

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-329/78-04; 50-330/78-04

Docket No. 50-329; 50-330

License No. CPPR-81; CPPR-82

Licensee: Consumers Power Company
1945 West Parnall Road
Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name: Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Midland Site, Midland, MI and Corporate Office

Inspection Conducted: April 18-21, 1978

Inspectors:

T. E. Vandel
T. E. Vandel

6/12/78

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Approved By: *D. W. Hayes*
D. W. Hayes, Chief
Projects Section

6/13/78

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 18-21, 1978 (Report No. 50-329/78-04; 50-330/78-04)

Areas Inspected: Review of procedures for NSSS equipment, other safety related equipment, and electrical components and cable installations; observation of work activities for setting of Unit 2 NSSS equipment, and electrical components and cables; record review for electrical components; and review of fire protection provisions. This inspection involved a total of 120 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted

Consumers Power Company (CPCo)

*J. D. Balzer, Electrical Section Supervisor
G. Bell, QA Engineer
*W. R. Bird, Section Head, QA Engineering
D. Jones, QA Engineer
*D. R. Keating, Field Engineer
*P. R. Kyner, QA Engineer
B. W. Marguglio, Director, Quality Assurance
R. Sciamanda, QA Engineer
R. E. Whitaker, Field Engineer

Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

W. L. Barclay, Project Field Quality Control Engineer
*H. D. Foster, Assistant Project Field Quality Control Engineer
*R. C. Hollar, QA Engineer
*J. L. Hurley, Resident Assigned Project Engineer
*J. F. Newgen, Project Superintendent
*W. H. Nielson, Assistant Project Field Engineer
*G. L. Richardson, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer

Other Bechtel and CPCo personnel were contacted during the course of the inspection.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-329/77-05, 50-330/77-08): Further review was conducted of the Nuclear Audit and Test Company QA program audit of July 9, 1976. It was determined that all Midland project related audit findings (23 items) have been implemented and closed. The inspector was informed that another QA program audit is planned to be performed sometime during 1978. The inspector stated that he had no further questions.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-329/77-11-01; 50-330/77-14-01): The inspector reviewed the auditor qualification and certification system and auditor records located at the Corporate office in Jackson, Michigan. A total of five procedures were reviewed and considered to be acceptable. In addition, the record files for two auditors were reviewed and appeared

to be complete. It was further learned that training sessions have been scheduled through 1978 which included training sessions at Midland site. Although the inspector was informed that not all training records have been provided to the Midland site yet, no further review was considered necessary. It is noted that the procedures complete a commitment outlined in the Management Interview section of NRC inspection report 50-329/75-05, 50-330/75-05.

Other Inspection Areas

1. Other Outstanding Items from Old Reports

- a. Use of an Index Register (report 50-329/75-05, 50-330/75-05). A CPCo commitment to develop and utilize an index register in the quality assurance manual to indicate approval of management has never been acknowledged as having been completed. In review of the current practice it was learned that an index register is used as a revision control for all policies and procedures issued. Indication of approval by management is accomplished by approval signatures on the last page of each procedure. Procedure I-1, revision 3, describes this method of control and it also requires that any revision of a procedure or policy requires the reissuing of the whole procedure as a new revision duly signed by management. This was considered acceptable and responsive to the commitment.
- b. Radiographic film density deficiencies (report 50-329/78-06, 50-330/75-06). A deviation was identified regarding containment liner plate radiography film density failing to meet ASME Code Section III, Division 2 requirement. It is noted that the licensee had themselves identified this deviation in nonconformance report No. QF-51 dated June 23, 1975.

Closeout review was performed by the licensee on September 11, 1975 at which time it was documented that test radiographs with a density as low as 1.54 had sufficient clarity to observe the penetrameter slit. This established that radiographic film with density less than the code minimum of 2.0 could be satisfactorily interpreted down to a density of 1.54. This was accepted by the licensee as establishing acceptable radiographs since no film had less than a 1.56 density. The inspector concluded that the licensee had adequately established that the radiographic film was acceptable even though below code minimum density.

