuss with you, either at your initiative or if there are issues, I would feel that it would be proper in my case to take my own initiative to come to you. Secondly, the SIR and the apalyses that we have made

of it or that have been made of it in the Executive Branch.

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
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6	We certainly, , want to make available
7	to you, the relevant Executive Branch instructions, policy
8	papers, analyses and summaries. These are often contained in
9	the cables, and therefore, we routinely and regularly distribute
10	those to you.
11	Full participation in the NRC staff in the action plan,
12	which we have worked out, and together, we have worked with
13	the IAEA in which the staff participates.
14	Finally, the access that you all have directly to
15	senior IAEA officials, Grumm and Erklund, for example, both
16	available to you and to the NRC staff in Vienna and Washington.
17	Now, there is only one further caveat which comes
18	to mind that I should mention with respect to detailed
19	information.
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7	I also want to say, as I have said before up here,
8	that our proposal is to work with the NRC in a program to
9	improve the state systems of accounting and control in this
10	particular area.
11	Now let me, if I can for a minute, address the question,
12	which I think is important, and I hope it would be of value to
13	you, to have an understanding on this, what we consider to be
14	the limitations on the availability of information. This
15	basically extends from the nature of the safeguards system
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The principal element of safeguards, as we see it, is the general respect for the confidentiality of information which is obtained by the IAEA. This is true on grounds of proprietary, as well as other concerns of the inspected state. We are committed to this, as you well know, through our Board and agency memberships, as well as a party to the safeguards agreements. It was interesting, just as a sidelight, in my discussions w. h John Glenn on the voluntary offer, a couple of weeks ago on the Hill , The issue: "How are we going to protect the proprietary information given by U.S. firms in the IAEA system," We had to make the case, as I believe we should make the case, that it is a system based on confidentiality. Confidentiality, in our judgment, has to cut both ways.

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7	The U.S. has had a very good working relationship with
2	the IAEA, and on a large part, this is because we have taken
3	a very supportive position with the agency. I would like to
4	mention here the technical programs that we have worked out
5	to assist the agency and our recognized serious interest as
6	a country in the objective of non-proliferation; to say nothing,
7	obviously, with the great impetus we gave originally at the
8	beginning of the agency.
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1	SIR. We believe that this is a common objective that we both
2	share, and one that we should continue to move ahead on.
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4	The basic approach of the IAEA, as you know, is that
5	it applies a general uniform set of safeguards which treats
6	similar plants in different countries on a similar basis, or
7	on a common basis.
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14	There is, as you know, generic information available.
15	This comes to you in the form through the SIR of such things
16	as how the IAEA is going to approach safeguards on LWRs as a
17	matter of general interest.
18	Country-specific information on a comprehensive basis
19	is not available, and we don't believe necessarily it would be
20	useful in improvement of safeguards. The SIR is a better
21	overview and an indication of how the type of export will be
22	covered, rather than a country-specific indication of past
23	practices.
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Now, let me briefly address what is basically, at this point, a theological question, but one, nevertheless, I think is on your mind, and therefore, we probably should come to grips with.

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Let me say, in beginning the preface to the addressing of the theological issue that it is theological .n my judgment, because at the moment, within the constraints of what we can obtain you do receive all information. I have no hesitancy in saying it. Therefore, it may apply more to the theology within the constraints of information, what more should be attempted to be acquired, rather than anything else.

However, in that context let me just state that as we tried to make clear in the letter of last December, we are concerned and we would like the Commission to be careful to distinguish between three principal factors with respect to information.

One, information required to determine whether specific export criteria are satisfied in the main things that appear in Section 127.

Information of importance in making the further judgment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act that an export will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

Finally, the third point, information which the
Commission believes desirable as background in examining
particular export cases.
Now, specifically we believe that Section 127(1),
which states that guards. "TAPA safeguards, as required by

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8 which states that, quote: "IAEA safeguards, as required by 9 Article 23 of the Treaty will be applied..." unquote, does 10 not require a judgment, in our feeling, as to the adequacy of 11 safeguards.

In our view, this requires an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and that IAEA safeguards are being applied, including on-site inspections, access, sampling, measurements on which to arrive at conclusions regarding the diversion or misuse of nuclear material or equipment. Those sorts of things.

By contrast, under Criterion 3 the Congress specifically provided that such a determination be made with respect to physical security by indicating, quote: "... adequate physical security measures will be maintained..." unquote; and secondly, that the Commission issue regulations to establish appropriate levels of protection to provide a basis for the determination of adequacy.

