
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Stephen H. Howell Vice President

Item


1.

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

November 21, 1977 Howe-197-77

Mr J. G. Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

MIDLAND NUCLEAR PLANT -UNIT NO. 1, DOCKET NO. 50-329 UNIT NO. 2, DOCKET NO. 50-330 PIPE SUPPORT FILLET WELDS



POOR QUALITY PAGES

PIPE SUPPORT FILLET WELDS

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), this letter constitutes an interim report of the status of shop and field fillet welds on pipe supports designed and fabricated by ITT Grinnell, Warren, Ohio. Fillet welds on linear

pipe supports have been found undersized. The following Table provides a brief description of the conditions:

Nonconformance Reporting
Documents

Grinnell designs appear to specify welds MCAR-18

which do not meet minimum size requirements as called for in NA 2452.1 of Appendix XVII of the ASM. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

ASML Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

Condition

Site inspection of a sample of 112 hanger shop fillet welds revealed that 27 of the welds are, in the worst case, up to 1/8" smaller than required by the Grinnell design drawings and

sketches.

3. Site inspection of a sample of 44 field (installation) fillet welds revealed that 4 such welds were smaller (by up to 1/16") than required by the Grinnell design drawings and sketches.

Interim Report #1 (in response to MCAR-18)

MCAR-19

NCR QF-201

The corrective action plans, for the above conditions, are documented in the attachments to this letter. The timing of this report precluded including the specific corrective action for NCR QF-201 which is presently being evaluated.

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The defects reported in NCR QF-201 represent at most a condition equal in seriousness to the defects reported in MCAR-19 and the final hardware disposition for MCAR-19 will be applicable to NCR QF-201. It is anticipated that the final result of analysis and testing will be that rework will not be required.

Another report, either interim or final, will be sent on or before December 30, 1977.



- Attachments: 1) Quality Assurance Program, Management Corrective Action Report, MCAR-1, Report No. 18
 - 2) Interim Report #1, dated November 14, 1977, MCAR-18.
 - 3) Letter (WRB 47-77), W. R. Bird to Secretary ASME B&PV Committee, Subject - Code Inquiries on Applicable Paragraphs for Subsection NF Fillet Weld Sizing, dated October 28, 1977.
 - 4) Letter, R. E. Weber to W. R. Bird, Subject ASME File #NI-77-406, dated November 11, 1977.
 - 5) Quality Assurance Program, Management Corrective Action Report, MCAR-1, Report No. 19.
 - 6) Statement of Corrective Action Progress, MCAR-19, dated November 16, 1977.
 - 7) Consumers Power Company Nonconformance Report, NCR QF-201.

CC: Dr Ernst Volgenau, USNRC (15)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, USNRC (1)





QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT MCAR-1

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JOB NO. 7220

P.O. 7220-M-106 Various

REPORT NO.

October 28, 1977 DATE

I 'DESCRIPTION (Including references):

MQAM Section III, Number 9, paragraph 3.1.1 states in part, "Engineering procedures shall provide for review and acceptance criteria to determine completeness and adequacy of supplier documents forwarded to Project Engineering." Contrary to this requirement, designs prepared by the hanger design and fabrication vendor appear to specify welds which do not meet ASME Section III Code minimum size requirement. The apparent code violation is in the design of fillet welds joining linear members of hangers and seismic restraints as specified in ASME Section III-NF 3392 and Appendix XVII - NA 2452.1.

*RECOMMENDED ACTION (Optional)

- Obtain formal justification of vendor position on Code interpretation.
- Seek Code clarification from ASME Code Committee.
- Prepare a detailed analysis of a 1% sample of hangers not meeting Table 2452.1-1 of Code Appendix XVII-NA 2452.1.
- QA/QC to reinspect a sample of 25 installed hangers and 15 hangers in the warehouse. Tabulate actual weld size vs. size specified on the drawings.
- Prepare an interim report and issue to the Project Manager within 15 days containing all available information, together with a statement as to when a complete report will be issued.

