

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF:

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
AND
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
ILLUMINATING COMPANY

Docket No. 50-346

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station, Unit No. 1)

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Place - Fort Clinton, Ohio

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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and : Docket No. 50-346

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(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power :
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Trinity Methodist Church
Conference Room
Adams and Second Street
Port Clinton, Ohio

Tuesday, 9 February 1971

The above-entitled matter came on for further
hearing, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a m.:

BEFORE:

WALTER SKALLERUP, JR., esq., Chairman,
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

DR. CHARLES E. WINTERS, Member.

DR. WALTER H. JORDAN, Member.

APPEARANCES:

(As heretofore noted.)

ln

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES:	DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
Lester Rogers	1762			
Paul Tompkins	1770			
Daniel Nelson	1807			
A. K. Davis	1862			
Edythaiena Tompkins	1821			
Bernd Kahn	1854			
Marvin Goldman	1872			
Lester Rogers (further)	1890			
Lowell L. Roe		1899		
Merton Goldman		1904		
EXHIBITS:	FOR IDENTIFICATION	IN EVIDENCE		
Staff No. 7	1814			
Staff No. 8	1828		1847	
Staff No. 9	1857			1871

P R O C E E D I N G S

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2 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: The hearing will please come
3 to order. We notice that Mrs. Bleicher is not present.
4 Miss Evans do you have any comment to make?

5 MISS EVANS: Mrs. Bleicher is not able to attend
6 today, but she will attend tomorrow on our behalf.

7 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: At ten o'clock last night
8 I had a phone call from Mr. Lau who said that it would be
9 convenient for him and his witnesses he thought to meet
10 Wednesday evening. Mr. Lau expects to see his doctor this
11 morning and thought he would be able to drop by the hearing
12 this morning to confirm this arrangement.

13 At the present time efforts are being made to
14 find a suitable room to hold the evening meeting, inasmuch
15 as this room will be occupied and we will have to break
16 tomorrow at about 4:15 in the afternoon so preparations can
17 be made for the evening affair here. We will be able to
18 meet here the following day at this point in time.

19 I understand you have a communication from Mr.
20 Baron.

21 MR. ENGLEHARDT: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

22 Last evening Mr. Russell Baron, counsel repre-
23 senting the Coalition telephoned me to find out what the
24 status of the hearing was. He informed me that he was
25 committed this morning to some professional matters and would

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1 be unable to be here this morning, but he would make every
2 effort to be here this afternoon. I indicated to him that
3 it was likely that the hearing would reconvene at 2:00
4 p.m. in accordance with what has appeared to be the customary
5 procedure. He indicated he would make every effort to be
6 here this afternoon.

7 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Do you care to make any
8 comment or statement, Mr. Charnoff?

9 MR. CHARNOFF: Only that I did understand yester-
10 day from Mrs. Bleicher that LIFE would be prepared to pro-
11 ceed with cross examination of our witnesses on rebuttal
12 this afternoon. And I assume that is still the case in the
13 person of Vicki Evans if not in the person of Mrs. Bleicher.
14 And as I recall our phone conversation yesterday at noontime
15 with Mr. Baron, he was also planning to be prepared to cross
16 examine us this afternoon.

17 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Is that your understanding?

18 MISS EVANS: Yes, it is. And I will try to cross
19 examine as far as I can go. And Mrs. Bleicher will resume
20 tomorrow.

21 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Dr. Jordan informs me that
22 he has a question he would like to ask the witness.

23 MR. ENGLEHARDT: We are also prepared to present
24 a clarifying statement with regard to the record of yesterday.
25 So we can begin again with Mr. Rogers.

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Whereupon,

LESTER ROGERS

resumed the stand as a witness on behalf of the Regulatory Staff and, having been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified further as follows:

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Dr. Jordan, did you want to raise your question or shall we proceed to clarify?

DR. JORDAN: My question has to do with the factor of 700. Is your clarifying statement with respect to that? You testified yesterday afternoon that in the case of iodine-131 and particulates there would be a factor of 700 applied. Indeed the power plant effluents would be held to a factor of 700 lower in the case of those isotopes than is shown in table 2 of 10 CFR 20.

Now my question is: What isotopes do the particulates include; namely, such things as cesium and strontium? And, secondly, how does the factor of 700 get applied? Is it in the tech specs or how?

WITNESS ROGERS: The factor of 700 is applied to particulate radioactivity with a half-life greater than 8 days. Now this would include any releases of cesium, strontium-90, and practically all other radionuclides other than noble gases would be included.

The way this is actually factored into deriving the tech spec limits is that the air concentration at the boundary based on the Appendix D part 20 values for unrestricted areas, those concentrations or air concentrations are in fact reduced by a factor of 700 in deriving the release rate for the iodines and particulates with a half-life greater than 8 days which is applied at the stack.

1 DR. JORDAN: Yes, I understand. Therefore,
2 from the known meteorological conditions at the stack you
3 calculate how much iodine and the other particulates can
4 be released from the stack in order to have a concentration
5 at the boundary that is a factor of 700 underneath those given
6 in table 2. And this appears then as a technical specifi-
7 cation for the plant; is this correct?

8 WITNESS ROGERS: Within the release rate, it is
9 factored into the rate. You will not find a factor of 700
10 stated as such in the tech spec, but it is factored into
11 the release rate that is derived for the iodines and the
12 particulates with a half life.

13 DR. JORDAN: Okay.

14 MR. ENGELHARDT: May the record show that Mr.
15 Howe of the Division of Reactor Licensing will now respond.

16 MR. HOWE: The factor of 700 is shown as a
17 technical basis for the technical specifications and
18 described in the manner in which the computations are made
19 and how the factor of 700 is entered into this computation.

20 The factor of 700 only appears in the basis as
21 part of the description for the mathematical technique used
22 to derive the values that are set forth in the actual
23 technical specifications.

24 DR. JORDAN: But the values that are set forth,
25 do they give a release rate in curies per day, say, of

1 iodine?

2 MR. HOWE: It gives it in the form of curies
3 per second.

4 MR. ENGELHARDT: At page 1755 of the transcript
5 which was at the close of yesterday's session there was an
6 exchange between Mr. Rogers and the chairman of the Board
7 appearing on lines 17 through 22 with respect to the practice
8 with regard to averaging out the releases.

9 Mr. Rogers would like to clarify his response
10 in connection with the Chairman's statement or question at
11 line 20 on transcript page 1755.

12 WITNESS ROGERS: The provisions of Part 2106
13 generally permit concentrations for radioactive material
14 released to unrestricted areas to be averaged over a period
15 not greater than one year. As a practical matter licensed
16 nuclear facilities are designed and operated in such a way
17 that releases of effluents to unrestricted areas and
18 exposures offsite are spread reasonably uniformly over the
19 year.

20 The general provisions of the Part 20 regulation
21 apply to broad and varied categories of licensing activities.
22 However, in the application of the provisions of Part 20
23 to limiting releases of radioactivity and effluents in
24 nuclear power reactors, the technical specifications which
25 control the operation of the reactor and are included as

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1 part of the operating license further restrict the
2 concentrations or quantities of radioactivity that are
3 permitted to be released over a short period of time.
4 For example, technical specifications in operating licenses
5 have provided that for gaseous effluents the maximum release
6 rate over any period of 15 minutes shall not exceed 10
7 times the average release limit.

8 Current practice is to generally limit maximum
9 concentration or release rates at any time to the annual
10 average release limits. These provisions make it unlikely
11 that an individual near the site boundary would receive more
12 than a very small fraction of the annual limit of 500 milli-
13 rem in a short period of time.

14 Technical specifications also require that
15 releases of radioactivity and effluents be kept as low as
16 practical. Implementation of this provision will provide
17 reasonable assurance that actual releases will generally
18 be small percentages of the tech spec release limits.

19 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP The Board will go off the
20 record for a moment.

21 (Discussion off the record.)

22 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Back on the record.

23 DR. JORDAN: Mr. Rogers, I understand that in
24 applying 10 CFR 20 there really are several provisions of
25 10 CFR 20 and you don't always pick the same provision.

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1 Sometimes you say well it is a concentration limit. Some-
2 times you say it is going to be 500 millirems to the man
3 at the border. Sometimes you say it is the 170 millirem to
4 the population at large, or a representative population
5 near the boundary. And other times we say well there is a
6 factor of 700 going to apply to certain isotopes. Presumably
7 this is done because we are meeting some other part of 10
8 CFR 20, so I feel that 10 CFR 20 is not just a single,
9 simple specification. And I think it would be helpful to
10 the Board if you would take time, not try to do it right now,
11 but prepare a statement for the record as to how you know
12 which part of Part 20 to apply and when. And I believe it
13 would clear things up considerably if you would try to do
14 that this afternoon.

15 WITNESS ROGERS: I will be glad to do that.

16 DR. JORDAN: Do you understand the question?

17 WITNESS ROGERS: Yes, sir.

18 DR. JORDAN: Okay.

19 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I believe that
20 completes for the moment Mr. Rogers' testimony. We have
21 some plans to present approximately six additional witnesses,
22 none of whom have been previously here to offer testimony.
23 I think it might facilitate matters if I were to call upon
24 all of those witnesses to appear now to be sworn by the
25 Chairman so that we can then call them as necessary and don't

1 have to worry about it later. So at this time I would
2 like to ask Dr. Tompkins, who is here to my right and
3 Dr. Kahn, Mrs. Tompkins, Dr. Daniel Nelson, Dr. A. K. Davis
4 and Dr. William Bibb to come forward.

5 We have one other witness who is not here yet,
6 but we will see him when he arrives.

7 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Dr. Nelson and Dr. Bibb have
8 been sworn.

9 MR. ENGELHARDT: They were interrogators. They
10 were not sworn at that time.

11 I believe we have everyone here now with the one
12 exception. And this gentleman will be with us a little
13 later and we will handle him separately.

14 Therefore,

15 PAUL TOMPKINS,

16 DANIEL NELSON,

17 WILLIAM BIBB,

18 A. K. DAVIS,

19 EDYTHALENA TOMPKINS, and

20 BERND KAHN

21 were called as witnesses on behalf of the Regulatory Staff
22 and, having been first duly sworn were examined and testified
23 as follows:

24 MR. ENGELHARDT: I would like to call Dr. Paul
25 Tompkins as the first witness.

1 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Would it be a convenience to
2 you to have the witnesses up at the table?

3 MR. ENGELHARDT: We will, as we develop this
4 case. Dr. Tompkins and some of the witnesses have a particular
5 area that they will speak to. And when we begin the cross
6 examination then we will bring all the witnesses back. The
7 program as we envision it with regard to the presentation
8 of these follow-on witnesses is to have the witnesses
9 present their testimony first and then to have them avail-
10 able as a group for cross examination by members of the Board
11 and the parties.

12 MISS EVANS: I just have a comment. Yesterday upon
13 receipt of the testimony from Mr. Engelhardt I did not
14 receive Mr. Tompkins testimony.

15 MR. ENGELHARDT: That is correct. I think I
16 mentioned to Mrs. Bleicher that we had only the three pieces
17 of testimony that we were able to give her in prepared form.
18 I think I see some of the material in front of you now.

19 MISS EVANS: Do you have Dr. Tompkins outline?

20 MR. ENGELHARDT: No, we do not.

21 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: I believe in colloquy I had
22 with Mrs. Bleicher the understanding was that she would be
23 given sufficient time to prepare cross examination on these
24 witnesses.

25 MISS EVANS: Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

Q Dr. Tompkins, would you please state your full name and address?

A My name is Paul C. Tompkins. Address: 6808 Melwood Road, Bethesda, Maryland.

Q Would you please state your present position and give a summary of your educational and professional qualifications?

A My present position is that of acting director, Division of Criteria and Standards, Radiation Office, EPA. As to education and qualifications I have a Bachelors in chemistry from Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington, 1935, and graduate work at the University of Chicago and the University of California. Ph.D from the University of California in Biochemistry in 1941.

As regards my work in this field, as a graduate student I helped some of my colleagues in the preparation of radioactive materials for the cyclotron at Berkeley where they were doing distribution experiments on such things as phosphorous burning tubes, potassium and so forth for physiological measurements.

When the Manhattan District was created, the recruiting procedure was that those who were brought into the project wrote to their friends that they thought had the

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1 background which would help the project. I was so approached
2 and I joined the Manhattan District in 1942.

3 The particular functions we were given were in
4 the biology division of the metallurgical laboratory,
5 University of Chicago, for the specific purpose of separating
6 and isolating high specific activity fission products
7 for toxicity measurements.

8 The reason for going after high specific activity
9 materials is that the function of that program was to derive
10 the kind of data that would be needed to establish the working
11 practices and standards for the plutonium separation
12 project at Hanford.

13 My work during the war was in the separation
14 of strontium isotopes, barium and lithium isotopes, phosphorous
15 burning tubes, radium, plutonium, columbium, yttrium and a
16 few others that I forget right at the moment that were then
17 used for animal experimentation, the purpose of which was to
18 determine those conditions and quantities that would be
19 lethal as a result of the internal deposition of the nuclides
20 in animals.

21 As a result of this dealing with a material that
22 was very high in radioactivity I became quite interested in
23 safe handling procedures and techniques. And a lot of my
24 experience during the war was in the development of laboratory
25 designs and laboratory equipment ranging in activities from

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1 the range of microcurie up to several hundred curies.

2 During the way as a result of this interest I
3 was moved to Oak Ridge where I continued this same process.
4 And I might say my interest in the safe handling techniques
5 and so forth was strictly a matter of self-defense. At
6 Oak Ridge I joined the biology division because of my
7 interest in biological effects.