Finally, the Executive Branch believes that the

1	adequacy of safeguards probably falls into the second
2	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tom, could I interrupt there?
3	MR. PICKERING: Yes.
4	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Those are the views of your
5	Counsel as well, I assume?
6	MR. PICKERING: We have consulted with our lawyer on
7	this, is that right?
8	MR. NOSENZO: Yes.
9	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I just wanted to be sure, and
10	that they reflect his judgments as to the legislative history.
11	MR. NOSENZO: That's right.
12	MR. PICKERING: Finally, the Executive Branch
13	believes that the adequacy of safeguards probably falls into
14	the second category, that is, information which should be
15	considered along with other pertinent information concerning
16	a country's non-proliferation credentials in making the overall
17	inimicality determination. That is related more to the
18	special cases where inimicality might become a serious question
19	rather than to the large number of routine questions where the
20	inimicality question can probably be answered by the enumerated
21	criteria of Section 127.
22	Now, that's a theological view. I think it might be
23	useful if you want to talk further about it, but I would just
24	urge that as we talk further about it, we talk about it against
25	the backdrop that we have tried to make clear in our first
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. 1	initial point that the information which is available to us
2	is also available to you, and we work hard to try to make it
3	available to you.
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12	That, Joe, is an overview. I recognize that doesn't
13	answer all questions, but I hope it provides enough of a
	beginning point and food for thought to carry forward with your
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15	own concerns.
16	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let me see if other Commissioners
17	who haven't had a chance to comment have any questions.
18	Vic?
19	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes. You referred to this
20	question as to what the safeguards information applies to, with
21	part of our responsibilities as a theological question, but you
22	made a pretty strong point of it in your letter.
23	I must say that I am a little troubled about you
24	interpreting our responsibilities for us, but I would like to
25	clarify, just to get it clear, just exactly what it is you are

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saying. Are you saying that there is no information about the safeguards that is relevant to the determination in Criterion 1?

MR. PICKERING: We are saying basically that the
existence of a safeguards regime and the carrying out of
inspections is relevant. Those kinds of information. Let
me just give you the point here.

7 In our view, this requires an appropriate safeguards
8 agreement with the IAEA, and that IAEA safeguards are being
9 applied, which includes on-site inspections, access, sampling,
10 measurements and so forth.

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How do we know that they are 12 being applied?

13 Let me put it this way: Is it fair to ask, in your 14 view, whether the IAEA is meeting its own standards here?

MR. PICKERING: Yes, I believe it is.

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16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, it seems to me, at that 17 point, you have to begin to ask, watching the inspection pretty 18 closely and so on. I mean, that gets you right into the 19 details of even if you don't reach the question of whether 20 those standards are themselves adequate compared to something 21 else. These are matters that are not that covered by the 22 confidentiality of the IAEA.

I'm not suggesting that there is an easy answer to this, but, in fact, just the opposite. I don't think there is any way of evading the questions of just what is the IAEA up

to, Even if one doesn't reach the question of: "Is their standards, in fact, adequate?" So I think it is highly relevant in the usual exports.

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4 MR. PICKERING: Let me just make a statement, Vic, that I don't think there is an issue of whether adequacy of safeguards is relevant to the exports or not. I think we all agree that the adequacy of safeguards is an important element. I think the discussion that we are having was, in the determination of meeting Criteria 1 is adequate -- Is that where you take adequacy into consideration, or do you take adequacy into consideration more broadly in terms of the inimicality of the situation?

Our reading of it is that what the Criteria 1 gets 13 at and is legally, and the legislative history supports that, is 14 whether there is a safeguards agreement there, whether the IAEA 15 is, in fact, implementing safeguards. 16

17 MR. PICKERING: No. Without recourse to the 18 standards, but rather, are they implementing safeguards as they 19 generally do throughout the world. 20

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Up to its own standards?

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How do you know that? MR. PICKERING: We have, for example, queried them at your request, and we are doing it -- now they have included in the SIR, an indication, first of all, where there are facility attachments to indicate that there are procedures for

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implementing those safeguards. Where the facility attachments are not in place, we have gotten assurances from the IAEA that they will apply them in an ad hoc such that they can have reasonable assurance ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You see, I'm not about to say 5 the detailed investigation of the actual performance in the IAEA 6 is required in every case to meet the requirements of the law 7 here, but I am pretty firm in the view that information about 8 the performance of the IAEA is not irrelevant to your finding 9 Should you have information that says that in Criteria 1. 10 they are not doing what they are supposed to be doing, I think 11 that's highly relevant. 12

Now, there is a certain presumption here that the system is applied in the way that we expect it to be applied, but that doesn't mean that if we have information suggesting othewise, that it doesn't affect the judgment on that criterion, or that in certain circumstances one may want to assure one's self that is, in fact, true.

MR. PICKERING: Nor does it suggest that if we by the information otherwise, you don't have it.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well ---

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MR. PICKERING: Or that that's going to be withheld, if you want to put it that way.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY. Okay, well, that's the way I take your remarks, but what then do you mean when you say, "In

1	that light we believe that it is clear that Section 127(1) and
2	so on, does not require a judgment of the adequacy of IAEA
3	safeguards?"
4	MR. PICKERING: We believe that the question of
5	country-specific adequacy is related more to a finding of
6	inimicality than it is to a finding of Criterion 1 that
7	safeguards are applied.
8	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Having said that, Tom, can
9	you describe what you mean and how you see it applying in the
10	context of inimicality? How is it done? Who does it?
11	What does it comprise?
12	MR. PICKERING: I would say that as questions of
13	inimicality, let's look at a more specific issue.
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Is that relevant? I think that that's the sort of distinction we want to make here.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess I'm still not clear.
From what Lou says -- this is just a little box and
you check it if there is an agreement and that is what I am
interpreting what Lou is saying.

Now, that's not the way I interpret it, and it is not clear to me how you interpret it. On the one hand it is clear that you don't think that a specific finding of adequacy in each case is required, but is information on the safeguards performance in the IAEA relevant to a finding in or or is it not relevant?