Functional or Program Areas Inspected

SECTION I

Prepared by F. J. Jablonski

Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief
Engineering Support Section 1

1. Review of QA Implementing Procedures for Electrical Components, Cables, Raceway Supports and Raceway

- a. The Consumers Power QA program is implemented to control structures, systems and components listed in the plant's Q-List. Section 3.00 of the Midland Project Q-List includes 4kV/480V switchgear and load centers, 480V motor control centers, batteries, battery chargers, and power-control cable.
- b. During the inspection it was determined that seismic Category I supports for Class 1E raceways, the raceways themselves, and grounding of the raceways were not included as part of the Midland project Q-List i.e., the architect-engineer's euphemism for safety related systems, components and structures. By not being included on the Q-List, matters such as designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, installing, inspection, etc. have not necessarily been included in the QA program. NOTE: The installation of raceway supports and raceway has been included on the Q-List.

Consumers Power's QA Manual, Topical Report CPC-1-A, has been evaluated and accepted by the Quality Assurance Branch, Division of Project Management, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). On page ii of the introduction to the Topical Report the following statement is made: "The requirements established by these documents (specific NRC and industry) form the basis for the Consumers Power Quality Assurance Program, which is implemented to control those structures, systems, components and operational safety actions listed in each nuclear power plant's Quality List (Q-List)."

It is unclear to the RIII inspector how installation/inspection of any component can be Q-Listed yet other requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B are not considered. This matter is unresolved and will be forwarded to IE Headquarters for further evaluation. (329/78-04-01; 330/78-04-01)

- c. Three separate Project Quality Control Instructions (PQCI) have been developed to provide receipt inspection activities: R-1.00, R-2.00 and R-2.20. Inspections are performed; results are documented. Included are such things as verification of freedom from damage, presence of manufacturing documentation, and manufacturer's storage requirements. Engineering evaluations of test documentation, i.e., seismic, environmental etc., are not performed by site receiving personnel. Bechtel form G-321-D and associated documentation are reviewed by Engineering personnel to ascertain if technical aspects have been met.
- d. Procedures FPG 4.000 and FPG 5.000 are utilized to verify the maintenance and storage inspection of equipment and materials. Forms 1/2 -10/20 are utilized to document storage inspections. Special storage requirements are determined by review of vendor or manufacturer's specifications/instruction books. A 90-day interval was listed as the inspection period for switchgear, batteries, battery chargers and induction motors.
- e. Field Procedures and instructions are established for the installation and handling of electrical components, raceway supports, raceway and cables. The procedures included both quantitative and qualitative acceptance criteria. Controlled copies of the procedures and instructions are distributed to Lead Electrical Engineers and installation superintendents. Training is provided to personnel performing installation activities. A complete engineering and technical staff is available to provide technical expertise for unusual conditions. The procedures reviewed include:
- . FPE-1.000 Raceway, Cable and Termination Document Control R-2
 - . FPE-3.000 Installation of Electrical Tray and Conduit R-0
 - . FIE-3.100 Class 1E Tray Support Installation R-June 1, 1977
 - . FIE-3.200 Class 1E Tray Support Fabrication R-January 20, 1978
 - . FIE-3.300 Class 1E Conduit Support R-December 29, 1977
 - . FPE-4.000 Installation of Electrical Cable R-0

- . FIE-6.100 Installation of Station Batteries, Battery Chargers & Associated Fused Disconnects and Ground Detectors R-September 14, 1977
 - . FIE-6.300 Installation of Control Panels and Control Stations R-August 5, 1977
 - . FIE-6.400 Installation of 5KV and 8KV Switchgear R-0
 - . FIE-6.500 Installation of Load Centers and Associated Transformers R-July 20, 1977
 - . FIE-6.600 Installation of Motor Control Centers R-September 14, 1977
 - . FIE-6.700 Installation of Large (50 HP and Larger) Electric Motors R-July 21, 1977
 - . FPE-7.000 Termination of 600 and Lower Voltage Cable R-0
 - . FPG-2.000 Qualification & Training of Construction Personnel R-0
- f. Inspection of installed equipment and components is carried out in accordance with established procedures. Procedures are updated, revised and distributed for use by QC personnel. Results of the inspections are reviewed by responsible personnel. Procedures reviewed include:
- . E-1.0 Installation of Conduit
 - . E-2.0 Installation of Cable Tray
 - . E-2.1 Installation of Raceway Supports
 - . E-4.0 Installation of Cables
 - . E-5.0 Cable Terminations
 - . E-6.0 Installation of Elec. Equipment
 - . E-6.7.1 Installation of Batteries or Racks
 - . PSPG-8.1 Qualification, Examination, Training and Certification of QC Personnel
- g. Material and components are identified if they are determined to be nonconforming. Nonconforming items are segregated. Raceway and cable are color and alpha numerically identified. Requirements are delineated in procedures FPE-3.000 and FPE-4.000 respectively. NOTE: Section 6 or Procedure FPE-3.000