	X ENGINEERING Reportable Investigation	Pending	CONSTRUCTION	[ISSUED BY MANAGEMENT	Dine 1/27
II REPORTABLE	DISCREPANCY		YES	0	NOTIFIED CLIENT	10/27/77 Date 25'77 Date 77
III CAUSE						
CORRECTIVE	E ACTION TAKEN					
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QUALITY ASSURANCE

AUTHORIZED BY. Date

DISTRIBUTION:

Project Manager Construction Manager Engineering Manager roject Engineer Proj. Supt. / Proj. Const. Mgr. or P & I Procurement Mgr.

Chief Field QC Engineer or Procurement Insp. Mgr.

J. B. Violette

T. M. Leverette

G. L. Richardson

J. Amaral (Gaithersburg) J. E. Bashore (Norwalk)

*Describe in space provided and attach reference document.

FORMAL REPORT TO CLIENT,

(If Section II Applies)

CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTED

VERIFIED BY_

Project QA Engineer

Date

SUBJECT: MCAR 18 (Issued (0-28-77)

INTERIM REPORT / DATE: //-14-77

PROJECT: Consumers Power Company

Midland Plant Units 1 & 2 Bechtel Job No. 7220

Description of Discrepancy

There is an apparent ASME Section III Code violation involving design of fillet welds joining linear type welded supports and component standard supports as specified by the hanger supplier. These welds do not meet the minimum size specified in ASME Section III-NF 3392, NF-3400, and Appendix XVII-NA 2452.1.

Potential Safety Implication

A potential safety problem could exist if a structural failure should occur in a Q-listed hanger due to an undersized weld. A sample of the questionable welds was analytically checked, and results show that welds as designed will carry the design loads. Based on the samples analyzed, there is no safety problem due to underspecified weld size.

Corrective Action and Investigation

Bechtel requested an informal code interpretation at the ASME Code committee meeting November 1, 1977. The code committee chairman stated, if a formal inquiry were presented, he would support a Code interpretation that minimum fillet weld size must be at least the thickness of the thinnest member joined where the Code minimum weld size table calls for a weld equal to or greater than the thickness of the thinner member.

Grinnell has been requested to clarify their position on code compliance. We anticipate their reply to be that, even though they didn't meet the above exact interpretation of the Code, they met the intent.

Grinnell has committed to conducting a program to substantiate weld integrity, including an analytical approach and destructive testing, and to submit a report justifying the adequacy of the questioned welds.

Grinnell has been requested to submit for review an outline of the investigation test procedure including:

- 1. Purpose of proof test report and how results will be used
- 2. Justification of sample size used in proof test, indicating how the samples are sufficiently large and representative to support any conclusion to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional authorities
- 3. Detail steps of proof test
- 4. Verification of test equipment calibration
- 5. Schedule

It is anticipated that Bechtel and CPCo will review test procedures prior to start of test, and will witness test.

It is also anticipated that results of the investigation will have to be accepted by both the owner and the ASME Code jurisdiction.

Bechtel checking of a random sample of 650 earlier sketches indicates 110 of these sketches have linear welds that do not meet minimum size specified by the Code as follows:

- 41 welds were specified as 3/16 when the Code requires 1/4
- 41 welds were specified as 3/16 when the Code requires 5/16
- 2 welds were specified as 3/16 when the Code requires 3/8
- 24 welds were specified as 1/4 when the Code requires 5/16
- 2 welds were specified as 1/4 when the Code requires 3/8

A detailed analysis of 80 of the random sample sketches not meeting minimum weld size indicates that all welds on the sketches are theoretically of adequate size for the specified loading. Emergency loading conditions were utilized in calculating weld stresses. Allowable stresses on the weld were determined from ASME Code material allowable stress for normal conditions. Results show that allowable stress equals 18 KSI and calculated maximum stresses in samples analyzed ranged from less than 0.1 to 12.3 KSI.

Grinnell has stated that they have been following the Code table for minimum size weld since April 1977. A sample check by Bechtel of 95 recently submitted hanger sketches, including 73 hangers with linear welds, shows that 4 hangers do not meet Code.