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think everybody must agree that 13 something further than checking the box is reasonable, because 14 we ask at some body's request or other whether there is a 15 facility attachment, and if not, is it clear that indeed there 16 will be appropriate inspection activities. As far as I know, 17 State has supplied that information both on their side and 13 ours, at least this further, maybe sub-box under the 19 Criterion 1 box. Everybody must feel this is a further check 20 It is something beyond just a simple check. on them. 27

MR. PICKERING: I suppose that as another sub-box is, are inspections being carried out? Is the process going forward where it needs to go forward?

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

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3 4 5 6 MR. PICKERING: In terms of Criterion 1. 7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, probably capability over 8 inimicality, too. 9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: If I misunderstood you, 10 I would like to have it corrected, and Lou seems to think that 11 I mischaracterized that. 12 MR. NOSENZO: Yes, I think you did. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I would like to have that 14 corrected, the mischaracterization corrected. 15 But certainly the impression I got from your letter 16 was that: . "Sure, we are going to supply you that information, 17 but let's be clear that this has to do with inimicality and 18 has nothing to do with Criterion 1." 19 I guess what I'm saying is, I think it has a lot to 20 do with Criterion 1, depending on the nature of the information. 21 22 23 MR. PICKERING: That's the important point, Vic. 24 I think what we have to try to distinguish here 25 is basically a notion that I hope you will understand.

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14	I'm saying that that causes a serious amount of
15	political and other damage to the system if we have to go
16	through that.
17	Now, maybe this is a question of making the
18	theology fit the case.
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24	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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11	MR. PICKERING: Now look. Without accepting your
12	characterization, there is no question at all that we both
13	join together in an action plan, and one aspect of this is,
14	obviously, to achieve to the extent that we can, declassification
15	in the IAEA context of safeguards confidential information
16	which clearly doesn't warrant that sort of protection.
17	So I don't think we have ignored that, and I think
18	that that's an important aspect of where we ought to be going
19	and the kinds of ways that we ought to be proceeding.
20	COMMISSIONEF GILINSKY:
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23	MR. PICKERING Lou, do you want to talk about that.
24	MR NOSENZO:
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l	MR. SHEA: We could get into that at 3:00 this
2	afternoon.
3	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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5	MR. SHEA: Okay.
6	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Good, I won't declare the level
7	raised then.
8	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me make just one more
9	comment.
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21	MR. PICKERING: I think that we, obviously, come at
22	this with somewhat different presumptions, and they may come
23	as the result of the different jobs we have to do, Vic, but it
24	seems to me that we have made a conscious policy decision to
25	have the IAEA perform the safeguards role internationally.

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2	That's the basis in which we have started.
3	We recognize that that has disadvantages, because
	we are not in complete control of the situation. We recognize
4	that we are willing to accept those on the basis of the fact
5	that we have strong U.S. participation, we even have U.S.
6	inspectors.
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11	we should presume,
12	particularly in cases where the country's credentials are good,
13	that it is working, at least adequately.
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18	I think that may be a different perception
19	than the one you feel incumbent on you in the NRC to take, but
	it is clear we have got a different set of starting points or
20	this if that's the case.
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22	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tom, could you elucidate a little bit on your view of the extent to which the United States has a, and I think the word was used, "oversight" responsibility in connection with IAEA's performance of its safeguard function? MR. PICKERING: Well, I would think -- I'm not an expert on this and I will call on my experts in a minute, but I would think as a responsible member of the agencies and as a member of the Board of Governors, we have a responsibility in that context to be sure that we are satisfied that the agency is doing its job or if it is not doing its job, it is doing all that it can in the context of an international agency, and all of, that implies, to pull up its socks. I think we have generally felt that to be the case, but, Lou, do you want to add anything on that? MR. NOSENZO: Our agreements, the way we have interpreted them, generally with our fallback safeguard rights,

if we believe that the agency is not applying safeguards on an
effective basis that we have the right to apply safegards
bilaterally. But I think what we have been trying to do is to
recognizing that the IAEA is not a perfect instrument, and I
think the point that we made previously, it doesn't have to be
a perfact instrument, but it has to be effective somehow,
quote: "effective" in deterring countries from diverting
material. Then the question is: What represents this level
of capability that would provide that effective return?
We push very hard to get the IAEA to accept, as a first
step, self-analysis, a critical analysis, the SIR. It started
with the Special Safeguards Implementation Report and now it is
routine every year.
We have pressed on the agency very hard that this is
a fine first step, but if you don't follow up on the things that
are in the SIR and identify it as deficiencies, that it seems
like the job is only half done, to keep identifying the same
deficiencies year after year does not make a lot of sense if
it is not in the interest of the agency. So we have been
pressing very hard on them, on Grumm, on E¢klund and on Fisher,
to set up a task force which would be specifically oriented to
try to correct some of these problems. And they are in the
process of doing it. It is very hard to get them to do it,
for a number of reasons. Budgetary reasons, reluctance by the
Board members chemselves to have the agency Secretariat look

at countries on a country-specific basis, but I think we are making some progress there. It takes a lot of pressure and a lot of work.