8 At the end of the war we were given our choice
9 of remaining with the project or returning to our point of
10 origin. I elected to return to San Francisco, from where I
11 came, and join the staff of the Navy Radiological Defense
12 Laboratory with the assignment of development of defenses
13 for the military against the radiation effects of nuclear
14 weapons with specific reference to fallout and fallout con-
15 tamination.

16 From 1952 to 1960 I was the scientific director
17 of that laboratory. And the experience and the functions
18 and missions naturally dealt with the origin, distribution
19 and environmental behavior and derivation of subsequent
20 hazards from environmental radioactivity.

21 In 1960 I was approached by the Public Health
22 Service to join them to do the same kind of thing but with
23 the emphasis on civilian protection instead of military
24 defense. I became the chief of the circuit branch of the
25 Division of Radiological Health. It became apparent very

1 early that the Public Health Service was a little premature,
2 that they were not equipped and not prepared to support
3 a program of the type envisioned.

4 So I transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission
5 as the Deputy Director of Radiation Protection Standards.
6 My first assignment there as a result of my experience with
7 the Navy was as the AEC member of the working group of the
8 Federal Radiation Council.

9 In 1963 when it was decided that the FRC would
10 set up a staff independent of any of the agencies I was
11 asked to become the executive director. It was in that
12 capacity that I served from March of 1963 until December 2
13 of 1970 at which time the FRC was abolished and its
14 functions were transferred to the Environmental Protection
15 Agency.

16 Q Dr. Tompkins, would you please discuss the history
17 of the development of the radiological protection guidelines
18 which underlie 10 CFR Part 20.

19 A I would be happy to. I think the basic factor
20 to be understood is that it has been known for some time
21 that ionizing radiation under appropriate circumstances
22 and in sufficient quantities is capable of causing damage
23 and even death to the persons exposed. The experience of
24 the early radiologists prompted the Second International
25 Congress of Radiology in 1928 to examine the hazards being

1 experienced by practitioners of that profession.

RMS/rms15 2 This, in turn, led to the establishment that same
3 year of the International Commission on Radiological Pro-
4 tection, more commonly known as ICRP. The ICRP was established
5 to develop recommendations for protection of radiologists
6 from exposure to X-rays and gamma radiation from radium and
7 its products.

8 The interests of the ICRP and associated
9 national organizations expanded thereafter to protection
10 from all occupational sources of exposure. As an outgrowth
11 of the founding of the ICRP, the National Committee on
12 Radiation Protection, known as NCRP, was formed in the United
13 States in 1929 under the sponsorship of the United States
14 National Bureau of Standards for the purpose of coordinating
15 the views of the various societies and other organi-
16 zations with an interest in radiation protection problems.

17 In 1964 Congress, pursuant to Public Law 88-376,
18 chartered the NCRP as an independent advisory body.

19 The series of events which led to the formation
20 of the Manhattan District during World War II included the
21 recognition by responsible scientists that the development of
22 nuclear energy contemplated would be associated with
23 quantities of radiation and radioactive materials many orders
24 of magnitude greater than man had ever encountered.

25 It was also recognized that from the experience

1 with radium poisoning and the deaths from cancer that
2 had ensued there would be a spectrum of unfamiliar radio-
3 nuclides as well as a spectrum of unfamiliar types and
4 energies of emitted radiation which would also be encountered
5 in large quantity.

6 Accordingly, General Leslie Groves, head of the
7 Manhattan District, set up medical, biological research
8 and what is now known as health physics organizations to
9 establish safety practices and associated standards to
10 guide in their development. Members of the NCRP were
11 brought in as principal advisors to the health and
12 safety personnel with responsibilities in the Manhattan
13 District.

14 In the early days of the Manhattan District they
15 were faced with three choices about which I can assure
16 there was a good deal of debate. The first choice was to
17 set the standards so that one would avoid any acute
18 toxicity and hope there would not be too severe a hazard
19 from the expected long-term latent hazards such as delayed
20 cancer.

21 The second possibility was to try to compromise
22 between these two and do a benefit-risk approach.

23 And the third was to insert, as a matter of
24 policy, very stringent control standards with the hope of
25 not only avoiding acute radiation injury but also avoiding

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1 the more latent longer-term developing side effects.

2 As a matter of policy, General Groves
3 selected the third option, and severe and stringent controls
4 were applied. And this has influenced the concept of
5 radiation protection developed subsequently through activities
6 of the Manhattan District during the war.

7 Radiation protection standards until the end of
8 World War II were expressed in terms of a "tolerance
9 dose." Also, since these were occupational standards, the
10 population at risk was considered to be adults. The radiation
11 protection standard in force during the Manhattan District
12 period was 0.1 R per day. For purposes of reference I will
13 equate for purposes of this discussion, one R with one rem
14 which is a tissue dose. This would permit a presumed annual
15 dose of 35 rem per year.

16 In 1946 the NCRP was reorganized to accommodate
17 the vast increase in responsibilities imposed by the
18 development of the atomic energy program. And the Committee
19 set up a number of subcommittees to reexamine NCRP
20 standards.

21 On the basis of the experience during the war,
22 the NCRP almost immediately decided to lower the permissible
23 dose for radiation workers from the then current level of
24 0.1 rem per day to 0.3 rem per week. This was done primarily
25 in recognition of the fact that under peacetime conditions

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1 the potential exposure of radiation workers would be related
2 to a much larger work force than was true during the war.
3 The action was based then on prudence, demonstration of
4 industrial capability to operate at the lower level and in
5 recognition of a growing work force.

6 The NCRP members participated in a series of
7 tripartite conferences among the United States, Great
8 Britain and Canada in 1949, 1950 and 1953. These tripartite
9 conferences went into detail on the lessons learned in the
10 wartime development. And all of the radiation protection
11 standards were re-examined. The other nations agreed
12 with the NCRP and the United States that experience with
13 radiation workers in nuclear institutions has shown that it
14 is practical to operate such installations at a lower
15 value than 0.1 rem per day for annual exposure. Therefore,
16 the value of 0.3 rem per week previously proposed by the
17 NCRP was adopted. This recommendation was also adopted by the
18 ICRP in 1950.

19 In 1954 the NCRP Handbook 59 was issued
20 containing that body's further recommendations respecting
21 exposure to radiation. A distillation of all available
22 knowledge concerned with possible effects of ionizing radiation
23 on human tissue at the time of the report lay behind the
24 NCRP recommendations. In the Handbook they discussed bio-
25 logical variability, latent period, recovery and repair,
radiosensitivity, relative biological effectiveness,

1 differential variations, that is, two distinct biological
2 entities with different radiation sensitivities being
3 exposed to two or more radiations of different specific
4 ionizations. It also included examination of the whole
5 body radiation, genetic effects and reduction in
6 lifespan.

7 The philosophy behind the basic recommendations
8 for radion protection is expressed in Section 4.1 of
9 Handbook 59 and is as follows:

10 "As a matter of principle it is sound to
11 avoid all unnecessary exposure to ionizing radiation,
12 because it is desirable not to depart from the natural
13 conditions under which man has developed by evolutionary
14 processes.

15 "However, man has always lived in a field of
16 ionizing radiation due to the presence of radio-
17 active material in the earth and cosmic rays. Whether
18 exposure to this level of radiation is beneficial or
19 deleterious to man and the race is a matter of specu-
20 lation.

21 "The obvious fact is that it cannot be avoided and
22 it is therefore normal for man to live in this environment.
23 We have a lower limit of continuous exposure to radiation
24 that is unavoidably tolerated by man.

25 "There is, on the other hand, a much higher level

1 of exposure that is definitely known to be harmful.
2 Between these two extremes there is a level of
3 exposure, in the neighborhood of 0.1 rems per day,
4 that experience to date shows to be safe for the individual
5 concerned. However, the time of observation of large
6 numbers of people exposed at this rate under controlled
7 conditions is too short to permit a categorical assertion
8 to this effect.

9 "It should be noted in this connection that lowering
10 the level of exposure by a factor of two or even ten, does
11 not materially alter the situation insofar as making a
12 positive statement of absolute safety is concerned.
13 The only statement that can be made at the present
14 time about the lifetime exposure of persons to pene-
15 trating radiation at a permissible level considerably higher
16 than the background radiation level, but within
17 the range of radiological experience, is that appreci-
18 able injury manifestible in the lifetime of the individual
19 is extremely unlikely.

20 "It is therefore necessary to assume that any prac-
21 tical limit of exposure that may be set up today will
22 involve some risk of possible harm. The problem then is
23 to make this risk so small that it is readily acceptable
24 to the average individual; that is, to make the
25 risk essentially the same as is present in ordinary

RMS/rms21 1 occupations not involving exposure to radiation."

2 End quote. Public controversy over the effects
3 on the environment of radioactive materials developed in the
4 early 1950's is the result of fallout from atmospheric
5 testing of nuclear weapons. By 1954 the controversy was
6 acute enough to prompt the Rockefeller Foundation to give
7 a grant to the National Academy of Sciences, known as the
8 NAS, to make a comprehensive review, independent of the
9 government concerning knowledge related to the biological effects
10 of atomic radiation.

11 The NAS, in turn, organized the Committee on
12 Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, commonly known as the
13 BEAR Committee. The first summary reports of the BEAR
14 Committee were published in 1956. Based upon its consideration
15 of the effects of radiation on reproductive material and
16 the quantity of radiation which was judged at that time would
17 double the natural mutation rate in man, and considering the
18 fallout would affect the population of the whole world, the
19 BEAR Committee recommended that, for the general population,
20 an average per capita gonadal dose accumulated during the
21 first 30 years of life should not exceed 10 rem of
22 man-made radiation and should be kept as far below this
23 value as is practicable.

24 The average per capita dose is by its definition
25 the per capita dose that would give -- per capita dose

1 multiplied by the size of the population at risk -- that would
2 give the same number of rems as the exposure actually received.

3 This was the first numerical recommendation for
4 a limitation of cumulative radiation exposure due to all
5 kinds of sources of man-made radiation based on genetic consider-
6 ations alone. The NCRP reviewed the BEAR Committee
7 reports and and, for practical reasons, divided this numerical
8 value between radiation exposure as associated with medical
9 practice and radiation exposure associated with all other
10 practices. It divided this 10 rems recommended by the BEAR
11 Committee into two , 5 rems for medical practice and 5
12 rems for everything else.

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1 Meanwhile, the United Nations, following the impli-
2 cations of fallout from weapons testing, established in
3 December 1955, a United Nations Scientific Committee on the
4 Effects of Atomic Radiation. This is known as UNSCEAR. This
5 committee examined every aspect of what was know at that
6 time about ionizing radiation, both naturally occurring and
7 man-made.

8 The first report issued in 1958 contained five
9 main subjects:

- 10 A. Genetics.
- 11 B. Effects of radiation by internally absorbed
12 isotopes, and the effects of external radiation.
- 13 C. Natural radiation levels.
- 14 D. Exposure during medical procedures and
15 occupational exposure.
- 16 E. Environmental contamination.

17 Item E quite naturally emphasized everything which
18 was known at that time about radioactive fallout from
19 atmospheric testing, the movement of this material in the
20 environment, and its implications with regard to effects on
21 health involving the whole world population. The available
22 information on the effects of ionizing radiation at the
23 level of individual molecules, cells, tissues, and more
24 complex organisms, such as the whole body of animals. The
25 types and quantities of radiation absorbed by tissue were

1 examined for the whole spectrum of functional organs. These
2 included separate sections on evidence for radiation injury
3 affecting the blood-forming organs, skin, gastrointestinal
4 tract, nervous system, bone, gonads, vascular system, eyes,
5 lungs, endocrine organs, and embryonic development.

6 The 1962 U.N. report was also comprehensive.

7 I would like to insert for the record starting
8 with the 1962 report -- I have served as a member of the U.S.
9 delegation on UNSCEAR and still serve in that capacity --
10 which covered the physical and biological aspects of the
11 interaction of ionizing radiation with matter -- somatic
12 effects, hereditary effects, sources of irradiation and
13 comparison of doses and estimates of risk.

14 In its 1958 report the U.N. Committee estimated
15 absolute risk, that is, it calculated the frequency or
16 number of effects which would result or be expected to
17 appear in a stated population subjected to a stated radiation
18 dose.

19 In its 1962 report, however, the committee decided
20 that the assumptions they had to make about biological
21 behavior under stress were so far reaching that the results
22 were highly theoretical and that the hypothesis on which
23 they rested were rather flimsy, and so the committee abandoned
24 this approach on the basis that such absolute risk could
25 not be estimated reliably, and shifted to estimating what

1 it called comparative risks, or the dose commitment.

2 By this procedure the estimated dose resulting
3 from a particular source such as fallout from atmospheric
4 testing of nuclear weapons is compared with the dose that
5 would be delivered by a different source such as that
6 arising from exposure to natural background radiation.

7 There is no attempt made to calculate the number
8 and frequency of adverse effects that might be associated
9 with either of the doses being compared.

10 After preparation of the 1962 comprehensive report,
11 the U.N. Committee felt that future reports should concentrate
12 on selected areas and that an updated evaluation would be
13 useful.

14 The 1964 report was accordingly confined to an
15 evaluation of radioactive contamination of the environment
16 by nuclear tests and radiation carcinogenesis in man.

17 The 1966 report up dated information concerned
18 with radiation from natural sources and environmental
19 contamination by manmade radiation.

20 The genetic risks of ionizing radiation were also
21 updated and reevaluated.

22 The 1969 report reexamined radioactive contamination
23 of the environment by nuclear tests, effects of ionizing
24 radiation on the nervous system and radiation in chromosome
25 aberrations in human cells.

The memberships of the various delegations that

1 assisted in preparing these various reports were selected
2 on the basis of their established professional competence
3 and expertise in the particular areas being reviewed.