Random measurement at the jobsite of actual weld size was conducted by Bechtel QA/QC on 112 shop welds selected from various stages of installation and from the warehouse. This inspection resulted in the following findings:

85 welds meet or exceed drawing requirements.

27 welds did not meet drawing requirements.

Of these, 17 welds were undersized by
1/16 inch or less over less than 15% of
the weld length, 6 welds were undersized
by 1/16 inch or less for more than 15%
of the weld length, and 4 welds were
undersized by 1/8 inch for more than
15% of the weld length.

Resolution of these undersized welds will be addressed in MCAR 19; however, Grinnell has stated that they have been inspecting 100% of shop welds since July 1977.

Forecast Date on Corrective Action

It is expected that the results of the test program will not be received until January or February 1978. Program results will then have to be accepted by the Owner and the Code jurisdictional authority. A final report would then follow.

Submitted by: Approved by:

Concurrence by:

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION



General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • Area Code 517 788-0550

October 28, 1977

WRB 47-77

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Att: Secretary, ASME B&PV Committee United Engineering Center 345 East 47th Street New York, NY 10017

SUBJECT: CODE INQUIRIES, ASME CODE SECTION III, SUBSECTION NF

Please provide an interpretation of the following questions to the writer:

1. Table NF-3132.1(b)-1 and Paragraph NF-3292.

If Class 1 linear supports are designed by "experimental stress analysis" or by "load rating," does paragraph NF-3292 apply?

2. Paragraph NF-3292 and Paragraph XVII-2450.

When paragraph NF-3292 applies, must all fillet welds comply with the minimum size requirements of paragraph XVII-2452 and Table XVII 2452.1-1 when the analysis shows a smaller weld size to be satisfactory?

We are of the opinion that a clear definition of requirements is needed in the Code with respect to the above inquiries.

W. R. Bird

W. R. Bird Section Head

Quality Assurance Engineering



The American society of Mechanical Engineers

United Engineering Center/345 E. 47th St., New York, N.Y. 10017/212 644-7722

Attachment 4 Howe-197-77

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

DATE: November 11, 1977

ATTENTION: W. R. Bird

SUBJECT: ASME File # NI-77-406

Gentlemen:

We have your letter of October 28, 1977, the Chairman of the Subcommittee concerned. and we are referring it to

We will advise you when we have heard from him.

If you have any cause to contact this office on this inquiry please be sure to reference the ASME file number given above.

Yours truly,

Ray. E. Weber

Nuclear Engineering Administrator

NOV 1 4 1977

QUALITY ASSURANCE



QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT MCAR-1

Howe-197-77

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7220 JOB NO.

P.O. 7220-M-106 Q NO. Various

REPORT NO ._ DATE November 4, 1977


1 *DESCRIPTION (Including references):

A weld siz inspection using a weld fillet gauge was conducted of a representative sample of pipe hangers to determine the actual weld size compared to Grinnell design drawings and sketches. This was done to fully assess all conditions associated with MCAR #18 involving the lack of Grinnell use of weld sizes from Table 2452.1-1 of Code Appendim XVII - MA 2552.1. It was discovered that from a sample of 23 hangers installed and 9 hangers from the warehouse, representing 112 welds, 22% of the welds were under the specified size required by Grinnell drawings. Contrary to Purchase Specification M-106, paragraph 10.1, Grinnell has not assured the compliance with *RECOMMENDED ACTION (Optional)

- 1. Establish how the deviation occurred at Grinnell.
 - a. Determine the cause of the deviation.
 - b. Determine the inspection technique and acceptance criteria utilized by Grinnell. Specifically, determine the percentage of welds measured for dimensional compliance.
- 2. Qualify existing weld size.
 - a. Provide for undersize variance in the scope of the worst case condition by using calculations and proof-testing by Grinnell to preclude rework of undersize welds from Grinnell drawings.