provides requirements for raceway identification; a corresponding inspection procedure, E-1.0 also includes "identification" as an inspection point.

- h. As documented in inspection reports No. 329/77-06 and No. 330/77-07, it was noted that stored 4.16kV stitchgear had not been identified down to the channel level in a distinct manner, such as by color coding.

On page 8.3-28 of subsection 8.3.1.3 of the FSAR, the following statement was made. "As indicated above, each separation group has its distinguishing color. Cable, raceway, and terminal equipment is color coded with those colors to provide a visual means of separation group identification."

During this inspection, i.e., during April, 1978, while discussing this same subject, the RIII inspector was made aware of revision 3 to the FSAR dated December, 1977. Subsection 8.3.1.3 was revised and now, in part, reads "Cable and raceway, up to the terminal equipment." The revision explicitly exempts the color coding of terminal equipment. NOTE: Chapter 7 of the FSAR, "Instrumentation and Controls" also references section 8.3.1.3 for identification requirements.

10 CFR 50.55a(h) (IEEE 279 1971), paragraph 4.22 states: "Identification - In order to provide assurance that the requirements given in this document can be applied during the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the plant, the protection system equipment (for example, interconnecting wiring, components, (*) modules, etc.) shall be identified distinctively as being in the protection system. This identification shall distinguish between redundant portions of the protection system. In the installed equipments, components, or modules mounted in assemblies that are clearly identified as being in the protection system do not themselves require identification."

*For clarification, the components (terminal equipment) would typically include switchgear, batteries, battery chargers, motors, motor operated valves, solenoids, RPS-ESFAS instrumentation, penetrations, etc.

This matter was not identified as an item of noncompliance, because during discussions with the licensee's QA Engineering Section Head and their Architect Engineer's Senior Electrical

Engineering Representative, the RIII inspector was informed that this matter had been discussed previously with NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and NRR had accepted the licensee's identification method.

This matter is unresolved and will be forwarded to IE Headquarters for further evaluation. (329/78-04-02; 330/78-04-02)

- i. Procedures FPD-1.000 and 3.000 have been developed to control design documents and field work prints. The inspector was informed that approximately 7000 drawings per month are processed through the document control center. Also, approximately 400 uncontrolled drawings, i.e., not retrieved, are distributed to various individuals for various reasons. The potential for inadvertent use of the uncontrolled drawings was discussed with the licensee during the exit meeting. Also discussed was a document control audit performed by the constructor of electrical field work prints wherein several drawings were found to be void. Followup audit results were similar. Due to time limitations the RIII inspector did not pursue the matter, however, followup will be performed during a subsequent inspection. (329/78-04-03; 330/78-03-03) This matter was discussed during the exit meeting.

- j. As documented in inspection reports No. 329/77-06 and No. 330/77-07 it was noted that Class 1E circuits were not necessarily being routed or protected such that failure of related mechanical equipment of one redundant system would not disable the circuits of equipment essential to operation of redundant equipment. Examples were listed as pipe growth (thermal expansion) and seismic movement. During the previous and present inspection, the RIII inspector observed mechanical/electrical equipment, i.e., pipe/cable tray supports and cable tray in close proximity to one another; in one case there was zero clearance. Pipe welding fitup will be difficult because of the pipe/tray support interference. The inspector was informed that the seismic supports for pipe provide a flexible system, however, raceway supports were solid. No provision, i.e., minimum dimension, has been established to preclude installations with critical interface dimensions. Examples include normal plant vibration, water hammer, high temperature, thermal expansion, seismic excursions, insulation installation etc., (see paragraph m. of this section). This matter is unresolved and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (329/78-04-04; 330/78-04-04)