4 In 1957 the NCRP issued a preliminary revision
5 to its recommendation for maximum permissible exposure
6 which was designed to control the accumulation rate. They
7 adopted the basic formula that occupational exposure should
8 be so controlled that the accumulated radiation dose would
9 not exceed $5 \times W^{-18}$ where "W" is the age in years. It also
10 repeated its earlier recommendation that permissible levels
11 from radioisotopes taken into the body would be accomplished
12 by control of the average concentration of radioactive
13 materials in the air, water or food taken into the body.

14 In discussing dose to persons outside of the
15 control areas, NCRP recommended radiation or radioactive
16 material outside of the controlled area and attributable
17 to normal operations within the controlled area shall be
18 such that it is improbable that any individual will receive
19 a dose of more than 0.5 rem in any one year from such
20 radiation. It also observed that the maximum permissible
21 average body burden of radionuclides in persons outside
22 of the controlled area and attributable to the operations
23 within the controlled area will normally entail control of
24 the average concentration in air or water at the point of
25 intake. And that the body burdens and concentrations of
radionuclides so estimated may be averaged over periods up

1 to one year.

2 During the same period of time, that is, between
3 1957 and 1960, the NCRP set up an ad hoc committee specifically
4 to consider the scientific and philosophical base of radiation
5 protection standards affecting the general population. This
6 was again an outgrowth of the concern over weapons test
7 fallout.

8 The important contribution of this study was the
9 view that the range of exposure conditions in the naturally
10 occurring environment was a logical point of departure for
11 considering permissible exposures of the general public.

12 At about during the same period there was a great
13 public debate over the applicability of the NCRP standards
14 to the interpretation and control of fallout from weapons
15 testing. It suddenly became aware to the government that
16 the NCRP was not a government body, was not a government
17 entity.

18 So the President asked the Director of the Bureau
19 of the Budget in concert with the Secretary of Health,
20 Education, and Welfare, and the Chairman of the Atomic
21 Energy Commission to review completely the posture of the
22 United States Government in its ability to handle official
23 standards for the government.

24 The result of this review which was transmitted
25 to President Eisenhower was that there was no single agency
with the scope of mission and assignment that could view

1 the problems of the Federal Government as a whole in concert.
2 It was therefore recommended to him that he be advised by
3 an interagency advisory group called the Federal Radiation
4 Council.

5 Accordingly, the Federal Radiation Council was
6 established by President Eisenhower in Executive Order No.
7 10831 dated August 14, 1959 and was subsequently made a
8 statutory body by an enactment of Section 274(h) of the
9 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on September 23, 1959.

10 Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act as amended
11 provides as follows and I quote: "There is hereby established
12 a Federal Radiation Council consisting of the Secretary of
13 Health, Education, and Welfare, the Chairman of the Atomic
14 Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
15 of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, their designees
16 and such other members as shall be appointed by the President.
17 The Council shall consult qualified scientists and experts
18 in radiation matters, including the President of the National
19 Academy of Sciences, the Chairman of the National Committee
20 on Radiation Protection and Measurements, and qualified
21 experts in the field of biology and medicine and in the field
22 of health physics.

23 "The special assistant to the President for
24 science and technology or his designee is authorized to attend
25 meetings, participate in the deliberations of and to advise

1 the Council.

2 "The Chairman of the Council shall be designated
3 by the President from time to time from among the members
4 of the Council.

5 "The Council shall advise the President with
6 respect to radiation matters directly or indirectly affecting
7 health, including guidance for all federal agencies in the
8 formulation of radiation standards and in the establishment
9 and execution of programs of cooperation with states.

10 "The Council shall also perform such other functions
11 as the President may assign to it by Executive Order."

12 The President added the Secretary of Agriculture
13 to the Council on August 16, 1962 and subsequently added
14 the Secretary of the Interior on January 16, 1968.

15 The Secretary of HEW was the first chairman
16 appointed by the President and by convention the Secretary
17 of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare continued
18 effectively as the chairman of the FRC from the time of its
19 abolishment.

20 Following the creation the FRC undertook a
21 completely independent review of what was then known about
22 ionizing radiation, with particular reference to its effects
23 on man. The first report of the FRC was submitted as a
24 memorandum to the President in 1960.

25 In its report number 1, the FRC stated "Although

1 ionizing radiation can induce genetic and somatic effects,
2 that is, effects on the individual during his lifetime other
3 than genetic effects, the evidence at the present time
4 is insufficient to justify precise conclusions on the nature
5 the dose effect relationship at low doses and dose rates.

6 "Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to prove
7 either the hypothesis of a damage threshold, that is, a point
8 below which no damage occurs, or the hypothesis of a no
9 threshold in man at low doses."

10 It also said "There are insufficient data to
11 provide a firm basis for evaluating radiation effects for
12 all types and levels of irradiation."

13 "There is particular uncertainty with respect to
14 the biological effects of very low doses and low dose rates.
15 It is not prudent, therefore, to assume that there is a
16 leveling of radiation exposure below which there is absolute
17 certainty no effect may occur."

18 This consideration, in addition to the adoption
19 of the conservative hypothesis of a linear relation between
20 biological effect and the amount of dose determines our
21 basic approach to the formulation of radiation protection
22 standards.

23 The PRC report number 1 also accepted the view
24 that setting radiation standards inevitably involves a
25 judgment on a balance between the benefits from the activities

1 associated with the cause of the exposure and risks resulting
2 from the exposure.

3 FRC report number 1 established an annual radiation
4 protection guide known as RPG of 0.5 rem for individuals
5 in the population and coupled that as an operational
6 technique when the individual exposure could not be estimated,
7 one-third of 0.5 would be applied to the average per capita
8 dose of a suitable sample of the exposed population.

9 The recommendations contained in FRC report number 1
10 were approved by the President for guidance of federal
11 agencies on May 13, 1960. It is implicit in the definition
12 of the RPG which states that the radiation protection
13 guide is the dose that should not be exceeded without careful
14 consideration of the reason for doing so, and that every
15 effort should be taken to maintain actual exposures far below
16 these guides as is practicable; that the benefit-risk
17 balance made by the Council at that time was that provided
18 these recommendations were met; that the aggregate benefits
19 from all activities would exceed by far the aggregate risks
20 coming from the resultant potential cumulative exposure.

21 On September 13, 1961, the FRC reviewed report
22 number 2, or issued report number 2, in the form of a
23 memorandum for the President.

24 In summary, report number 2 contained recommendations
25 for the guidance of federal agencies and activities designed to

1 limit exposure of members of the population groups to radiation
2 from radioactive materials deposited in the body as a result
3 of their occurrence in the environment from normal peacetime
4 operations.

5 Subsequently normal peacetime operations had to
6 be redefined and the actual definition is that the RPG
7 applies to industrial activities, where the controls are
8 primarily placed at the source.

9 It is envisaged that this would apply to such
10 things as power reactors, research installations, experimental
11 arrangements, hospitals, and so forth.

12 The recommendations in report 2 contained radiation
13 protection guides for certain individuals in the general
14 population, as well as averages to be applied to the suitable
15 sample of exposed groups. It also included guidance on
16 general principles of control applicable to all radionuclides
17 occurring in the environment, and specific guides in connection
18 with exposure of population groups with radium 226, iodine
19 131, strontium 90, and strontium 89.

20 Included in this guidance was the concept of a
21 graded scale of accidents. One-tenth of an average daily
22 intake is the basis under which intake guides are established,
23 one-tenth of the average daily intake --

24 Excuse me. I will go back.

25 The average daily intake taken each day over a

1 year which would result in a tissue dose or dose rate equal
2 to the RPG for the organ or tissue in question. This was
3 the base number. One-tenth of that, or 10 percent of the
4 RPG was considered to be sufficiently low that the only
5 requirement was that surveillance be capable of insuring
6 that the environmental contamination levels were indeed less
7 than 10 percent of the RPG. This was called range 1.

8 Within range 2, which is in the area between
9 10 percent and the RPG, the instruction was to shift the
10 quantitative surveillance, measure or estimate the actual
11 exposures, and if a growing trend was noted, to take such
12 additional engineering restrictions as would be required
13 to prevent the annual exposures going as high as the RPG.

14 It also established a range 3 which was 10 times
15 the RPG, and there the stipulation was that some kind of
16 definite corrective action to bring the exposures back down
17 was indicated.

18 These FRC recommendations were approved by the
19 President on September 20, 1961.

20 Now as to the way the FRC works, I have already
21 indicated in Section 274(h), the composition in terms of the
22 agencies involved.

23 Procedurally, each member of the FRC appointed,
24 a senior member of his senior staff, the criterion being
25 scientific competence in radiation matters, and the purpose

1 was to serve on what was known as the working group of the
2 Federal Radiation Council.

3 The working group brought to the FRC problems of
4 immediate interest to federal agencies. When the FRC was
5 engaged in a specific project, the work was conducted by
6 means of task groups of technical people in government, and
7 when appropriate, consultants from the scientific community,
8 representatives of state agencies, industry, and labor.

9 The work of these task groups was then reviewed
10 by the working group and the relevant information compiled
11 in a background staff report. The staff report included
12 a discussion of the essential scientific considerations and
13 technical considerations in a way which will be relevant
14 to policy decisions that might be involved in the particular
15 problem and the policy decisions then are made by the
16 members of the Council themselves.

17 The FRC Executive Director and the working group
18 approved each staff report but the Council members themselves
19 approved the memorandum for the President which made the
20 official recommendations.

21 The recommendations to the President involved both
22 technical and policy considerations..

23 Upon approval by the President and publication in
24 the Federal Register, FRC recommendations become official
25 guides for federal agencies.

1 There have been nine FRC reports to the President
2 during the period of 1960 to 1969.

3 The situation at the present time is that on
4 December 4, 1970, Mr. Ruckelshaus put into the Federal
5 Register a notice which will be found in Federal Register
6 Volume 35, No. 235, page 18486. This is entitled "Continuation
7 of Functions" and the instruction was that those functions
8 in being at the time of the transfer or the creation of the
9 Environmental Protection Agency would continue as the
10 EPA -- they were simply transferred and would be adopted
11 by the EPA.

12 Accordingly the Water Quality Standards which were
13 formerly in the Department of Interior became EPA Standards
14 in the Water Quality Office of the Environmental Protection
15 Administration.

16 The air quality criteria and standards formerly
17 in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare became
18 the EPA Standards for the Air Pollution Control Office in
19 EPA. And the FRC Standards became the EPA Standards for
20 the Radiation Office in EPA.

21 I think there are a few other things I should
22 mention in terms of the general history.

23 The ICRP adopted the general philosophy of
24 attempting to measure the safety in the nuclear industry
25 against safety in other industries that had quite different

1 hazards to cope with.

2 Consequently they felt that they had a policy
3 requirement to identify or estimate to the best of their
4 ability the risk of injury, particularly of cancer, at the
5 doses and dose rates specified in their maximum permissible
End #1 6 dose recommendations.

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2 Now this is quite a departure from the scientific
3 decision of the United Nations that said this couldn't be done.
4 But feeling that they had to make the best estimate they could
5 anyway, they have had two task forces examining the matter of
6 estimating risks as they might be judged at levels and condi-
7 tions comparable to the MPDs.

8 During the middle sixties they put out two rather
9 important documents, one known as ICRP Task Report No. 8 that
10 made estimates of risk and they cataloged them in what they
11 termed the orders of risk. By definition the order -- well,
12 a 6th order risk, for example, would indicate that one would
13 expect between 1 and 10 cases per million persons exposed, the
14 6 coming from the exponent 6.

15 If it is 1 to 10 per 100,000 persons exposed, it
16 would be called a 5th order risk. The ICRP 14, recognizing
17 the rather widely diverse dose distributions in different
18 tissues instituted a study on the relative sensitivity as a
19 function of space distribution and tissue sensitivity. This
20 was called ICRP 14. And the philosophy of ICRP is that they
21 are concerned with what you might call the actual number or
22 absolute number of adverse effects that would be predicted.

23 The possibility that radiation risk could be
24 examined equally in terms of a percentage change in the under-
25 lying natural risk was pointed out by the Committee in the
early 1960s. But the rationale of ICRP is that a small

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1 percentage change in a particular disease that has a high
2 natural incidence would result in more deaths than a large
3 percentage change in a disease which had a low natural inci-
4 dence and since they were concerned with absolute safety,
5 they wanted number of cases, rather than percentages.

6 And that is the official position of ICRP at the
7 present time.

8 In November of 1969 Drs. Gofman and Tamplin from
9 the University of California at Livermore opted to go for
10 the percentage change explanation. And they made a presenta-
11 tion to Senator Muskie, in which they claimed that the actual
12 effects to be anticipated from or permitted under the guide-
13 lines of any of the radiation protection bodies would result
14 in a much larger number of adverse effects than such bodies
15 had contemplated.

16 Senator Muskie sent this testimony to the federal
17 agencies, it was decided the agencies would reply separately,
18 and they did. In the reply from the Department of Health,
19 Education and Welfare it was pointed out that the HEW, as
20 indeed was true of all of the federal agencies, did not
21 accept the underlying premise, assumptions, and so forth that
22 were necessary for Tamplin and Gofman to make in arriving at
23 their numbers.

24 But in view of the fact that there are three
25 different ways to express risk, and that recognized

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1 international scientifically competent bodies had opted for
2 alternates, Secretary Finch quite properly in my opinion felt
3 it was time for the Federal Radiation Council to completely
4 review the scientific basis of its own guidance. He made this
5 recommendation to the Council and as a consequence of that,
6 a major review was initiated by the FRC early in 1970.