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4 But I guess the point I'm trying to make is that 5 we, including not only the Executive Branch, but the NRC people, 6 are trying to push on the agency, in a generic sense, to apgrade 7 safeguards and to insure that they meet at least a minimum 8 effectiveness that will allow us to be able to take the statement 9 of the agency when it makes it in the SIR that in their view 10 there have been no significant diversions of material on its 11 face value, and believe it. But I think that this problem is 12 one that we have to tackle generically and examine generically, which we have been doing, rather than on a country-specific 13 basis. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 With regard to your comment, Vic, on a lot of the 21 information that is safeguards confidential and it shouldn't 22 be, I don't think there is anybody that disagrees with that. 23 We may disagree on certain aspects of it, but we have been 24 working hard as part of the action plan as well, to try to get 25

l	the agency to try to declassify some of this stuff, to make it
2	generally available. I think the facility attachment, the
3	one that they are now publishing, is a good example of some
4	success that we have had.
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14	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
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16	MR. NOSENZO:
17	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes
18	MR. NOSENZO: Yes.
19	MR. PICKERING: Vic, could I say one thing, because
20	it seems to me we may be coming from pretty far apart from
21	some of the things you have said, at least, leads me to believe
22	that in practical terms, we can talk about it in the operational
23	terms, we are not so far apart, if there is a general acceptance
24	on your part that leaving aside our differing views in the
25	theology, which must remain, I suppose, differing views given

1	from where we come from, but I think are less relevant to the
2	answer than the fact is,
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12	Now, if it is the other way around, you will certainly,
13	as a member of the Commission, want to stand on your view of
14	the Commission's legislative responsibilities, and I can't,
15	again, say that. I can only give you mine or the Executive
16	Branch's views.
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19	That
20	may be something that is more discussable, more rettled by
21	staff, and something that is a little more amenable to reaching
22	an agreement between us than the question of trying to argue
23	the issue of where we both come from on it.
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3	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I wonder if I could make a
4	couple of comments.
5	It appeared to me before, and I think the meeting
6	has really just reconfirmed or reemphasized that you might
7	say that in my view there are at least there were three
8	questions and they are of a different character.
9	First is, should the NRC address adequacy? And
10	that's your theological point, Tom. And I think that there are
11	several differences that are not only where we are, but it is
12	the overall approach. I think the State Department, by its
13	general nature, approaches things in a more or less subjective
14	fashion, and
15	MR. PICKERING: I think that's a nice comment.
16	Not very often do people say that. We should get those
17	inscribed in bronze.
18	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Did you say "objective"?
19	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I said, subjective.
20	MR. PICKERING: Oh, I thought you said "objective".
21	(Laughter)
22	MR. PICKERING: A communications problem.
23	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Whereas, I think a regulatory
24	agency tends to try through the regulations, particularly, I
25	think when you get it down to the NRC staff that is in the

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business of trying to examine, for example, domestically, we have such regulations which we apply. Here are what are 3 required to be met, are they met. There is certain detailed 4 information that has to be provided to ensure that they are 5 met, and then it, at least in principle, is a straightfoward 6 conclusion, yes or no.

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7 Therefore, when a regulatory agency is brought into 8 this arena of trying to assess something in the international 9 sphere in working with the State Department you have this 10 fundamental conflict. On the one hand, your mode is to work 11 with -- you work with so many grey areas so often that I think you feel a lot more comfortable in trying to address or reach 12 a resolution of an issue pulling together all of those gray 13 areas. Whereas a regulatory staff is very uncomfortable in 14 that and will attempt to acquire the kind of detailed 15 information that they are more comfortable with, and in their 16 view, if you have a statute that says something that's the 17 way you live up to a statute. 18

Now, it gets down into this question of whether or 19 not the statute requires us to make an NRC determination of 20 adequacy. Now, adequacy, in our view I think, or at least in 21 the staff's view would end up being adequacy as the same 22 question of Erwin with regard to fuel services. Do they have 23 adequate safeguards? 24

I wouldn't be surprised, no matter how hard we have .

1	worked to resolve this, at some point then we have to go back
2	to the Congress and ask them, "What did you really have in
	mind?" You people are a lot more familiar with the background
3	and history. I have not read that much on it, but what little
4	and history. I have not read that there is a conscious I have read, it appears to me that there is a conscious
5	I have read, it appears to me that emphasize the second second at the part of many of the participants not to resolve
6	decision on the part of many of the provide ambiguity, and at that issue, and as a result there is this ambiguity, and at
7	that issue, and as a result there is that is what extent can
8	some point we probably will have to face, to what extent can
9	we meet our type of regulatory conclusion and see if the
10	Congressional view is that they wanted the NRC to apply the
11	same kind of standards that they would apply domestically, that
12	really is a much tougher standing than I think you people are
13	prepared to have us apply, or that the system is really ready
14	for us to apply.
15	MR. PICTTRING: Could I make just one comment.
16	I think I would add here, leave our attitudes alone
17	and if you can, talk about the adequacy of the international
18	system of which we are a member, Its capacity to provide the
19	information.
20	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But you see, 10m, the point
21	I wow made is that the United States is in an agreement that
22	TAFA will provide international safegards. My international
23	of it is that there may be an inconsistency then room
	least some interpretations of the NNPA and that of
24	And that's what I meant, we will have to get a
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MR. NOSENZO: But in terms of adequacy, I thought 1 the point Tom was making is that one looks generically at the 2 IAEA in terms of adequacy. Not in terms of adequacy, but in 3 terms of does it apply to safeguards. 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Well, but "apply" then gets 5 directly into the questions Vic was raising. You have to 6 ask very specifically what is done where. 7 I'm not saying that I have reached that point, but 8 that seems to me, in the background. 9 The second question was, "Do we have all of the 10 information that you people have?" I hope we do, so you can 11 put that to rest. 12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Could I ask a question in 13 that category? 14 Tom, I got from what you say we, at least, have access 15 to all of it, but I guess I'm a little unclear on the process 16 of delivery. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 MR. PICKERING: 24 25