- k. QC Procedures E-1.0-Conduit, E-2.0-Cable Tray, and E-4.0 require that such things as size, type, location, routing, clearance, etc., be verified by inspection.
- l. Raceway segregation and separation requirements are not necessarily delineated in procedures; design reviews do not take place onsite. Design drawing 7220-E-47 provides separation information and is referenced in raceway installation procedure FPE-3.00. NOTE: A corresponding inspection procedure, E-2.0-Cable Tray, does not reference drawing 7220-E-47. This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (329/78-04-05; 330/78-04-05)
- m. Field change request (FCR) and field change notice (FCN) requirements are delineated in Procedure FPD-2.00. Typical changes reported include:
 - . interference problems encountered during installation
 - . conflicting design information
 - . errors or omissions found on drawings or specifications
 - . structures, systems or components which fail to meet specified functional requirements
 - . design changes to completed work that cannot be implemented.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

2. Fire Prevention/Protection

- a. The Bechtel Fire/Safety Representative has responsibility for development and administration of the fire prevention and protection program.
- b. Bechtel Power Corporation Procedure No. FPS-1.000, "Fire Prevention and Protection Program" was approved for use on September 14, 1977. The procedure addresses, e.g., fire reporting, evacuation, fire emergency response and fire prevention/protection. Referenced in FPS-1.000 are procedures FIS-1.110 "Flammable Liquid Handling and Storage," and FIS-1.3000 "Welding, Burning and Cutting."

- c. Fire suppression equipment inspection requirements are delineated in sections 8.3 and 8.4 of procedure FPS-1.000. Suppression equipment is to be inspected weekly.
- d. Fire reporting and fire response requirements are delineated in Sections 5 and 7 of procedure FPS-1.000. Communications are by public address system or telephone for station alert; by telephone for notification of outside fire departments. Telephone numbers are provided for both Midland City and Midland Township fire departments. During off shift hours watchman service is provided by the security guard force. Section IV of Consumer Power's Security Operations Manual delineates fire watch requirements; Section V delineates fire procedures.
- e. Training requirements were reviewed. The following was determined:
 - (1) Fire reporting methods are included as part of a new employee's orientation.
 - (2) Section 8.1 of FPS-1.000 provides general requirements for fire brigade training.
 - (3) An "in house," i.e., Safety Department, guideline included a fire brigade personnel chart which indicated that 18 craft personnel would make up the day shift fire brigade.
 - (4) Paragraph 10 of the guideline indicated that fire brigade training would be held every other Tuesday. Training records for a period between January 11, 1978 and April 4, 1978 indicated that at no time did 18 personnel avail themselves of the training. No minimum requirements for brigade training were delineated. The licensee stated that minimum requirements would be established. This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (329/78-04-06; 330/78-04-06)
- f. Fire protection/prevention during the construction phase is not included in the site QA/QC program, therefore procedures are not necessarily subject to review, approval or distribution controls.

- g. The following observations were made in the auxiliary and containment buildings:
- (1) Portable fire extinguishers were located throughout; all were pressurized; all had updated inspection tags (approximately 20 were observed).
 - (2) Hose stations were pressurized and in good repair (approximately five were observed).
 - (3) Combustible materials were well controlled; containers were provided for trash and debris.
 - (4) Portable extinguishers were available at welding locations (two locations were observed).
 - (5) All Class 1E equipment was covered with fire resistant materials.
 - (6) Scaffolding was fabricated with noncombustible materials.
- h. Fire insurance is provided by Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML). Inspections are performed by M&M Consultants. Three of their reports were reviewed by the RIII inspector including October and November 1977, and March 1978. All recommendations made by M&M had been implemented by the licensee.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