7 The review covers essentially four parts. The
8 reexamination of the scientific basis for estimating risk was
9 established by contract between the FRC, or between the
10 Department of Health, Education and Welfare and on behalf of
11 the FRC and the National Academy of Sciences. That review
12 will be not only comprehensive, but it is hoped it will be
13 quite critical and exacting. It is of a scope and magnitude
14 equivalent to the Bear Committee's reports of a decade or so
15 ago and the estimate of the Academy is to do a scholarly and
16 reliable job of reviewing all of the evidence, and also all
17 of the competing interpretations and it will take approximately
18 two years.

19 We have with the NCRP a contract to evaluate the
20 models relating to contamination of the environment by
21 strontium and cesium isotopes, the intake in the body, and
22 subsequent tissue dose resulting from an effort to look at the
23 distinction between a continuous long-level low intake, as
24 is characteristic of fallout, and a more acute contaminating
25 event as might occur from an accident, where you had a short

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1 burst. The risk considerations become quite different here:
2 The NCRP is examining the best way to draw these relationships
3 in order to permit reasonable decisions for protection and
4 safety to be made in the face of a variety of circumstances.

5 A third part of the review is being conducted by
6 a temporary staff assigned to the FRC, one from the Atomic
7 Energy Commission, one from the Department of Defense, and one
8 from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The
9 purpose of this temporary staff is to utilize the full
10 resources of all of their agencies to quantitate what we
11 can say at this point in time about the dose commitments
12 associated with differing activities, what we can say about
13 the populations at risk, what we can say about changes in
14 occupational exposure that have occurred in the past decade,
15 are they going up or going down, are the control practices
16 keeping pace with the changes in application.

17 Recognizing that if one is going to talk about
18 radiation risk as such, one is not entitled to talk about
19 only that part of it which is being subjected to radiation.
20 Therefore, we are going to see to what extent we can quan-
21 titate the dose commitments from the natural backgrounds,
22 the variations in populations at risk that might be associated
23 with variations in natural backgrounds, the dose commitments
24 to the traveling public as a result of cosmic ray exposure
25 from jet travel, projections of the future exposure that might

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1 be anticipated as a result of the growth of nuclear power.
2 And in effect as complete a catalog of the current state of
3 knowledge regarding what is now affecting the population of
4 the country as a whole as we can derive.

5 Now in order to establish a rational basis for a
6 benefit-risk balance, it will also be necessary to project
7 major changes or innovations of growth that may occur in the
8 next 10 to 20 years. Consequently, we will try to get some
9 kind of official judgment as to what reasonable can be expected
10 in connection with the SST development, in connection with the
11 not currently approved but sought after commercial application
12 of peaceful nuclear explosive, particularly for stimulation
13 of gas and any other major newer growth in old applications
14 that we can find.

15 Implicit in this is there is no distinction for risk
16 purposes drawn between medical and nonmedical exposure in
17 contrast to the distinction drawn on standards. And I believe
18 this whole program was transferred to EPA and starting with
19 fiscal year 1972, it will be conducted under EPA sponsorship
20 and EPA budget. In January of this year the National Council
21 on Radiation Protection and Measurements issued a new Report
22 No. 39 which in effect updated and upgraded its so-called basic
23 standards that were previously found in the so-called Handbook
24 59.

25 This covers the same territory essentially covered

ln6 1 by FRC Report No. 1. They have made some changes which they
2 consider to be minimal and certainly not very drastic. One
3 change was the thyroid dose criterion for occupational workers
4 which in the previous report and in the FRC report was 30 rems
5 per year, this has now been changed to 15.

6 I think this is in recognition of the fact that
7 the current evidence would suggest that instead of being
8 somewhat less sensitive than other tissues to injury, it is
9 now felt that the thyroid is at least as sensitive as other
10 tissues and, therefore, should be treated similarly in terms
11 of dose limits.

12 The occupational skin dose criterion for an
13 unlimited area of the body was changed from 30 rem per year
14 to 15 rem per year. The forearm dose criterion for occupational
15 workers was changed from 75 rem per year to 30 rem per year.
16 The feet and ankle dose criterion for occupational workers
17 was changed from 75 rems per year to 15 rems per year. A
18 limitation of 0.5 rem to the fetus during the entire gestation
19 period has been proposed for application to pregnant women
20 in the occupational worker category.

21 Women of reproductive capacity in the occupational
22 work category and exposed to stated radiation conditions
23 should be limited to a rate of two to three rems per year
24 instead of the five rems which is the normal occupational
25 and it is known that when a woman becomes pregnant the

ln7 1 exposure of the fetus should be limited in both dose and dose
2 rate. This change essentially would establish a new radiation
3 worker category.

4 They have a recommendation for students under age
5 18 who are involved in educational activities for which the
6 limitation should be 0.1 rem per year. The educational
7 activities in question do not necessarily refer to the use of
8 radionuclides, but are intended to serve as a basis for
9 establishing appropriate procedures and safeguards in high
10 school and college physics laboratories using cathode rays
11 and similar radiation producing types of devices.

12 In the nonoccupational exposure category, certain
13 organ dose criteria to the individual and the public were
14 changed from 1.5 rems per year to 0.5 rem per year. These
15 particular organs include skin, GI tract, lung, bone, thyroid,
16 kidney, spleen, pancreas, prostate, muscle tissue, or fatty
17 tissue. In its explanation of its report, the members of
18 the NCRP made it clear that the fundamental approach in making
19 these changes had two objectives.

20 One was to examine and reexamine what levels could
21 be considered practicable for the activities to which the
22 standards apply and the changes in occupational categories
23 were predicated on the belief that these lower limits were
24 indeed practical and, therefore, should be utilized. The
25 second was that in having a difference between exposure of

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1 the whole body and the exposure of certain individual organs,
2 a difference by a factor of three, made life unduly complicated
3 and where one is dealing with the general public it is by
4 definition the risk must be kept exceedingly low so that
5 biological variability becomes an important factor. They
6 saw no biological justification for trying to draw distinctions
7 between various organs and tissues, and, therefore, they just
8 arbitrarily established the same dose limit of .5 rems per
9 year regardless of how, where, who, what the exposure condi-
10 tions might be.

11 They were quite emphatic that none of these
12 changes were related to -- well, there is only one change
13 that was in fact related to a change in opinion on sensitivity
14 and that was the thyroid. They do not feel that the restriction
15 they put in on the fetus or to protect the fetus implied any
16 change in their previous judgments regarding sensitivity of
17 embryonic and fetal developments, but the recommendation was
18 made to insure that the dose rate, which is important in
19 potential hazards to developing embryos, was kept quite low,
20 as well as the total accumulated dose.

21 And I would say in closing that there is one other
22 principle that has been followed by ICRP, NCRP, and by the FRC,
23 and that is what we call the consensus principle. Namely,
24 we try to get a consensus of opinion on all of these recommenda-
25 tions and changes from anybody who would be directly affected

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1 by one or the other. The medical profession was consulted
2 at great length on the hand and finger limitations because of
3 the use of radium applicators and so forth in medical
4 practice.

5 Any group that might be affected is invited in
6 to participate in the task forces. We make a broad-scale
7 effort to incorporate everybody who has a direct stake in
8 the outcome. And I think that that is the general viewpoint
9 of all people who are concerned with standards.

10 We make no pretense of trying to consult everybody,
11 but we make an issue out of consulting all legitimate interests
12 that have a stake in the outcome of whatever standards may be
13 up for development.

14 Now, the last comment I will make is that FRC
15 standards and guidelines apply to all activities, not just
16 to a few. They are not designed specifically for the atomic
17 energy industry, but the atomic energy industry is expected
18 to live within them. They apply equally well to the regula-
19 tions put out by the Department of Health, Education and
20 Welfare relative to permitted emissions from color TV sets,
21 and the whole works.

22 There is some belief that in EPA one should perhaps
23 look at the implications of establishing enough planning
24 standards such as FRC has done. But perhaps relook at the
25 types of activities for which standards would be appropriate.

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1 No action has been taken on this, but the subject
2 is certainly being looked at in terms of the advantages and
3 disadvantages.

4 DR. JORDAN: The last statement you had made had
5 to do with apportioning between the various industries?

6 DR. TOMPKINS: That is what some people call it.
7 See, when you put in a limit and then talk about apportioning,
8 the first assumption one is making is that exposure to that
9 limit is quite acceptable. I don't buy that. That is the
10 maximum.

11 The exposure should be kept as far below as is
12 practical. So what it comes down to is determining what is
13 practical for each of the different classes of activities.
14 And I call that separate standards for separate activities,
15 but I would not concede to a true apportionment because of
16 the concept.

17 That is just a philosophical thought.

18 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I believe that
19 completes Dr. Tompkins' testimony. In line with our proposed
20 approach, we would now plan to proceed with the presentation
21 of our other witnesses, and Dr. Tompkins would be available
22 for such examination by the Board and parties as may be
23 desired when we complete the full presentation.

24 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you, Dr. Tompkins.

25 We will take a 10-minute break.

(Recess.)

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CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Will the hearing please come to order.

We are fortunate to be able to announce that arrangements have been made for tomorrow night's session and they will be held at the St. John's Lutheran Church, which is across the street from here, on the southeast corner of this intersection of Adams and Second Street.

It is our plan to adjourn tomorrow afternoon at 4:15 and to resume the evening session at the St. John's Lutheran Church at 7:00 p.m. We will make this announcement again tomorrow morning at the opening of the session.

MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Engelhardt resumes with his rebuttal, I would just like to indicate that this morning we have sent over a copy of yesterday's transcript to Mr. Lau's home, so that that would be available to him for his preparation of any cross-examination he might have of us.

Secondly, after noting the good right arm of Miss Evans writing away while Dr. Tompkins was speaking, we have made arrangements with the Reporter to bind up copies of this morning's transcript and we will lend to LIFE and to Mrs. Stebbins, as soon as it is available from the Reporter, a copy, we will lend a copy to LIFE and a copy to Mrs. Stebbins of our copies of this morning's transcript, so that the rebuttal testimony by the AEC offered this morning and not

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1 available in written form yesterday will be available to
2 both of those parties as soon as it is available to all of us
3 in writing.

4 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you, Mr. Charnoff.
5 Mr. Engelhardt.

6 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to call
7 as our next witness Dr. Daniel Nelson.

8 DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

10 Q Would you please state your name and address?

11 A Daniel J. Nelson. I live at 116 East Morningside
12 Drive, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

13 Q Would you please state for the record your present
14 position and provide us a summary of your educational and
15 professional qualifications?

16 A Presently I am Assistant Director of the Ecological
17 Sciences Division, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak
18 Ridge, Tennessee.

19 My educational qualifications include a bachelor
20 of science degree in 1947 from Iowa State University, in 1947,
21 a master of science degree in fish and game management from
22 Oregon State University in 1949 and a Ph.D. in zoology with
23 major in ecology from the University of Georgia in 1957.

24 I have worked for the Georgia Game and Fish
25 Commission from 1949 to 1953 and I was an assistant professor

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1 of biology at West Virginia University from 1957 to 1959.
2 Since 1959 I have been at Oak Ridge National Laboratory as an
3 ecologist, where I work with radioactivity in the environment.
4 We study food chain movements, radionuclide cycle and the
5 effects of ionizing radiation on natural populations of
6 organisms.

7 I am a member of a number of professional
8 societies, such as Ecological Society of America, American
9 Society of Limnology and Oceanography, Health Physics. I am
10 a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of
11 Science. I review papers editorially for the Journal of
12 Science, Ecology, Limnology, and Health Physics, among several
13 others.

14 Q Dr. Nelson, are you familiar with the testimony
15 of Dr. Tamplin which was given in this hearing?

16 A Yes.

17 Q Would you give your evaluation of Dr. Tamplin's
18 views with respect to the doses of radioactivity which may
19 be anticipated because of food chain process.

20 A Both the testimony of Dr. Tamplin in the Transcript
21 Pages 1499 to 1510 and answers in the cross-examination in
22 Transcript Pages 1523 to 1560 question the adequacy of
23 10 CFR 20 to protect people living in the vicinity of nuclear
24 facilities from excessive exposure to radiation.

25 Dr. Tamplin contends that the maximum permissible

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1 concentration values have very little relevance in the real
2 world. Dr. Tamplin further contends that radionuclides are
3 concentrated in food chain processes and because of this man
4 will experience excessive radiation exposures from drinking
5 milk from cows which are grazing on pastures exposed to MPC
6 levels of cesium-137.

7 Similarly people drinking water with MPC values
8 would receive excessive exposure, as would people eating one
9 pounds of fish per week from contaminated water.

10 Dr. Tamplin's testimony is based on a mathematical
11 description of the movements of cesium-137 in air to pasture
12 forage which cows eat and in turn yield milk contaminated
13 with cesium-137.

14 According to Dr. Tamplin's calculations, the con-
15 sumption of one liter of milk by a 150-pound man, a 75-pound
16 child or a 100-pound pregnant woman would result in exposures
17 greater than the limits set forth in 10 CFR 20. Similar
18 conclusions were reached for drinking water and eating fish.

19 Details of the methods used by Dr. Tamplin to
20 calculate the effects on man of radioactivity in the environ-
21 ment are contained in a series of reports identified by
22 Dr. Tamplin on the Transcript Page 1524.

23 An important assumption of Dr. Tamplin's mathematical
24 description is that the food chain will receive the maximum
25 amount of radioactivity immediately upon exposure from a

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1 source. This is biologically unsound because we know that
2 cesium-137 moves in the food chain from grass to the cow
3 to the milk and then to man and there are time-dependent
4 variables in this process.