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6	MR. BORIGHT: The things that Tom listed, the
7	categories of information, each one of them has a pretty normal
8	channel by which it comes to us. Some of them you see in
9	routine cables, some of it because your staff worked with
10	us on the action plans. So I think if you go down that list
11	you will be able to identify
12	MR. NOSENZO:
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15	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, that's what I was
16	MR. NOSENZO: " and do we record that in
17	what we provide you?"
18	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yes.
19	MR. NOSENZO: I think the answer to that is,
20	negative.
21	MR. PICKERING: Negative, if you had it.
22	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
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24	MR. NOSENZO:
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1	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
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12	I think, at the moment, I have the feeling that we
13	could continue to come and sit around this table, but the
14	staff doesn't do a similar thing.
15	MR. PICKERING: John, could I just add two points.
16	First, I appreciate your very clear explanation of
17	the different points to which we are coming. That was part
18	of what I was trying to articulate when I talked about the
19	fact that Vic and I or others might disagree, and I think
20	that that's right.
21	I think also, your suggestion of the solution is very
22	much in sympathy with the sort of approach I would like to take.
23	How practically can we resolve the question, which at this
24	point, seemingly is a crisis of confidence between the NRC
25	and the State Department, try to remove that so that there is

1	at least some feeling of understanding of what each does and
2	where it comes from, even if we have a little better sense of
3	where we can't meet your requirements.
4	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let's go back to your letter
5	for a moment.
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19	MR. PICKERING:
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24	The feeling we have is the precedential or the
25	slippery slope problem. If one is seen to be the entree for

1 that, then why isn't -- there is no way of distinguishing, in 2 our judgment, b cween the two. Whereas the inimicality question 3 allows one to consider a broad range of foreign policy 4 considerations. 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But that, it seems to me, is 6 something that ought to be looked at for the Commission to 7 decide how it interprets its specific responsibility. 8 MR. PICKERING: Okay. Well, what we were doing is 9 wanting to put down a marker in response to the marker we felt that came to us in Joe's letter, as governments will do, even 10 11 in conversing among themselves about a particular thesis or 12 theological point of view which was expressed there. Now, I think that certainly we could sit here and 13 enjoy ourselves all day arguing about that. It isn't my 14 judgment of how to spend our time --15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No, we can't either. 16 MR. PICKERING: -- in the best possible way. 17 But I would say, in all frankness, I just want to be straight-18 forward and frank, that having received the letter we thought 19 that it would be better to be on record in response that a 20 view that was our own view of how the situation should be 21 responded to. 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Another reason why staff 23 should get together instead of us writing letters. To 24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Tom, I'd like to go back something 25


	that you just said at the beginning of your note.
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4	. Well, I'm clear as to how that works, because it is
5	, a practical matter.
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12	Now, that is real theology, let me suggest. That's
13	what it is really all about. But, you know, you can't get
14	there from here. That's a massive jump from the first to
15	the 10th floor and one can only do that through a series of
16	steps. How do you take those steps? Who makes that judgment?
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19	MR. PICKERING: Can I say two things on that, Dick.
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15	The real concern I have is that up until now, we
16	have only a theological problem to wrestle with, we have not
17	had a practical one. And your question is addressed to the
18	issue of when we have a practical one, what are we going to
19	do.
20	I will say that I will come here as a reasonable
21	guy, or Lou, and tell you when we can't make it and why and
	hope we can gather enough support from you all to make the
22	issue clear.
23	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You are assuming that
24	reasonableness is on both sides?
25	MR. PICKERING: Exactly, right.

1	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I commend you for that point.
2	MR. PICKERING: I think it is all the way around,
3	or hope it is, yes.
4	MR. NOSENZO: Let me just say that in the past the
5	request by the NRC for information, which I think we have
6	responded to, have been generally
7	MR. PICKERING: We haven't had any ceiling about
8	that, no.
9	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
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15	MR. PICKERING:
16	MR. NOSENZO:
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4	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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10	MR. PICKERING:
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17	After all, many countries in the world are unhappy
18	After all, many countries in the sections that their
19	with the notion they have to accept any inspections that their and
20	word is at stake, that got to verified. It is inherently a
21	burden for them, but when they are willing and freely able to undertake, but it has got its limits. And the issue there,
22	I suppose, Vic, is that we see ourselves in our pursuit of
23	I suppose, Vic, is that we see our cliffer nonproliferation policy as having to bear some of the burdens
24	of the demander in the process, as well as being right.
25	of the demander in the protient,

1 I think we have no question in the judgment that we are doing 2 the right thing, but we also have to sell the rest of the 3 world and that isn't a question of legislation or international 4 system so perfect that we can enforce that view, because it is 5 generally conceded to be right. 6 It is a part of the international process that we are 7 where we are now. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I mean, there is no provision 8 in the IAEA, say for the Indians coming in, that they are 9 worried about the Pakistanis and could you send in another 10 inspector. 11 MR. PICKERING: I wish there were. That might help 12 us. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Whether or not it is 14 exercised, there is no way for anybody to do that. 15 MR. SHEA: 16 MR. PICKERING: 17 18 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: 20 21 22 23 24 25