SECTION II

Prepared by P. A. Barrett

Reviewed by R. L. Spessard, Chief
Engineering Support Section 1

Review of Receipt Documentation for Electrical Equipment

1. The 4160/480 volt transformers (Nos. 1X17, 1X18, 2X17, and 2X18), were received on Material Receiving Report, MRR, No. AEO-4673, dated October 31, 1977; Quality Control Inspection Record, QCIR, No. R-1.00-2283; and Purchase Order No. 7220-E-6-AC.
2. Cable Penetrations
 - a. The internals for penetrations 1Z123, 1Z126, 2Z126, and 2Z145 were received on QCIR No. R-1.00-2940 and PO No. 7220-E-20-AC. The internals were in Conditional Release status because of documentation shortages. The documentation shortages were properly identified on a Nonconformance Report, in accordance with Quality Control Notices Manual, Project Special Provisions Not P G-3.2, Rev. 4, Section 3.4.
 - b. Weld Chase Rings, Part/No. 50013119-01, were received on MRR No. AEO-1658, Rev. 1; QCIR No. R-1.00-176, Rev. 1; and PO No. 7220-E-20-AC. Bechtel Form G-321-D, as implemented per Manager of Engineering Directive, MED, 4.58-0, Rev. 5, indicated required documentation was at Bechtel's Ann Arbor office.
 - c. Weld Neck Flanges, P/N 50013077-01, were received on MRR No. AEO-1843, Rev. 1; QCIR No. R-1.00-242; and PO No. 7220-E-20-AC. These flanges were reported to be defective on Nonconformance Report No. 515 and returned to the vendor. Replacement flanges were supplied on MRR No. AEO-3698 and QCIR No. R-1.00-1619. Documentation was supplied to the site, however, the required acceptance by Bechtel's Project Engineering Department at Ann Arbor was not indicated on Form G-321-D.

Pursuant of this deficiency, the inspector determined that the functions and the implementation requirements of Form G-321-D were not clearly delineated in MED 4.58-0. The

licensee provided Nonconformance Report No. QF-193 dated October 17, 1977, which already addressed this problem. Affirmative action has been taken in the form of a letter from Bechtel Project Engineering at Ann Arbor, dated November 21, 1977, which gives interim instructions until Form G-321-D can be revised. The licensee informed the RIII inspector that Nonconformance Report No. QF-193 will remain open until complete and proper corrective action has been taken. The inspector has no further questions on this matter.

3. Control Panels, 1C12/1C22 (for Reactor Coolant/Balance of Reactor Coolant and Reactor Auxiliaries Vertical Panel) and 2C13/2C23 (for Control Rod Drive and Computer Benchboard/Chemical Addition and Balance of Reactor Control Vertical Panel), were received on MRR No. AEO-5469; QCIR No. R-1.00-2736, Rev. 1; and PO 7220-J-201-AC. Nonconformance Report No. 1237 was written to control deficiencies relative to these panels.

The records described above were in accordance with the specified site requirements; Bechtel's Quality Control Notices Manual, Project Special Provisions Notice, PSP, G-5.1, Revision 3; and Quality Control Instruction R-1.00, Revision 5, dated September 14, 1977. Bechtel's MED 4.58-0 requires much of the receipt documentation for the above equipment to be located at their Ann Arbor, Michigan office rather than at the Midland site, and therefore, this documentation which was not available for the inspector's review will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection in accordance with the routine inspection program requirements.

Documentation relative to the above equipment was in some cases in the form of certification. Therefore, to verify the validity of the certificates and to determine the effectiveness of the certification system, the licensee has participated in audits of their suppliers. The RIII inspector reviewed correspondence between Consumers and the auditing firms (File Nos. MGO 76-2, 76-12 and 77-4) which documents the licensee's participation.

No items of noncompliance were identified in the areas inspected.

SECTION III

Prepared By R. J. Cook

Reviewed By D. W. Hayes, Chief
Projects Section

Other Inspection Areas

Reportable Deficiencies (50.55(e))

- A. During a previous inspection^{1/} nonconforming welds for seismic Class 1 cable tray supports in the lower spreading room were noted. Subsequent to this inspection, a reinspection of completed fillet attachment welds in the lower spreading room was performed. As a result of this reinspection, 133 QC hold tags were issued. The upper spreading room was examined by the inspector during this site visit. It was noted that the same degree of QC reinspection, that was performed in the lower spreading room, had not transpired in the upper spreading room. During the exit interview, the licensee stated that the Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) system would eventually address this matter through examination and evaluation of seismic welding in the upper spreading room.
- B. As a result of a 10 CFR Part 21 obligation transmitted by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) Consumers Power Company has issued a 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) pertaining to Nuclear Instrumentation/Reactor Protection System (NI/RPS) channel loss of ground without the loss of ground being evident. B&W has recommended that periodic testing for ground adequacy be instituted.
- C. A portion of the defective welds, found in the containment personnel locks, were examined during the inspection. At this time, it is believed that the fillet welds failed because of an improper joint fitup which became overstressed during field weld operations. Four welds in the Unit 1 and five welds in the Unit 2 personnel locks have failed. A repair procedure has been submitted to the licensee which is under evaluation, particularly in the area of post weld heat treatment requirements.