5 Another assumption is the fact that he assumed
6 that the availability of the radionuclide in food was always
7 100 percent. We know -- by availability, we mean the capa-
8 bility of the organisms, digestive processes, to utilize and
9 assimilate this particular nutrient element. And we know that
10 availability varies significantly depending upon its chemical
11 form and associated materials which are swallowed along with
12 the grass.

13 With cesium, for instance, if any dirt or soil
14 particles are ingested with the grass, the amount of cesium
15 which is available will be reduced. Dr. Tamplin does not
16 take into account varied practices.

17 For instance, supplemental feed is an important
18 part of the diet of dairy animals and cows give more milk
19 when they are penned and fed than when they are allowed to
20 graze at will on the range. In fact, Dr. Tamplin admitted on
21 page 1554 of the Transcript that it was absurd to assume
22 that cattle would stand at the boundary fence and eat all day.

23 With respect to the assumption that man drinks
24 2,200 milliliters of water each day, Dr. Tamplin has
25 similarly misinterpreted the application of concentration

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1 limits with respect to calculations used with average man.
2 Actually the average man is assumed to drink 1,200 milliliters
3 of water, and the other 1,000 milliliters of water in his
4 average daily diet comes from the food.

5 CHAIRMAN SKALLEFUP: Could you convert that into
6 common language of pints?

7 THE WITNESS: Well, a liter is roughly a quart,
8 slightly more than a quart, one and six-hundredths quart.
9 So what we are saying is that a man drinks probably about a
10 quart and a pint of water each day, five pints of water, some-
11 place in there. And then there is another quart of water
12 that you get with your mashed potatoes or beef steak, whatever
13 you happen to be eating, or gravy.

14 The total for the average individual being then
15 slightly over two quarts. With fish exposed to one day's
16 maximum permissible concentration of cesium in water,
17 Dr. Tamplin also assumed that these fish reached their maximum
18 concentration instantaneously.

19 Again this is biologically unrealistic, because
20 we know fish have to digest their food and this is a function
21 of temperature and it can go from maybe eight to twelve hours
22 on up to three or four days. Dr. Tamplin has used these
23 mathematical descriptions to calculate estimated doses.

24 On page 1551 of the Transcript, he says that there
25 is little discrepancy between the results of his methods and

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1 results obtained by other methods. Actually his results
2 yield doses that are high by a factor of 50 to 100 or even more
3 for adults. For a 75-pound child, they are in even greater
4 error, because he simply doubles the dose that a child would
5 get which is not correct.

6 He neglects important biological factors with
7 respect to children. They have a higher metabolic rate, the
8 volume of air they breath is less, and also the volume of
9 water consumed is less. But actually the quantity of food
10 they eat, I guess most of you know, is considered equal to
11 that consumed by the average man.

12 We are talking about a 75-pound child in this
13 particular case. Because of Dr. Tamplin's unrealistic or
14 erroneous assumptions with respect to the biological and
15 ecological processes, his dose estimates are not valid.

16 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

17 Q Dr. Nelson, in your testimony you indicated that
18 Dr. Tamplin has used mathematical descriptions to calculate
19 estimated doses. Then you say that his results yield doses
20 that are high by factors of 50 to 100 or more for adults and
21 similar highs for others.

22 Would you explain a little more specifically what
23 the basis is for that particular statement?

24 A Well, we have calculated doses using similar
25 mathematical descriptions of the processes which occur in the

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1 environment and in these descriptions we calculated doses
2 as did Dr. Tamplin that were one percent to two percent of
3 those that he observed. And I think this is the basis for
4 our comments there.

5 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, that completes
6 Dr. Nelson's direct testimony.

7 DR. JORDAN: Dr. Nelson, have these calculations
8 that you have done been published somewhere?

9 THE WITNESS: No, they have not. We do have
10 calculations available if you wish to look at them in tabular
11 form for direct comparison of Dr. Tamplin's doses and the
12 doses we calculated.

13 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, Dr. Nelson in
14 conjunction with some of his associates at Oak Ridge National
15 Laboratory has prepared a document which is called "Comparison
16 of Doses Estimated by Dr. Tamplin's Methods and the Oak
17 Ridge National Laboratory From Releases of Maximum Permissible
18 Concentrations of Cesium-137 in Air and Water."

19 It may be helpful to offer this document for
20 identification and then offer it in evidence. I would, however,
21 like to distribute this proposed exhibit and have Dr. Nelson
22 explain this proposed exhibit and then we can consider further
23 the offer of this exhibit as a staff exhibit for this
24 proceeding.
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1 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

2 Q Dr. Nelson, would you explain the significance --
3 first of all let me ask you, did you prepare this for the
4 purposes of our identification?

5 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have
6 this chart which has just been distributed identified as
7 Staff Exhibit 7.

8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Staff Exhibit No. 7 for
10 identification.)

11 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

12 Q Dr. Nelson, would you tell me whether you have
13 prepared this document which we have identified as Staff
14 Exhibit 7?

15 A Yes, I prepared this document.

16 Q Would you identify the document by again reading
17 the title?

18 A This is a comparison of doses estimated by
19 Tamplin's method and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from
20 releases of maximum permissible concentrations of cesium-137
21 to air and water.

22 Q Can you tell us how this chart or this exhibit
23 was prepared?

24 A Well, people in the Ecological Sciences Division
25 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been developing

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1 mathematical descriptions of ecological systems for a long
2 period of time. The general idea behind these approaches is to
3 permit us to estimate exposures of populations, both wild
4 animal populations and human populations, to radionuclides
5 in the environment.

6 The particular mathematical description that I
7 used here in conjunction with two of my colleagues at Oak
8 Ridge National Laboratory, Dr. S. V. Kaye and Ray Booth has
9 grown out of a need to predict doses or to estimate doses in
10 connection with nuclear events. This is the same reason that
11 Dr. Tamplin has developed his mathematical descriptions of
12 ecological systems.

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1 Q Dr. Nelson, could you now explain this document
2 which was identified as Staff Exhibit 7 so that the Board
3 and the parties may understand what this chart is intended
4 to convey?

5 A Well, Dr. Tamplin used three sources, milk, water
6 and fish, which we have up there. And he has also put in
7 certain assumptions with respect to these sources.

8 Incidentally there is an error in the transcript
9 on page 1549, line 5, in connection with Dr. Tamplin's
10 testimony. It says 82 microcuries per square meter and it
11 really means 0.82 microcuries per square meter. This is in
12 the milk calculation, the deposition of cesium 137.

13 DR. JORDAN: How do you know that that is an
14 error on Dr. Tamplin's part?

15 THE WITNESS: Because his paper on the deposition
16 of manmade radioactivity in the environment, which he
17 quoted from at the hearings, contains the 0.82. It is
18 the regulation of manmade radiation in the biosphere by
19 Arthur R. Tamplin.

20 DR. JORDAN: Was that put into evidence?

21 THE WITNESS: No, it was not.

22 DR. JORDAN: And it might be the one that is in
23 error.

24 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think so, because at
25 the same time we found one other error in this transcript

1 where he had used one-thousandth for a concentration factor
2 for fish and it appeared in the transcript as 1,000.

3 MISS EVANS: I might add we noted the same mistake
4 about the concentration of cesium in fish flesh.

5 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I think it should
6 be noted that there has been no opportunity for witnesses
7 to offer any corrections to the transcript as yet and it
8 may very well be that as Dr. Nelson has indicated in these
9 two areas that there has been an error in the transcription
10 presented in the record.

11 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: The Board will go off the
12 record.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Back on the record.

15 Mr. Engelhardt, we had a discussion regarding
16 this AEC Staff Exhibit No. 7 and Dr. Winters would like to
17 make a comment with respect to it, and then after that Dr.
18 Jordan has a number of observations that he would like to
19 make with respect to it.

20 DR. WINTERS: I would like to clarify the origin
21 of this document and the representations that it represents
22 the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

23 Does it indeed represent the Oak Ridge National
24 Laboratory's position? Or are these positions of individuals
25 of that organization?

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1 THE WITNESS: This work will appear in official
2 Oak Ridge National Laboratory documents. The work on which
3 this is based will appear in the documents.

4 DR. WINTERS: That is different.

5 What is this purporting to set forth then?

6 THE WITNESS: Well, what this is is another
7 mathematical description which we feel is more realistic.
8 It represents a dynamic approach to the study of radionuclide
9 movements through the food chain. Whereas Dr. Tamplin's
10 position is one where you obtain instantaneous contamination
11 at the source, followed by transients through the food
12 chain.

13 The net result being that in his model you have
14 peak contamination, or his mathematical description, you
15 have peak contamination initially, with a gradual decline
16 in radioactivity through time.

17 In the model developed by Drs. Kaye and Booth, there
18 is a gradual build up and when you integrate the areas under
19 the curves, you see large differences in the dose to organisms
20 and to man.

21 DR. JORDAN: Dr. Winters concern however was
22 that this particular calculation was represented as an OENVL
23 document and he thinks it would probably be fairer to repre-
24 sent this as a Nelson-Kaye-Booth document.

25 Would you be willing to so change the description?

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1 THE WITNESS: We could, yes.

2 MR. ENGELHARDT: I think, Dr. Jordan, that in our
3 description on the record earlier of this document that it
4 was clear that Dr. Nelson and the other two had done
5 the work with regard to this chart. We can easily delete
6 from this identified exhibit the term "Oak Ridge National
7 Laboratory" and identify it as Dr. Nelson's, as he participated
8 in developing this model.

9 DR. JORDAN: All right.

10 Now then --

11 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Well, let's do that.

12 What do you strike and what do you insert?

13 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I think the matter
14 can be resolved by just striking out the words "And the
15 Oak Ridge National Laboratory" and then we have a comparison
16 of doses estimated by Tamplin's method from releases of
17 maximum permissible concentrations. And the comparison
18 would be with the work of Dr. Nelson and his associates.

19 I was not proposing to insert anything, but to
20 have the witness sponsor this exhibit as his own work.

21 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: I am having difficulty
22 with the word "comparison" if there is nothing to compare
23 it with.

24 DR. WINTERS: And lines 12 and 15.

25 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Where it says "ORNL."

1 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, we may revise it
2 to a comparison of doses estimated by Tamplin's method with
3 the Nelson model.

4 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: And likewise on lines 12 and
5 15?

6 MR. ENGELHARDT: Likewise on 12 and 15, we would
7 strike "ORNL" and insert "Witness Nelson."

8 DR. JORDAN: I know I am anticipating a little
9 bit what is coming, but on the other hand under the assumptions
10 here, it is one day exposure?

11 THE WITNESS: Tamplin specified the one day exposure,
12 that is right.

13 DR. JORDAN: So therefore --

14 THE WITNESS: But he also multiplied by 365 to get
15 an annual exposure. Just directly.

16 DR. JORDAN: I see. And you claim that the --

17 THE WITNESS: I say that this is wrong.

18 DR. JORDAN: Okay.

19 Now then this means that we will have to understand
20 how you get from one step to the next and I am a little doubtful
21 that we will be able to do this on just hearing you testify.

22 I am wondering if therefore a submitted sample
23 calculation wouldn't be more effective.

24 THE WITNESS: Or supporting documentation.

25 DR. JORDAN: Or supporting documentation wouldn't

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1 be more effective than just testimony as to how you get from
2 one place to the next.

3 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, to expedite this
4 matter, could we defer on further consideration of this
5 exhibit to permit Dr. Nelson to work out this explanation in
6 a form that will be usable and understandable for the
7 record?

8 Meanwhile this Staff Exhibit 7 has been offered
9 for identification purposes only, not as an exhibit, and
10 it will remain in that status, that limbo status, until we
11 have an opportunity to present some further back-up material
12 with respect to its contents, at which time we will offer
13 that and further discuss that matter.

14 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Very good.

15 MR. ENGELHARDT: Dr. Nelson then has completed his
16 rebuttal at this stage. I think we are ready to call our
17 next witness.

18 I would like to call as the next Staff witness
19 Mrs. Edythalena Tompkins.

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20 DIRECT EXAMINATION

21 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

22 Q Mrs. Tompkins, would you state your name and address?

23 A Edythalena Tompkins, Bethesda, Maryland.

24 Q Would you please state your present position and
25 give a summary of your educational and professional qualifi-

1 cations?

2 A Well, as of last week I was transferred to the
3 Environmental Protection Agency where I am the senior radiation
4 epidemiologist in the Division of Research, Radiation Office.

5 I received an A.B. degree in biochemistry in 1939
6 at Stanford University, California. I then did a year's
7 graduate work in organic chemistry, followed by two years as
8 a research assistant in the Department of Biochemistry.

9 For the next 10 years I was occupied full time as
10 a mother.

11 Then I returned to graduate school and had two
12 years work at the Department of Statistics at Stanford
13 University in biostatistics, and since that time I have been
14 working in radiation epidemiology.

15 The first five years were spent at the Stanford
16 University Medical School, where I was involved in a
17 study of children who had died of acute leukemia, as
18 compared to children who had not, in which we were trying to
19 determine what factors in the history of the children with
20 leukemia might be associated with the disease.

21 We then moved to Washington and for the past
22 nine years I have been with the Bureau of Radiological
23 Health.

24 My continuing primary responsibility has been as
25 the project director of a large scale study of persons who

1 were treated for hyperthyroidism with the radioisotope 131-I.
2 We have 22,000 of them under study and we are comparing the
3 long-term effects in these patients with some 14,000 patients
4 who were treated by other means for the same disease.

5 In addition for the past two years I have been
6 chief of the Genetic Study Section in the Epidemiology Branch
7 of the Bureau.

8 Q Mrs. Tompkins, at page 1234 of the transcript
9 this Board took official notice of Appendix 2, titled
10 "Evaluation of the Possible Causal Relationship between
11 Fallout Deposition of Strontium 90 on Infant and Fetal
12 Mortality Trends," in Volume 2 of the Joint Committee on
13 Atomic Energy hearings on the effects of producing electric
14 power.