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1	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
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12	it is
13	MR. BORIGHT: But that is almost a situation that is
14	facility specific and not country specific, sort of by the
15	way you define it. The SIR gives you the information, (3)
16	So yow didn't know how bad the situation is, and (b) to take the
17	steps to improve it. So it is not clear why you would need
18	to put the finger on the specific country if the SIR says,
19	do you have a hard time doing the job at a fabrication plant,
20	for example. COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Supposing two or three years
21	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Supposing the was continuing to
22	had gone by, though, and that same item was continuing to
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24	all MR. BORIGHT: But that was the plan I was trying to
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1 get at before, because there is another, carrier, which is the 2 SSAC, which perhaps is country specific, where we have been 3 trying to work through the agencies and get them to follow up 4 on, for example, the bulk plant facilities, and part of that 5 is technology. You just really don't have the technology 6 to be able to appropriately handle that.

barrier

On the SSAC, it is a matter of encouraging these
countries and working with them. As you know, last year we
made an offer to help countries bilaterally with their SSACs,
we have renewed it this year, we are taking two steps, you
are taking one step, which is working with Korea, as one
example, to help them improve their SSAC.

We also, as part of the next part of physical security inspections, are offering experts in accountancy and control on the teams to discuss accountancy and control with our technical people. We have bilateral cooperation, and I think they will be receptive to it in that framework. You know, we have had some indication of the receptivity.

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But again, the question of approaching it generically rather than approaching it through the export licening process.

MR. PICKERING: Peter, could I make one point here.

It would seem to me the cases that you are raising are initially, at least, acceptable to improvement of safeguards by careful examination of the deficiencies on a facilities basis in the SIR. That ought to be our first effort. One should certainly look there. if that continues to reappear in the

process that we have set out in future years, doesn't seem 1 to make any improvement, then I suppose one does get to a 2 question in terms of inimicality judgments as we see it, 3 4 5 6 7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me see, Tom, I'm thinking 8 of a specific case. Highly-enriched uranium. As I read 9 the agency's rules it talks about inspecting stocks of highly-10 enriched uranium, to go through the quantities four times 11 a year. The SIR tells you they don't come close to that 12 sort of a standard, and that's highly-enriched uranium in 13 front of you. I am concerned about whether the IAEA is, in 14 fact, meating its standard which, I must say, I regard as 15 inadequate in itself, as a minimum that they are meeting their 16 standard. 17 18 19 MR. PICKERING: Well, I think the appropriate 20 inquiries should be on a generic basis with respect to all --21 to meeting all of their inspection standards with respect to 22 HEU. 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: 24 25

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. 1	Now, it is one thing if the SIR was saying, you know,
2	yes, the standard is being met and you could still say, well,
3	how do I know it will be met in this case, and there is no
4	end to the kinds of questions you can raise. But you have
5	to assume there are certain presumptions of adequate
6	performance that you have to make, but when their reports say
7	that they aren't coming close, and I don't regard the IAEA
8	as being an agency that exaggerates criticism of its own
9	performance, and that's a matter of considerable concern to me.
10	MR. BORIGHT: Yes, I have meant to comment.
11	Commissioner Gilinsky has used the phrase, "The IAEA
12	standards," in several questions, and I think we have been
13	through this before, but we do have to remember that the
14	situation is that the IAEA has never adopted a specific
	interpretation of that paragraph in 153 that says timely
15	detection.
16	We have worked very hard and pressed on them, a
17	certain set of goals on that assumption the feelings that
18	without something specific in mind, you couldn't put their
19	feet to the fire sufficiently. And we have suceeded in having
20	them adopt a set of specific timelimits and sensitivity goals
21	as goals, and in fact, they are writing the SIR measuring
22	against those goals. But their instructions from the Board,
23	which is the only capable organ to give them instructions, is
24	very clear that those are goals and not requirements. In fact,

25 there is some unhappiness with the last Board in particular, with

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1	the use of those thing.
2	Just for the record, when you say their standards,
3	it jo that they are standards used by the Secretariat in
4	absence of anything else, that they are not adopted standards,
5	and one has to keep that in mind.
6	As a footnote
7	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But where does that lead you?
8	MR. BORIGHT:
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21	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But is isn't as if the
22	standard is very strict, really, it's stocks of highly-enriched
23	uanium four times a year.
24	We have a national policy to keep plutonium from
25	getting spread around because we regard this kind of inspection

1 as inadequate. 2 MR. BORIGHT: Yes. Four inspections a year on HEU 3 would certainly be strict and that is certainly not the 4 standard we are talking about. 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But that standard is not 6 met. 7 MR. BORIGHT: All right, that's the kind of a problem 8 that we should be working on, but the standard that we are talking about is something like & few weekts inspections, every 9 That's the timeliness that should be achieved. 10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, on one SIR a day --11 12 MR. BORIGHT: But they use the same standards under the same goals. 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I don't know where it leads you, 14 Vic. 15 On the one hand, you say you recognize the imperfection 16 of the system and you agree with the, thrust to work in it. 17 Then you say, you don't think they are meeting whatever their 18 own standards are, understood in the sense of goals, and you 19 don't agree that those are adequate even if they were met, and 20 what are jou going to do with this export. 21 Question: What are you going to do? Should we simply 22 just shutdown the export business? Is that a national policy 23 which you would agree to? 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, let me turn this around. 25