Tendon Galleries

During the inspection, the vertical tendon galleries were physically examined. It was noted that access control was being maintained. The excess dampness noted during previous inspections appears to be controlled, and the walls and overhead were dry. There is still some ingress of water, particularly

^{1/} IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-329/78-03 and 50-330/78-03.

at the eastern quadrant of Unit 2. However, this ingress is believed to be from standing water in the tendon access pits which will be eventually covered. The amount of water accumulation and in-leakage appears to be some less than the previous inspection of January 1978. Bechtel performed a scheduled examination of the tendon galleries on February 10, 1978. The Bechtel Field Engineering Report for this tendon gallery examination indicated that the accumulation of water had lessened.

Water Use for Initial Hydrostatic Tests

Prior to use of Midland city water for hydrostatic testing purposes, the licensee performed chemical analyses of water taken from three different plant locations: (1) Combination Shop, (2) Auxiliary Building, and (3) Turbine Building, Room 2. The results of these analyses revealed the following nominal values:

Conductivity	-	235 <i>M</i> uhos
Chloride	-	8.5 ppm
Flouride	-	1.0 ppm

The results of these analyses permit use of Midland city water for hydrostatic testing, as specified in Specification Guide No. 7220-M-490(Q) and Procedures 7220-M-342 and 7220-M-341 for Q-listed and non-Q-listed piping, respectively.

Weld Shield Fabric Quality

The contamination potential from weld shield material, used in the plant as temporary insulation of the stainless piping from hangers and in area weld operations, was evaluated by the licensee. The three types which may be used in the plant contained 25 ppm chloride, 3 ppm chloride, and 12 ppm hologen. The licensee is making a continuous effort to minimize the chloride contamination to stainless piping from the use of temporary insulation and weld shields.

Corporate Meeting

A meeting was held with corporate QA and Midland Project Personnel in Jackson, Michigan, on April 18, 1978. The meeting was held to discuss potential construction and operational events which have occurred at other facilities and which might have a direct bearing on the Midland Plant.

SECTION IV

Prepared by T. E. Vandel

Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief
Projects Section

1. NSSS Components Installation, Unit 2

At the time of the inspection, activity was underway moving steam generator unit 2E-51A to the Unit 2 reactor building for installation. The inspector observed: (1) the steam generator loaded trailer, (2) the J1 Jacking frame for unloading the steam generator from the trailer, (3) the reactor building crane in the blocked position with the reliance hoist set to lift the generator inside the building and set in place, and (4) the skirt pedestal ready for installing the generator. Activities appeared to be responsive to the following Reliance Truck procedures reviewed by the inspector.

- . 110 - Rev. 1 Installing Steam Generator Support Grillage
- . 101 - Rev. 5 Off Loading Steam Generators
- . 109 - Rev. 0 J1 Jacking Frame Test Lift
- . 107 - Rev. 3 Transporting Steam Generator
- . 106 - Rev. 3 Test Lift in Containment
- . 111 - Rev. 2 Erecting Steam Generator

The above Reliance procedures, all having been reviewed and approved by the licensee, appeared to be compatible with the following B&W procedures reviewed by the inspector.

- . Construction Procedure No. 2, Setting of Steam Generator Sole Plates for Unit 2 (through revision 3 dated March 27, 1978).
- . Construction Procedure No. 11, Set Steam Generator Unit 2 (through revision 1 dated April 4, 1978).

No items of noncompliance were identified.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters in which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section II under Paragraphs 1.b, 1.h and 1.j.

Exit Interview

The inspectors met with site staff representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted Paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21, 1978. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings. A potential problem with document control identified in Section II under Paragraph 1.i was also discussed with the licensee during the exit interview.