15 Are you the author of this report identified in
16 Appendix 2?

17 A Yes, I am, in association with Morton Brown, a
18 colleague of mine.

19 Q Mrs. Tompkins, I would like to show you a copy
20 of a document which is published by the United States
21 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health
22 Service, Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service.
23 It is identified as document DBE-69-2 and is entitled
24 "Evaluation of a Possible Causal Relationship between Fallout
25 Deposition of Strontium 90 and Infant and Fetal Mortality

1 Trends."

2 Is this document which I am showing you now
3 identical to that which is contained in Appendix 2 of the
4 Joint Committee hearings?

5 A Yes, it is.

6 Q And you are the senior author, as you described,
7 of this document also?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Mrs. Tompkins, could you tell the Board why this
10 particular report was prepared?

11 A In the summer of 1969 Dr. Sternglass, Dr. Ernest
12 Sternglass, sent to the Secretary of HEW, Secretary Finch,
13 a copy of all of his papers and presentations which he had
14 made up to that time on infant mortality trends.

15 As is usual when such a thing comes into a
16 Secretary, it is referred down to the program level for
17 evaluation. In this case a task force was formed consisting
18 of people from the Bureau of Radiological Health, the National
19 Cancer Institute, the National Office of Health Statistics,
20 to prepare a report to return to the Secretary evaluating
21 these documents.

22 I was assigned the primary responsibility of
23 preparing the report, doing the analyses, and Mr. Brown, my
24 associate, prepared certain of the analyses, and then when
25 the report was in draft phase, it went back to all of the

1 members of the task force for review and when it was in its
2 final form it was then returned to the Secretary.

3 Q Would you please summarize the content of this
4 report?

5 A I would like to refer to the report at certain
6 points in the summary. I think the Board members --

7 MR. ENGELHARDT: As a point of information for
8 the Board, the Staff will at the conclusion of this summary
9 offer this document as a Staff exhibit. But we would like
10 to have the witness summarize the content for the benefit
11 of those who may be attending this hearing primarily. The
12 report we are summarizing is identical to the report
13 distributed to the Board and parties at yesterday's session
14 of the hearing.

15 THE WITNESS: When we looked at the documents
16 which Dr. Sternglass had submitted we found that in each
17 of them he stated that his research had proven a causal
18 relationship between the deposition of 90 strontium from
19 fallout due to atomic weapons testing, and the decrease in
20 the rate of downward trend of infant and fetal mortality.
21 He also stated that his hypothesis was that the slower
22 rate of decline was caused by an excess of deaths that
23 resulted from genetic damage due to the incorporation of
24 90 strontium into the genetic material of the parents
25 before the child was conceived.

Now the only data given in any of these documents

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1 was in the form of graphs. So if necessity we were limited
2 to analysis of these graphs. And we found that in one paper,
3 the evidence for low level radiation effects on the human
4 embryo and fetus which was printed in the proceedings of the
5 Hanford Symposium on the Radiation Biology of the Fetal and
6 Juvenile Mammal, May 5-8, 1969, contained a graphic
7 presentation which was included in the other papers.

8 We, therefore, limited our analyses to this paper
9 which seemed to contain everything that was in the other
10 documents.

11 Now, the evidence which he presented was divided
12 into three areas, leukemia, childhood leukemia, I should
13 say, fetal mortality, and infant mortality.

14 I will discuss these in these three areas, the
15 evidence, and simply give examples of the kinds of problems
16 we felt were inherent in the data.

17 All of the leukemia data is based on numbers of
18 cases. The primary data is various plots of distribution
19 by time, by age, and so forth, of 55 cases of acute child-
20 hood leukemia, I should say 55 deaths of acute childhood
21 leukemia in the years '52 to '62 in children age zero through
22 15 in the Troy-Albany area of New York. These children
23 were alleged to have died as a result of the exposure to
24 the rain fallout debris in April of '53 in this area. And
25 it was stated that there was an increase in the rate of
leukemia following the rain fallout.

1 Now all of this data was presented independent of
2 the underlying population at risk. And it is almost impossible
3 to look at cases over a time period and determine that there
4 is an increase in rate of death.

5 For example, if you observe seven cases per hundred
6 thousand in 1950 and --

7 Excuse me, I gave it to you as a rate.

8 If you observe seven cases in 1950 and if you
9 observe 14 cases in 1960, the rate has not doubled if the
10 population from which these children came has doubled. Seven
11 per 100,000 children is exactly the same rate as 14 children,
12 deaths, per 200,000 children. So that looking at cases
13 alone is very misleading, and very difficult to interpret.

14 In addition, when you talk about 55 cases divided
15 over 10 years, you are talking about an average of 5.5 cases
16 per year.

17 With small rates of this kind, with small numbers,
18 we had very large errors, statistical errors, on what the
19 true rate really is.

20 Consequently, to make any statement about changes
21 from year to year is virtually impossible.

22 To get around this problem of the small numbers,
23 Dr. Sternglass then went on and looked at all of the deaths
24 from acute childhood leukemia in the State of New York. Of
25 course with a much larger population he had many more cases.

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1 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, at this juncture
2 since reference is being made to this report specifically,
3 we would like to have this report previously identified
4 to be identified now as Staff exhibit 8, just for identifi-
5 cation.

6 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: It is so ordered.

7 (The document referred to as
8 marked Staff Exhibit 8 for
9 identification.)

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10 THE WITNESS: Dr. Sternglass went on and said
11 the fall-out in New York which of course was from other than
12 the Troy rain-out, had caused an increase in risk of leukemia
13 in the whole state of New York.

14 In this plot which is somewhat confusing you will notice
15 there are three different distributions, all on the same
16 scale, I should say, and all again by numbers of leukemia cases,
17 not by rates.

18 The top group is the total number of leukemias in the
19 age group zero through 14, with the base line at approximately
20 153 which he said was the average number of deaths in the
21 years 1950 to 1954 in New York, stating that this was the
22 time before the effect of the fall-out could be seen in
23 leukemia.

24 The next distribution down on the graph is a break-out
25 of the children 5 to 14, through 14 years of age, and the

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1 bottom group are the zero to 1 year olds.

2 He also has entered the dates of various testing programs,
3 both at the Nevada test site, the USSR, US and UK large tests,
4 and if you notice there is an off-set from the time of the
5 tests going over five years, approximately five years, in
6 which he states it takes five years from the time of the fall-
7 out for its effect to be seen in leukemia.

8 I think in this plot the problems with working with cases
9 alone is quite evident. For example, the maximum number of
10 cases which he shows in any year is 209 cases in the State of
11 New York. And yet the population at risk between 1950
12 and 1960 -- that is children zero through 15 years of age --
13 has increased in New York State in that period of time by
14 38 percent.

15 So if you take a simple 38 percent of his average of
16 153, you would expect to see 206 cases of leukemia, which is
17 about what they did see, 209 cases.

18 So there is no evidence here for any increase in
19 leukemia in the New York area in this period of time.

20 I would like to just briefly read one paragraph which
21 was our summary conclusion on the leukemia data.

22 "The dangers in postulating the existence of an
23 association based on comparisons of number of cases observed
24 over the period of time is well recognized by epidemiologists.
25 Unless the cases can be related to a base population, from

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1 which the cases were derived, and comparisons then made of
2 the observed rates, or unless the base population has
3 remained static, no trends of change over time can even be
4 assumed.

5 "Even if such a trend could be demonstrated, an increase
6 in an exposed population" -- and I say exposed in quotes --
7 "without a different pattern in a 'no-exposed' population
8 fall short of even demonstrating an association let alone
9 a causal relationship."

10 Now the fetal and infant mortality data. He used one
11 methodology in all of the analyses. We divided our evaluation
12 of this data into two parts, one the methodology itself, and
13 two, ignoring our criticisms of the methodology and accepting
14 his methodology, we looked at the completeness and the
15 consistency of the data in support of his hypothesis.

16 Now the methodology which he used is the following:
17 He assumes that a logarithmic transformation of the infant
18 or fetal mortality observed rates from 1935 to 1950 is
19 linear. And if you extend this line this is what we would
20 have expected to see for the next 16 or 17 years if fall-out
21 had not been around.

22 We have plotted in Figure 6 on page 9 the logarithmic
23 transformation of the infant mortality rates and the fetal
24 mortality rates for the United States from 1922 through 1966.
25 Excuse me, the fetal mortality through 1966, and infant

1 importantly these reporting requirements have changed within
2 states over the period of time which are used.

3 For example, you will see on this plot of Figure 6 that
4 there is a break, there are two lines for fetal mortality.
5 The top one is all gestations, meaning all periods which were
6 reported. That is not even reported after 1960. In 1945 the
7 National Office of Vital Statistics changed their requirement
8 and they now report fetal mortality of gestations of 20
9 weeks or more.

10 As far as we can tell Dr. Sternglass used a cross-over
11 from the line of all gestations to get the data that he needed
12 for the lower gestation periods. These are two different
13 reporting bases.

14 With these problems with fetal mortality, the base
15 data, which incidentally are reported in every publication
16 of the fetal mortality ratios by the National Office of Vital
17 Statistics, all of the conclusions are somewhat suspect, shall
18 we say.

19 But I would like to look at one figure as an example
20 of the kinds of things we did in looking for completeness
21 and consistency of the presentation, independent of the
22 methodology.

23

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1 For example, I would like to refer you to figure
2 nine on page 13. That is a reproduction of the figure
3 presented by Dr. Sternglass in his paper, and we used the
4 galleys to prepare these graphs. This plot shows fetal
5 death rate in California versus New York State and
6 is stated to show that the New York trend began to change
7 in '50 to '52 due to fallout from the Nevada test site, whereas
8 California did not change until '56 to '57, because it did not
9 get fallout except after the start-up of Pacific testing.

10 I am sorry it is on the next page, but if you
11 look on the next page, page 14, Figure 10, you will see
12 the plot from the same data which we prepared. We did a
13 least squares fit line, whereas Dr. Sternglass put an
14 eyeball fit line on.

15 And in addition, we included all of the data
16 for New York State. If you look on the first plot, Dr.
17 Sternglass' plot, for some reason he left out all of the
18 points between 1938 and 1945.

19 If you look on ours, we include this data.
20 And to state that any line from these figures from 1935
21 to 1950 could project what could happen in the
22 future, of course, is insane. There is just no way of
23 doing it.

24 The California data, however, was complete, and
25 with a fitted line it appears the change in California started

1 in the very early 50's, not in '56 to '57 as you would look
2 at the plot of Dr. Sternglass with his eyeball line.
3 The infant mortality data is quite complete and
4 does not have the problems inherent in the fetal mortality data.
5 All of the data which Dr. Sternglass presented are plots
6 comparing his calculated excess deaths. And to avoid having
7 to say this every time, whenever I say excess deaths,
8 this is Dr. Sternglass' calculation of what if the mortality
9 trends had continued on the same line they had been going
10 on, then how many more children would be alive, is actually the
11 way you would say it.

12 But these are not excess deaths, these are excesses
13 over his projected line. I don't want to have to qualify
14 this "excess" every time I use it. All of his data is a
15 comparison of these excess deaths versus various distri-
16 butions of strontium-90 in teeth, in milk, deposited and so
17 forth.

18 Now the first data, figure 17, page 20, in which
19 he is comparing the excess deaths for the State of Missouri
20 with the data of -- data against the data of strontium-90
21 in teeth. These are in deciduous second molars of children,
22 as collected by Dr. Rosenthal at St. Louis starting in
23 1947.

24 If you look at this plot, it does appear to
25 show there is a close correlation between the rise in his

ms 3
1 excess infant mortality and the strontium-90 in teeth.
2 However, I would like to point out that the 1951 point of
3 excess seems to have been ignored in the line of his trend
4 line of the excess.

5 And unfortunately Dr. Sternglass also seems
6 to have made a fairly simple arithmetic error in that he
7 changed his baseline, he calculated, he got the slope of
8 his projected line by extending from 50. But then he wanted
9 to set it back to 47, and instead of moving the slope
10 of the line and recalculating all of his excesses, he simply
11 subtracted the percentage of 1947 from his percentages of
12 1950 and subsequent years. And his percentages are a ratio.
13 If they are based on different denominators, you cannot
14 subtract or add them and have any meaningful term.

15 We redid this data intending to correct the
16 arithmetic error, but we also found that St. Louis infant
17 mortality over these years was not the same as the State of
18 Missouri. As all of these teeth had been collected in the
19 St. Louis metropolitan area, we felt that the St. Louis
20 data, if his hypothesis was true, should fit the strontium-
21 90 even better than the Missouri data.

22 So we did the infant mortality excesses, using
23 his model and his methods, for the St. Louis City-County
24 area, and we plotted this against the strontium-90 in
25 teeth.

rus 4
1
2 Now, as the infant mortality data was only
3 available from 1942 on, we also did the Missouri data using
4 1942 to 1950 as the baseline rather than 1935 to 1950.

5 If the hypothesis is correct, that past predicts
6 future, it should not matter what years you use for this
7 baseline. And in fact the closer the better. So that the '42
8 to '50 should not change the projection.

9 I told you this was a very sensitive indicator.
10 If you will look at figure 18 on page 21, the line with
11 the circles in it is the Missouri excess deaths calcu-
12 lated by Dr. Sternglass based on the years '42 to '50 projected
13 line. And you will see that it is very, very different from
14 that on a '35 to '50 base.