2 3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: 4 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, each Commissioner has 6 7 got to decide for himself, I suppose. It seems to me that you have a choice here. To go 8 one way -- too far in one direction, you have made the point --9 you have used the words, but the common phrase is that we are 10 undermining the IAEA. In the other direction, it seems to be 11 we are underming the NNPA and it is clear the choices are going 12 to have to get made here, but we have also got to be concerned 13 about the latter. 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's why I'm interested in 15 having staffs do a little bit more work together. At some 16 point the conclusion may be that that kind of a fundamental . 17 dichotomy really will be seen and we will have to go back to 18 Congress. 19 MR. NOSENZO: Victor, on the HEU point in 20 particular, I don't argue with you on the inspection 21 frequency and the need for it. I think that the rationale 22 for pushing very hard on the agency to improve their 23 ability to inspect stockpiles or facilities that have HEU, 24 and need to put on some minimum kind of conditions. But I 25

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suspect you are aware that while the resources of the agency are limited and when you push harder in one direction you do tend to take off capabilities in other directions. The agency has, in fact, done that. It, of course, pays more attention to HEU critical facilities, bulk-handling facilities et cetera, than it does, for example, to LEU and reactors.

What would have to happen is that both things we have been pushing for, more focus on what (inaudible) and two, an increase in the number of inspectors, and also, an increase in the speed with which they get accredited by their various countries.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It seems to me everybody wants their system to be improved, obviously, I would like to see them improved and I would like to see the agencies do that, but at the beginning of any effort in this direction seems to me is an accurate and clear appraisal of what is, in fact going on.

MR. NOSENZO: The SIR indicates that, I mean, that's where you got your frequency numbers and the reason they are in there is because (inaudible) COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

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2	MR. PICKERING: That's a proposition we have accepted.
з	MR. NOSENZO: What is troublesome and where we
4	differ, I think, although you indicate there is an ambiguity,
5	John, I would really say there really is no ambiguity based
6	on the negotiation history of the law, otherwise the word
7	"adequacy" would have been put in Criteria 1. It is where
8	you consider it.
9	If you consider adequacy in the context of all of
10	the nonproliferation considerations that go into inimicality,
11	for example, are they an NPT party?
12	COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That is something, it seems
13	to me, you ought to leave to us. I mean, I understand
14	perfectly why you prefer to have it that way, but you know,
15	given that we pass on these exports, just as to where we
16	allocate the information and which part of the findings,
17	we are all into, that is something that
18	MR. NOSENZO: It is obviously something each
19	Commissioner has to decide for himself.
20	What I was conveying was
21	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: On the other hand, the law is
22	hardly NRC's private property.
23	MR. PICKERING: That's right, and I was going to make
24	that a point. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The Executive Branch has a
25	clear responsibility and right to put down the way it reads that
	creat responsibility and right to put down the way it reads that

1	statute.
2	MR. PICKERING: You feel there is a statutory
3	obligation on you to do certain things, and that imposes
4	a secondary statutory obligation on us to provide information,
5	and we, obviously, have to have a view as to the initial
6	aspect as to how the legislation bites.
7	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Listen, we have gone until 11:00,
8	which appears
9	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Stay for lunch.
10	(Laughter)
11	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: We are running out of the assigned
12	time, and I must say, if I felt there was a convergence in the
13	discussion that I could perceive, why I would be willing to go
	on a little bit longer, but it seems to me there is not
14	convergence and I can't see just exercising the same points.
15	Peter, do you have You haven't said much so why
16	don't I give you the last round
17	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Okay. I'm not sure it is
18	a different question and if it seems as though it is going
19	to take you long, maybe I can do it another time.
20	I wonder if you could just look quickly at the
21	I wonder if you could just form ing safeguards
22	Attachment in Joe's February letter regarding safeguards
23	information, and flag out which of those items is reasonably
24	available (background noise, inaudible.)
	MR. PICKERING: Without going through an
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1	that is why I mentioned in my opening remarks, page 2, the
2	numbered paragraph 2, it is kind of a generic sweeping up of
3	everything.
4	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: As to Item 1, then, is that
5	not a particularly troublesome
6	MR. PICKERING:
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21	MR. SHEA: So earlier, Lou, I think, last August,
22	you had indicated their willingness to work with NRC in
23	acquiring voluntarily available information and you are
24	reaffirming that, I gather.
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- 1	MR. NOSENZO: Yes, we are reaffirming that, and							
2	we discussed two ways to do it. One way was through a direct NRC, and their equivalent, cooperative arrangements, which is one way to get at one; and the other one was, well, how else could we do it through							
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6	bilateral cooperation.							
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10	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But or Page 4 of that list							
	has a couple of headings: Missing material and unauthorized							
11	applications, occuránce of a significant MUF.							
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21	MR. NOSENZO:							
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25	MR. BORIGHT: Pertain sensitive facilities, obviously							