REFERRED TO [XENGINEERING	CONSTRUCTION	QA MANAGEMENT	
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II REPORTABLE DISC	REPANCY	YES	NOTIFIED CLIENT	Date (Plate)
III CAUSE				V

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN



AUTHORIZED BY	
	Date

DISTRIBUTION Project Manager Construction Manager Engineering Manager Project Engineer Proj. Supt / Proj. Const. Mgr or P & I Procurement Mgr. Chief Field OC I riginizer or Procurement Insp. Mgr. QA Supervisor

J. B. Violette

T. M. Leverette

G. L. Richardson

J. Amaral (Caithersburg)

J. E. Bashore (Morwalk)

A. G. Horner

*Describe in space provided and attach reference document

CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTED

VERIFIED BY_ Project ()A Engineer

FORMAL REPORT TO CLIENT_

(If Section II Applies)

Management Corrective Action Request Page 2

Report	t No		19	_
Date !	November	4.	1977	

I. RECOMMENDED ACTION (Cont'd.)

- b. Review the above proof-test procedure for Grinnell's test-to-failure tests including sample size and scope of investigation.
- c. Obtain schedule for completing tests and date of submittal of test and analytical results.
- 3. Establish controls for hangers not installed or in manufacture.
 - a. Perform an inspection of the lot of hangers shipped 10/31/77.
 - b. Based on the above, if the lot is acceptable:
 - (1) establish a PSQR monitoring program to assure that the current weld quality is maintained,
 - (2) verify that Grinnell's inspection procedures provide and document sufficient inspection to assure that all welds comply with contractual requirements.
 - c. If the lot is not acceptable:
 - (1) inspect all new hangers at the Site based on an AQL of 1% of . the lot size until controls are established at the source,
 - (2) tighten procedures with Grinnell to assure acceptability.
- d. Identify the quality status with respect to welding on all hangers.
 4. Inspect an additional sample of installed hangers to determine if there
- are any welds with dimensions less than the worse case condition.

 Identify discrepant welds and coordinate further corrective action with

 Grippell
- 5. Have PSOR increase surveillance and reject undersized welds prior to shipment.
- 6. Determine reportability under 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55(e). Prepare an interim report and issue to the Project Manager within 15 days containing all available information, together with a statement as to when a complete report will be issued.

STATEMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRESS

MCAR-19

- Bechtel has communicated all the items on MCAR-19 to Grinnell where Grinnell has specific action to perform.
- 2. A meeting was held at Midland on November 16, 1977 with Bechtel, Consumers Power, and Grinnell in attendance at which Grinnell committed to revise their inspection procedure (O2AOO6 Visual and Dimensional Acceptance Criteria for Welds) to provide maximum and minimum tolerances and other specifics. A target date for a released revision is mid-December.
- 3. Bechtel has implemented an inspection of weld size for all new hangers received at the Midland site based on an AQI of 1% (Mil Q 105D).

WRB/1b

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G. L. Richard Bechtel Lead	mance Report is dson Quality Assura	nce Engineer	Approve Written	d By KCKstunk Date 11-15-7 d By Date 11-30-77 ive Action Requested By Date 12-16-
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File 16.3.6
Issue Date November 15, 1977
Project Midland 1 & 2
File Title NCR's on Bechtel
Quality Control

Attachment to Report No QF-201

Nonconformance Description and Supporting Details:

As a result of dimensional and visual inspection of hanger fillet welds, the following nonconforming conditions were documented:

Item #1 - Auxiliary Building, Room 28, Hanger 4-2HCB-20-H1, Sketch 2-613-3-6, weld attaching Item #2 (sway strut assembly) to existing W 21 x 55 beam at Elevation 582'-3" requires a 1/4" fillet weld.

Contrary to the above one area of the fillet weld is undersize.

Item #2 - Auxiliary Building, Room 25, Hanger 6-1CCB-18-H7, Sketch 1-612-4-16, weld attaching Item #1 (sway strut assembly) to Item #2 (4" M-beam) at Elevation 570'9" requires a 5/16" fillet weld.

Contrary to the above one area of the fillet weld is undersize.

Item #3 - Auxiliary Building, Room 217, Hanger 2 1/2-2CCB-12-H3, Sketch 2-604-7-3, weld attaching Item #1 (3/8" x 10" x 10" carbon steel plate) to wall embedment at Elevation 605'9" requires a 3/16" fillet weld.