15 There seems to be little explanation for the
16 St. Louis City-County mortality as compared to the strontium-90
17 data. You will notice as the strontium is increasing,
18 his excess deaths go down below zero. And then they increase
19 very rapidly and then they plateau out again independent of
20 the even, smooth increase of Strontium.

21 Perhaps the plot which appears in every paper
22 which Dr. Sternglass perhaps gives, it is the one plot
23 which appeared in all of the papers which Dr. Sternglass
24 presented to the Secretary, the maps of the United States,
25 two maps, one in 1946 and one in 1959. This plot is figure
26 24 on page 28. Dr. Sternglass states, and I quote, "The

rms 5

1 three to five-year delay in the peak of infant mortality
2 which suggests the genetic rather than a direct somatic
3 effect is best shown in the changes of the rates of
4 mortality in the Southern, downwind states following the first
5 atomic weapons test in Alamogordo, New Mexico in July, 1954."

6 Now to explain this plot for a moment, Dr.
7 Sternglass calculated his excess, and because he
8 was looking for the effect of Alamogordo testing, he used
9 the baseline 1935 to 1945, which of course is perfectly
10 proper.

11 He stopped his projections at 1945, but he only
12 used 1940 to 1945 as his projected line. He then calculated
13 the excess or deficit in deaths, in infant mortality, for each
14 state and he has plotted 1946 for all of the states and 1950
15 for all of the states.

16 The shaded states are those which show an excess
17 of more than five percent. Now in his 1946 plot he shows
18 that Montana and North Dakota have an excess of five percent --
19 I shouldn't say that -- more than a 5 percent excess of deaths.

20 In the 1950 plot Montana and North Dakota still
21 have this excess. But Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
22 Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina show the
23 same, more than 5 percent excess. He states that this is due
24 to the fact that the fallout from Alamogordo went across
25 the southern part of the United States and the gradual build
up in the genetic material of the parents resulted five

rms 6
1 years later in this excess in infant mortality across the
2 southern states.

3 If this hypothesis is true, you would expect to see
4 a very gradual build-up of excess infant mortality in these
5 lower states, with nothing showing in the first years and
6 then gradually building up to the plot which he has shown in
7 1950.

8 We calculated these excesses for all of the 48
9 states plus the District of Columbia for each year from
10 1946 through 1951. We found some interesting things.
11 For example, in 1947 Arkansas and Louisiana already showed
12 an excess of five percent or greater. But Montana no longer
13 did.

14 In 1948, Texas, Mississippi and Alabama joined
15 the five percent or greater group, but so did Wyoming and
16 South Dakota. In 1949 Georgia, South Carolina, North
17 Carolina passed the five percent level, as did Virginia
18 and Vermont while South Dakota was no longer at 5 percent
19 any more.

20 In 1951, the year after the plot he shows, Virginia
21 was again at the 5 percent level. Thus, only the year 1950
22 shows the distribution of states with percent of excess
23 mortality of 5 percent which Dr. Sternglass used as the demon-
24 stration of a three to five-year delay from the arrival of
25 fallout to a five percent excess infant mortality.

rms 7

1 No explanation other than radiation from
2 fallout is suggested by Dr. Sternglass for these excesses,
3 including even the '46 excesses in Montana and North
4 Dakota. In order for the Sternglass hypothesis of the three
5 to five-year delay effect to stand unchallenged, some
6 sources of radioactive strontium in Montana and North
7 Dakota must be identified in the years 1941 to 1943.
8 The Hanford Washington reactor did not go into operation until
9 1944. The first atomic weapons test in 1945 could not
10 explain the changes in Arkansas and Louisiana as early as
11 1947 and still other sources would be needed to explain the
12 changes in Vermont, South Dakota, Wyoming and Virginia.

13 We are unaware of any such sources of strontium
14 at that period in time in these areas. In epidemiology we make
15 hypotheses and we say that all of the data must be con-
16 sistent with the hypothesis or we must change our hypothesis
17 to fit all of the data.

18 We were also interested as to why Dr. Sternglass change
19 his line from '35 to '45 to '40 to '45 in this particular
20 plot. Being curious epidemiologists we did it. So we
21 did the same thing exactly using '35 to '45 for all of the
22 states for the periods of time and the results of this analysis
23 are shown in figure 25 on page 30.
24
25

end 6

7 DB-1

1 The sensitivity of the base line I think is well demon-
2 strated by this plot. For those of you who do not have the
3 plot, I would like to state that in 1946 there were five
4 states with an excess of five percent: Washington, Idaho,
5 Montana, North Dakota, and Texas. And in 1950 the states
6 were Utah, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, and
7 Wisconsin.

8 If you use the '35 to '45 base line, there is no excess
9 across the southern part of the United States at all.

10 The last piece of data which was presented was milk
11 data and the comparison of excesses with milk.

12 Now the milk data which Dr. Sternglass used was
13 gathered by our Bureau in the so-called milk network. There
14 was a raw milk network which started in '57 and '58 with ten
15 stations and then in 1961 and 1962 it converted over to a
16 pasteurized milk network and went to 62 stations.

17 This milk network was to monitor the amount of radio-
18 activity in the milk. The raw milk network was based on
19 sampling the milk at the producer. The pasteurized milk
20 network was based on monitoring the milk at the consumer
21 level, that is, it was taken from shelves in grocery stores.

22 Now there were nine stations which had been continuously
23 in the network since it started in 1957. However, analyses
24 reported in the Bureau Rad Health data reports, which inci-
25 dentally Dr. Sternglass referenced as his way of putting

DB-2

1 together the raw milk network and the pasteurized milk networks,
2 specifically state that two states, Missouri and Georgia,
3 can not have the data put together. The milk sheds are so
4 different that the data is not comparable. Where, therefore,
5 Dr. Sternglass got his data for those early years in Georgia
6 and Missouri I don't know. But it is presented.

7 He used four-year moving averages. He took all of the
8 measured activity in the state for a four-year period and
9 then moved the average along. He did this to try to get an
10 average dose showing to the parent before the infant mortality
11 to allow for this three to five-year delay in the effect.

12 Now if you look at the plots on page 31, figure 26,
13 this is the data presented by Dr. Sternglass and indeed some
14 of these states show a very close relationship with the
15 moving infant mortality, excess infant mortality and the
16 moving four-year average in milk.

17 Again, being curious, we wondered about the three
18 states in the network which were not shown. And unfortunately
19 Dr. Sternglass made his same arithmetic error of subtracting
20 percentages. So we went back and for those states in which
21 it was valid to put together the raw milk network and the
22 pasteurized milk network, we plotted all of the data. This is
23 shown in figure 27.

24 Now as there are some differences with the correction of
25 the arithmetic error in the four states. Utah, Illinois and New

DB-3

1 York and Texas, which are valid, there are still some reason-
2 ably close relationships. However, the three states which he
3 did not show, which are Ohio, California and Washington, seem
4 to be quite different.

5 For example, Washington has one of the highest concen-
6 trations of strontium 90 in the milk of any of the states which
7 we have continuous records on. And yet it has the lowest
8 excess infant mortality of any of the states used in this
9 comparison.

10 On the other hand, California has the lowest strontium
11 90 of any of these states in the milk, and it has one of the
12 highest rates of excess infant mortality.

13 In summary and in the discussion we made the statement:
14 "Although all of the evidence which Dr. Sternglass has
15 presented to support an association between 90 strontium
16 deposition and a decrease in the rate of decline of infant
17 and fetal mortality in the United States has failed to stand
18 up under careful scrutiny, the important implications of
19 such an association, if true, warrant some further investi-
20 gation."

21 We felt that although Dr. Sternglass' data could be
22 knocked down, that it was incumbent upon us to do anything
23 that we could do to try to see if this association was
24 indeed a valid one. We made the hypothesis that if the
25 changes in the infant and fetal mortality, the infant mortality,

DB-4

1 I should say, which we will limit ourselves to, were due to
2 a common factor, that is, fall-out of strontium 90 in par-
3 ticular, then you would expect to see certain things occurring
4 simultaneously.

5 For example, you would expect to see the neo-natal and
6 the post-neo-natal mortality rates changing at the same
7 time. In those states which have large enough non-white
8 populations to be reported separately, you could also hypothe-
9 size that the non-whites and the whites should change at the
10 same time.

11 In other words, what we were doing was trying to cut the
12 populations within states into different groups to see if
13 they were behaving commonly.

14 However, we realized that the main entry of strontium
15 90 into the human is via milk, and we felt that it was
16 perfectly possible that the socio-economic status of the non-
17 whites could mean that they got a lower level of milk and
18 therefore they might change at a later period of time.

19 These analyses were primarily done by Mr. Brown, my
20 co-author, but the table and the results of these analyses
21 are shown on page 35.

22 Looking at the neo-natal and post-neo-natal data,
23 those entries with dashes in them indicate that there was
24 either no change in the period from 1935 through 1967 in the
25 trend of infant mortality deaths, or that there were multiple
changes.

DB-5 1 DR. JORDAN: Could you explain to me neo-natal
2 and post-neo-natal?

3 THE WITNESS: Sure. Infant mortality are the
4 number of deaths which occur within the first year. Neo-
5 natal is within the first 28 days; post-neo-natal is from
6 29 days through 365 days.

7 Now although some of the states did change then at the
8 same time neo-natal, post-neo-natal, some of them changed
9 at quite different times, and in two states there was as much
10 as four years difference when maximum change in trend occurred.
11 These two states were Michigan and South Carolina, in which
12 there was a four-year difference between the neo-natal and
13 the post-neo-natal change.

14 It is interesting that they are just the opposite,
15 one was 49 in '53, the other is 53 in '49.

16 We also looked at the white versus the non-white popu-
17 lation. Contrary to our hypothesis that the non-whites might
18 be later because of their lower consumption of milk, the
19 non-whites -- I should say there are 26 states which have a
20 10 percent non-white population and therefore their statistics
21 are reported separately. Of these 26, in 14 states the
22 non-whites preceded the whites and in one state by as much as
23 five years. That state is Oklahoma in which the change in
24 trend occurred in 1946 in the non-white population and did
25 not occur until 1951 in the white population.

DB-6

1 As a final effort to check out this hypothesis,
2 we did one more thing. It was stated that complete depos-
3 ition of strontium 90 records going back from the early fall-
4 out days are available for 13 states.

5 We hypothesized that the accumulation of excess of
6 deaths, if you accumulated these excesses by years, should
7 correlate with the accumulation of strontium.

8 For the 13 states we did the accumulated excess deaths,
9 as calculated by Dr. Sternglass' method, and the strontium
10 90. The correlation coefficient is minus zero point zero 15.

11 I would like to say that this is about as close to a
12 no-relationship as you will ever get in a correlation co-
13 efficient. Zero indicates none.

14 In summary, our summary paragraph for this paper which
15 was presented to the Secretary says:

16 "The rate of decline of infant mortality in the
17 United States did change around 1950.

18 "This lowering of the rate of decline has been a
19 concern of many people working in the public health field.
20 Many careful studies have been made and no single factor
21 nor group of factors have been identified which explain this
22 change.

23

24

25

DB8 In1 1

2 "While the hypothesis that this change is a result
3 of 90 strontium deposition from fallout is an interesting one,
4 the data presented do not appear to indicate any relationship
5 between the change in rate of decline of infant mortality and
6 the deposition of fallout in the United States."

7 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
8 that the report which has been identified as Staff Exhibit 8
9 be admitted as Staff Exhibit 8 in this proceeding.

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Would you please read back what
11 Mr. Engelhardt said?

12 (The Reporter read the record as requested.)

13 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: As evidence?

14 MR. ENGELHARDT: As evidence.

15 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: It is so ordered.

16 (The document referred to,
17 heretofore marked Staff Exhibit
18 No. 8 for identification, was
19 received in evidence.)

XXXXX 19

BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

20 Q On page 1296 of the Transcript, Dr. Sternglass
21 has stated that he was the only one engaged in certain types
22 of epidemiologic studies. Do you agree with Dr. Sternglass'
23 statement?

24 A No. In addition to the studies which we have made
25 there are two other studies which have already been published

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1 on the relationship of strontium-90 and infant mortality.
2 One is 90 strontium in infant mortality by Patricia Lindlop
3 and J. Rotblat of the Medical College of St. Bartholomew's
4 Hospital, London, which was published in "Nature," Volume 224,
5 December 27, 1969.

6 Another one, 90 strontium in infant mortality in
7 Canada, by R. F. Shaw and A. P. Smith, Department of Preventive
8 Medicine and Pediatrics, Dalhousie University, Halifax,
9 Nova Scotia, which appeared in "Nature," Volume 228, November
10 14, 1970.

11 These studies are based directly on the types of
12 analyses and studies which Dr. Sternglass has done. In addi-
13 tion, there are a great many other definitive epidemiology
14 studies going on and have been going on for some year in some
15 cases in an effort to determine the long-term effects of
16 internally deposited isotopes in the human body.

17 Q Mrs. Tompkins, one last question with regard to
18 your response. Do the reports that you specifically identified
19 relate to the type of studies that Dr. Sternglass has per-
20 formed, or do they reach any similar conclusions as does
21 Dr. Sternglass in his studies?

22 A I can read the final summary paragraph of the
23 Lindlop-Rotblat paper. I should say the final sentence.
24 "In summary, none of the evidence given by Sternglass stands
25 up to objective analysis and we must conclude that there is

ln3 1

no justification for linking the break in the downward trend of the infant mortality curve with strontium fallout."

2

3

Now, the Canadian paper used Dr. Sternglass' method and compared it with the findings in infant mortality in Canada. And their conclusion, "The strontium-90 in the mortality rates in the various states," which we call provinces "do not rise together. If anything, they show a slight negative association. The regression coefficient is minus 0.81."

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2 MR. ENGELHARDT: That completes this witness'
3 testimony.

