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REGION II  
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101 MARIETTA STREET  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

A. Gibson

SUBJECT: Hatch Unit 1, Docket No. 50-321, Notification of Reportable Occurrence No. 50-321/1980-076.

DATE: 7-2-80

NOTIFIED: Mr. Pete Taylor

DATE: 7-2-80  
TIME: 2:35 EDST

#### DESCRIPTION OF REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

##### Initial Condition

The Unit 1 reactor was in hot standby for the HPCI/RCIC investigation and repair effort when the site engineering staff was notified that the axial supports for the 20" line between the 1E11-F006A-D valves are inadequate.

##### Nature of Occurrence

While reviewing the as-builts submitted for the IE Bulletin 79-14 program the AE discovered that hangers 1E11-RHRH-196 and 1E11-RHRH-313 would not adequately support their loads during a design bases earthquake. The AE then informed the site of this problem per PDCR B2M-054.

##### Immediate Corrective Action

A design change request is being written to have the PDCR implemented. These supports will be modified prior to the unit coming on line.

##### Cause

The apparent cause is due to a faulty design in which incorrect valve weights were used in the original computer analysis.

##### Supplemental Corrective Action

NA

##### Status of Redundant or Backup Systems

Shutdown cooling is not required and is not inoperable at this time. LPCI, core spray, ADS, and RCIC are operable. HPCI is inoperable.

##### Impact to Other Unit

The IE Bulletin as-built review did not indicate any problems for the similar supports on the Unit 2 RHR system.


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Justification for Continued Operation

The unit will remain at its present low power conditions for LPCI testing until the supports can be modified. The analysis revealed that the existing supports were adequate to withstand the operating bases earthquake (OBE). The chances of experiencing an OBE in this area is approximately  $1 \times 10^{-6}$ . Any failure that would occur would not make LPCI or containment spray inoperable.

  
M. Harris  
Plant Manager