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1	a few of a kind, one has a better idea of what you are dealing
2	with.
3	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
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7	MR. NOSENZO:
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9	and probably the major
10	But remember, that is the key, really and probably the major
11	area identified in the SIR. It is not only an issue which
12	is one that is related to the country, though, it is a
13	technological issue, we don't have the capability for the
14	inspector to really do a good job.
15	The other one is the inventory taking, and it has
16	got to be a combination of advance in technology, plus the
17	coordination between the agency and the operator to insure,
18	kind of minimum interference, yet ability to accurate
19	inventories.
20	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But there could then, be a bulk-handling facility which as having significant difficulties
21	bulk-handling facility which as having significant
22	with material accounting and control, which then could be
23	reported in the SIR, but which would not be reflected in your
24	A assessment to us of safeguards related to the country. MR. NOSEN20: Well, our assessment to you is we
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1 have no reason to believe that there has been any diversion 2 of material. I guess that standpoint would be accurate, 3 whether there would be a large MUF or not, I think is another 4 issue. 5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yes. But I'm not sure I know 6 what I would do if there were a large MUF. 7 8 9 MR. NOSENZO: 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: One last item, Tom. 11 I see that we have some -- we both have letters from Senator Glenn, and I think that we can answer them separately, 12 but it appears to me that the staffs might do some check ---13 MR. PICKERING: Yes. If I might say, in answering 14 the question that he addressed to me, there seemed to be an 15 effort to make some difference between full substance and 16 all information. 17 18 19 20 21 However, we are Farepared to respond exactly the 22 way we have responded to you today, by saying we provide all 23 of the information and then list the information that is 24 relevant. And in fact, we might even attempt to take another 25

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1	look at the testimony to make certain that we are very clear.
2	His letter seems to distinguish between full
3	substance and everything in my copy. I haven't seen yours,
4	so I don't know what he is really driving at, but there is
5	obviously some concern on the Committee staff, which I think
6	is misplaced.
7	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: There might have been some
8	point that had been (inaudible) and in your transcripts
9	you said you would endeavor to provide full substance,
10	however (inaudible) and the implication could be then reached
11	that you give him documents which you have to.
12	MR. PICKERING: Yes, we can straighten that out.
13	We can leave the "in confidence" and it applies both to you
14	and us, and "in confidence" also applies to the SIR. There is
15	no "however".
16	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: We are also are requested to supply
17	the relevant correspondence between ourselves and you, and
18	if you have any objection to our attaching our answers to the
19	letter, why
20	MR. PICKERING: I think we are going to do the same
21	thing, so if you have no objection, we'll send them duplicates.
22	We have to make certain that our staffs know that we both
23	have the same view of the relevant correspondence.
24	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's right, the collections.
25	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We can always solve that by

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bundling up everything that exists and shipping all that 1 and let them decide what is relevant. 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay, let's see. I can't think 3 of any othe urgent matters. 4 MR. SHEA: I was going to say that, speaking for the 5 staff, we certainly will endeavor to follow up with Lou's 6 people, as Commissioner Ahearne suggested to try to make 7 sure, I guess, initially that we have all of the available 8 information; it is so scattered that we may simply not have 9 it if it is older. 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Or within the Commission and 11 you cannot collect it. 12 MR. SHEA: That's right, or maybe in people's heads 13 and not written down. So we would like to be sure we have 14 all of that. 15 Justification economic distribution for high-enriched or just pass on on that 16 17 and maybe Lou could say --18 MR. NOSENZO: I think it needs some talking, usually 19 can we get into the theological question of whether that material 20 is, in fact, appropriate in your export licensing process for 21 making a determination that either on the export criteria or 22 on the inimicality question. But in practical matters, we have, 23 in the past supplied background information on what the 24 situation is with regard to HEU and the potential conversion of 25

1	it consistent with the President's policy. You are aware
2	of the President's policy. the SNEC
3	
4	Also, the NRC staff is on its neck and therefore, and technical rationale, for
5	example that is prepared by Argonne, are available to you,
6	
7	and if there has been any problem in the past, I would assume
	that there would be no problem in the future.
8	Again, though, I would point to the theological
9	question of whether this is a matter of policy, Presidential
10	policy and if we are facing this policy whether this is
11	COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That is the issue.
12	You may not understand that when you are dealing
13	with a theological institution, theology becomes terribly
14	important.
15	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay, very good.
16	I think we could usefully withhold this tape and
17	I will ask your vote. Those in favor?
18	COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Aye.
19	COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Aye.
20	COMMISSIONER KENEDY: Aye.
21	CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So ordered.
2.2	(Whereupon, the meeting in the above-entitled matter
23	was concluded at 11:10 a.m.)
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25	



UNITED STATES NUCLEÄR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

July 8, 1980

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:

Transcript of Briefing by Executive Branch on International Safeguards, July 10, 1979

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.10?(c), the Commission has determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be released to the public. The remaining portions of the transcript are being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:

Page/Line	thru	Page/Line	Exemption
5/19		6/5	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
6/6		6/6	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
6/20		7/6	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
7/16		8/11	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
9/9		10/24	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
11/7		11/13	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
11/24		12/25	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
13/23		14/3	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
16/4		16/11	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
20/14		20/25	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
21/25		22/6	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
22/21		22/22	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
22/25		23/13	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
23/18		24/10	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
24/20		24/22	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
24/24		24/25	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
25/3		25/4	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
25/10		25/20	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
26/6		26/11	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
26/14		26/18	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
26/22		27/9	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
29/15		29/20	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
30/4		30/16	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
31/2		31/11	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
31/16		31/19	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
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35/17		36/5	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
36/12		36/14	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
36/22		37/11	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
38/6		38/23	10 CFR 9.104(a)(1)
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Acting Secretary of the Commission