Contrary to the above the following condition exists. Item #1 is bowed away from the embedment with a resulting gap of approximately .075 in. (1.88mm). This results in an effective fillet leg of approximately 1/8 in. on the plate, which is below the required 3/16" fillet.

Item #4 - Auxiliary Building, Room 28, Hanger 8-2GBC-16-H2, Sketch 2-613-3-13, weld attaching Item #1 (4" M-beam) to existing W 21 x 82 beam at Elevation 582'3" requires a 1/4" fillet weld.

Contrary to the above the weld fails to meet acceptable visual requirements. Excessive overlap results in most of the weld material being deposited on the hanger (Item #1) and very little weld deposition on the existing beam.

All of the above discrepancies are on field welds. Bechtel has subsequently issued NCR's on the above items.

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REG FILES MRC PUR I S E (2) OFLD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIDC CASE ROYD De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ HELTEMES	SYST R. W. SCHRO ENGIN ENGIN BOSN SIHW PAWI REAC ROSS NOVA ROSZ CHEC	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER NEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOCZY K		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LAINAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON S MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH
REG FILES MRC POR I S E (Z) OFLD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIPC CASE ROYD PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ	SYSTI R. M. SCHRO ENGI ENGI ROSN SIHW PAWI REAC' ROSS NOVA ROSZ CHEC	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER NEERING HT AK FIL ICKI TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON S MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS
REG FILES MRC PUR I S E (2) OFLD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIDC CASE ROYD De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ HELTEMES	SYSTI R. M. SCHRO ENGI KNIG BOSN. SIHW PAWT REAC' ROSS NOVA ROSZ CHEC AT & SALT	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER VEERING HT AK EIL ICKI TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K I		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON S MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH
REG FILES MRC PUR I S E (2) OFLD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIDC CASE ROYD De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ HELTEMES	SYSTI R. M. SCHRO ENGI KNIG BOSN. SIHW PAWI REAC ROSS NOVA ROSZ CHEC AT & SALT RUI 3	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER WEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOCZY K I ZMAN ERG		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON & MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS KPEGER
REG FILES TAC POR I S E (Z) OELD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIPC CASE ROYD PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ HELTEMES SK	SYSTING SCHROOT SCHOOL STALT RUTS SEXTERN	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER MEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K I ZMAN ERG WAL DISTRIBUTION		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON S MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS
REG FILES MRC FUR I S E Z OELD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER WIPC CASE ROYD De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON WELTZ HELTEMES	SYSTING SCHROOT SCHOOL STALT RUTS SEXTERN	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER MEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K I ZMAN ERG WAL DISTRIBUTION		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON S MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS KREGER
REG FILES THE POR I S E (Z) OFLD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER MIPC CASE ROYN De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON MELTZ HELTEMES SK	SYSTING SCHROOT SCHOOL STALT RUTS SEXTERN	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER MEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K I ZMAN ERG WAL DISTRIBUTION		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON & MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS WREGER CONTROL NUMBER
REG FILES MRC PUR I S E (Z) OELD GOSSICK S STAFF HANAHER WIPC CASE ROYD De Young PROJECT MANAGEMENT SKOVHOLT P. COLLINS HOUSTON WELTZ HELTEMES SK	SYST R. M. SCHRO ENGI ENGI ENGI ENGI ENGI ENGI ENGI ENGI	INTERNAL EMS SAFETY ATTSON DEDER MEERING HT AK EIL ICKT TOR SAFETY K TOGZY K I ZMAN ERG WAL DISTRIBUTION		B. HARLESS IBUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO BENAROYA LATNAS IPPOLITO F. ROSA OPERATING REACTORS STELLO EISENHUT SHAO BAER BUTLER GRIMES	ENVIRON ANALYSIS DENTON & MULLER CRUTCHFIELD ENVIRON TECH ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL (2) SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J. COLLINS KREGER CONTROL NUMBER