4 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Dr. Tompkins, do you recall
5 whether the Canadians made any studies which indicated the --
6 let me first refer to figure 25. What hits me here is that
7 the Border States --

8 THE WITNESS: They do it by Provinces.

9 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Was there any geographical
10 similarity with their southern provinces and our northwestern
11 states, as it were?

12 THE WITNESS: Review my geography for me.

13 DR. JORDAN: She wants to know what the
14 provinces are. Alberta --

15 DR. WINTERS: Saskatchewan, British Columbia.

16 THE WITNESS: They have quite close depositions
17 of strontium 90 in those three places and that is where their
18 excesses are, interestingly enough, right in the same place,
19 going up 5 to 25 percent, whereas in New Brunswick, for
20 example, which has the highest strontium deposition, their
21 excesses run to minus 50 percent. This is where I assume
22 he put all of his data together for all of the Provinces and
23 then got the correlation coefficient. It is interesting.

24 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you.

25 DR. JORDAN: I had a question or two. Is there
any reason that you know of for expecting a logarithmic,

rms 2 1 straight line logarithmic decrease in infant mortality?

2 THE WITNESS: There is every reason not to expect
3 it. You mean to be linear?

4 DR. JORDAN: Yes. In that connection then can
5 you say what is the experience in other countries in this
6 respect, Scandinavia, France, anything like that? Have you
7 looked at that data?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have looked at every place
9 where I could get strontium data around the world. We
10 compared their excesses calculated in this way. It completely
11 depends, of course, on the general development of the country.
12 For example, as our infant mortality -- and in fact all of Europe
13 and so forth has done it, it has flattened out as it
14 gets lower and lower and lower, even on a logarithmic plot.

15 Japan, on the other hand, which interestingly
16 enough has had probably the highest concentration of
17 strontium-90 anywhere, because of the Russian tests, is going
18 down much steeper than linearity, as the country has
19 developed since World War II. And this is probably what
20 you are seeing more than anything else. So that the shapes of
21 these curves will change very dramatically, depending on the
22 development of the country. This reflects also the reporting,
23 of course. It is an oversimplification, even for a short
24 period of time to assume a semi-logarithmic transformation.

1 DR. JORDAN: Is linear?

2 THE WITNESS: Is linear, I am sorry.

3 DR. WINTERS: Mrs. Tompkins, if you go to this
4 figure 6 in this report on page 9, all of the discussion today
5 has been concerned in extrapolating this curve in a forward
6 direction.

7 Has anyone tried extrapolating this curve in a
8 reverse direction back into the 1800s?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

10 DR. WINTERS: Because if you take this curve
11 and extrapolate it backwards, it gets to where nearly
12 everybody would die as an infant.

13 THE WITNESS: That is right, none of us would be
14 here, there is no question about this.

15 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: What conclusions do you
16 draw from this?

17 DR. WINTERS: There is something wrong with
18 extrapolations in either direction from data.

19 THE WITNESS: In normal National Office Vital
20 Statistics analyses, for example, they will take trend lines
21 over five-year periods, because the variability within one
22 year, comparing two years, side by side, can be very great.
23 If you have a flu epidemic, for example. So they normally
24 use five-year trend lines as a measurement of how are we
25 doing in public health, you know, is the general trend

1 down, is the general trend up. But it is a measurement of
2 what is happening today in a currently moving situation and
3 not projecting at all what is going to happen tomorrow or
4 what happened yesterday.

5 In our own country, for example, New Mexico is
6 continuing to go down very rapidly, but it started out very
7 high.

8 DR. JORDAN: In addition to the infant mortality
9 studies for United States, Dr. Sternglass also reported on
10 infant mortality studies in the neighborhood of Dresden
11 reactor, and I am going to ask you, are you or someone else
12 going to address themselves to that question?

13 MR. ENGELHARDT: Yes, sir. We will have two
14 witnesses who have prepared detailed records with regard to
15 that material and they will be our next witnesses following
16 Mrs. Tompkins.

17 DR. JORDAN: Thank you.

18 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you, Mrs. Tompkins.

19 We will break for lunch and resume at 2.

20 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was recessed,
21 to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., this same day.)

End #10

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2

(2:00 p.m.)

3

CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Will the hearing please come to order.

5

Any further word from Mrs. Bleicher?

6

MISS EVANS: No, I couldn't reach her.

7

MR. ENGELHARDT: The Staff's next witness is Dr. Bernd Kahn. Dr. Kahn has been sworn this morning and is now under oath.

10

DIRECT EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

12

Q Would you please state your name and address?

13

A Bernd Kahn, Cincinnati, Ohio.

14

Q Would you please state your present position and

15

give a summary of your educational and professional qualifications?

16

17

A I am with the Crange Engineering Laboratory of

18

Radiological Engineers, Office of the Environment Protection

19

Agency. I have a Ph.D. in chemistry, I have been involved

20

with studying radioactivity in waste disposal of radioactivity,

21

radioactivity in fallout and radioactive effluents from

22

nuclear power stations since 1951, first at Oak Ridge

23

National Laboratory, then with the Public Health Service,

24

and for the last few weeks with the Environmental Protection

25

Agency.

ln2

1 Q Dr. Kahn, are you the senior author of a report
2 entitled "Radiological Surveillance Studies at a Boiling Water
3 Nuclear Power Reactor," identified as RH-DEB 70-1, a Public
4 Health Service publication, which has been put into evidence
5 by the applicant as Applicant's Exhibit No. 10?

6 I show you a copy of that document.

7 A Yes.

8 Q Is this report used by Dr. Sternglass as the
9 basis for his radiological exposure analysis contained in a
10 paper by Dr. Sternglass entitled, "Infant Mortality and
11 Nuclear Power Generation," dated October 18, 1970, which has
12 been put into evidence by Intervenor LIFE as their Exhibit
13 No. 2?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Do you agree with Dr. Sternglass' analysis of your
16 data?

17 A I have certain differences with Dr. Sternglass'
18 analysis of the data.

19 Q Would you explain those please?

20 A Yes. In brief, Dr. Sternglass tries to show a
21 connection between the radioactivity released from the stack
22 of the Dresden nuclear power station and the increase in infant
23 mortality in the entire state of Illinois, an increase in
24 infant mortality data in certain counties near the station,
25 between 1964 and 1966, and in passing mentions I think some

ln3

1 other things.

2 He uses data from our measurements and I think
3 tries to show three things with these data. First, and mainly,
4 he refers to the external radiation due to the radioactive gas
5 discharged from the stack. In passing he mentions the inhala-
6 tion effect of radioactive gases and also in passing mentions
7 internal exposure due to radiation from other radioactive
8 substances, such as the radioactive particles that are the
9 daughters of these radioactive gases.

10 Now in respect to the effect from these radiations,
11 which Dr. Davis will discuss later, one has to consider that
12 there is a natural radiation background, external radiation
13 background of approximately 90 millirem per year and one has
14 to put any external radiation from the gas in perspective
15 relative to that.

16 With regard to the inhalation of radioactive gases,
17 one has naturally occurring radon-222, which is always present,
18 and one has to put the radiation from the radioactive gas from
19 Dresden in perspective to that.

20 Finally, with regard to internal exposure to
21 radiation from radioactivity particles and other radionuclides,
22 other than the radioactive noble gases, one has radionuclides
23 from fallout as a background relative to what comes out of
24 Dresden.

end 11

25

1 Q Dr. Kahn, are you the co-author of an article
2 entitled "A Critical Review of Infant Mortality and Nuclear
3 Power Generation," by E. J. Sternglass?

4 A Yes.

5 MR. ENGELHARDT: May I have this report identified
6 as Staff Exhibit 9.

7 (The above-mentioned document was
8 marked Staff Exhibit No. 9 for
9 identification.)

10 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

11 Q Would you summarize the contents of the report
12 with respect to the portion of the report which you authored?

13 A Yes. The main argument of Dr. Sternglass is that
14 the external radiation exposure is between 114 and 340
15 MR per year, which of course would be a considerable increase
16 over the natural radiation background. He bases this on
17 measurements which we made over the period of less than an
18 hour several times at the centerline of the plume of the gas
19 or beneath the plume of the gas emitted by Dresden.

20 We reported these values in terms of micro-
21 roentgen per hour, and Dr. Sternglass multiplies the hour
22 numbers by the number of hours per year of approximately
23 8800.

24 This is clearly a mistake, since the wind direction
25 is, of course, variable at Dresden, as in most other places,

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1 and wind does not come sufficiently close to any one point
2 with sufficient frequency during the year to permit one
3 to multiply the instantaneous maximum plume dose by the
4 number of hours of the year. A more appropriate value would
5 be approximately 1/50th of the number Dr. Sternglass uses.
6 This takes into account the fact that an 8 degree wind is in
7 an 8 degree sector at the point of measurement during
8 1968 when we did this study, approximately 3 percent of the
9 time, and also that the station was only operating two-
10 thirds of the time in 1968.

11 As a result of this, in 1968 our measurements
12 would show that at these locations, within one mile of
13 Dresden, the values were between 2 and 7 milliroentgen per
14 year, and at a distance of approximately 12 miles from Dresden
15 the value was approximately .4 milliroentgen per year rather
16 than his number of approximately 20 milliroentgen per year.

17 The second point I would like to make, in view of
18 the fact that Dr. Sternglass points out that a large
19 fraction of the population in Illinois is within a 50-mile
20 radius of the station, that most of this population within
21 a 50-mile radius is more than 12 miles distant. Chicago
22 is roughly 50 miles from Dresden, northeast of Dresden.

23 And at the location near Chicago, where most of
24 the population would be exposed, external radiation would
25 be considerably less than even 4/10ths of a milliroentgen

1 per year, or would have been that in 1968 when we made the
2 study.

3 I would also like to mention that with regard to
4 the noble gases, the same thing applies in the Chicago area;
5 namely, by the time the plume would reach Chicago, the
6 concentration of the xenon, radioactive xerons and kryptons,
7 would be considerably less than the 100 to 400 picocuries
8 per cubic meter which is the natural radon-222 level in air
9 near Chicago. I use Argonne National Laboratory Data there.
10 The passing reference to radionuclides other than the noble
11 gases also should be mentioned. This should not be meant
12 to imply that the dose from these radionuclides is signifi-
13 cant.

14 We have made measurements and we have published
15 calculations based on these measurements of
16 the radioactive iodine coming out of the stack, for example,
17 radioactive tritium, some of the cesium-137 and strontium-89
18 and strontium-90, daughters of these gases, and in every
19 case the radiation is considerably less than the radiation to
20 the people. It is considerably less than the radiation
21 from the gases.

22 This should not mean that one ought not continue
23 to look at these individual radionuclides coming out of
24 nuclear power stations very carefully. But at least in
25 every case that we have seen so far at Dresden, there has

1 not been any significant radiation exposure from these other
2 radionuclides. Finally, as has already been mentioned, I
3 believe, I think Dr. Sternglass reversed wind directions, his
4 idea of the direction the wind was blowing at Dresden,
5 in that the county which is actually downwind, if one can
6 use the term, from Dresden -- which I believe to be an erroneous
7 use of the term, really -- Will County has a very small increase
8 in infant mortality rate between 1946 and 1966, 5 percent
9 according to Dr. Sternglass, while Livingston County, which
10 he considered to be downwind, but which is actually upwind in
11 this kind of frame of reference, had I believe 140 percent
12 increase according to Dr. Sternglass.

13 Now, the reason I believe one should not even use
14 these terms is that, again like many other places, the
15 wind essentially goes in all directions some of the time
16 during the year, and while it may go in the
17 downwind direction twice as frequently as the average,
18 and in an upwind direction half as frequently as the average,
19 let's say, nevertheless every point from Dresden is to
20 some degree downwind.

21 MR. ENGELHARDT: In connection with Dr. Kahn's testi-
22 mony, we would also like to have as a witness Dr. A. K. Davis,
23 who was the co-author of this paper.

24 At this point I would like to ask him some
25 questions, at which time I will offer the exhibit which I

1 have identified as Staff Exhibit 9 into evidence.

2 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Including the Sternglass
3 article?

4 MR. ENGELHARDT: The Sternglass article is already
5 in the record as the Intervenor LIFE's exhibit No. 2, I
6 believe. It might also be noted that the article itself,
7 which is LIFE's Exhibit No. 2, is appended to the copy of
8 the article which has been co-authored by Drs. Davis and
9 Kahn and is included in the -- I believe -- in the material
10 which we have previously, yesterday, given to members of the
11 Board and to the parties.

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1 CH IRMAN SKALLERUP: How do you reconcile this
2 title, or is it completely relevant "The Testimony Presided
3 by A. K. Davis and E. Howard"?

4 MR. ENGELHARDT: We are not offering that. This
5 is a copy of material that has previously been offered as
6 testimony in another proceeding. We are offering the content
7 of the document. If you have a document with a cover sheet
8 on it, the cover sheet should be stripped off. We are not
9 dealing with the cover sheet.

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: That helps.

11 MR. ENGELHARDT: I think there were some copies
12 that had no cover sheet and I believe there were some with
13 the cover sheet, depending on where we got our source of
14 supply.

15 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Then we won't have to duplicate
16 the Sternglass article.

17 MR. ENGELHARDT: That is correct.

18 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: As part of your exhibit?

19 MR. ENGELHARDT: That is correct. We are just
20 dealing with the material that has been authored by Drs.
21 Davis and Kahn.

XXXXXX

DIRECT EXAMINATION

22
23 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

24 Q Dr. Davis, would you please state your full name
25 and address?

1 A A. K. Davis, Great Falls, Virginia.

2 Q Would you please state your present position and
3 give us a summary of your educational and professional
4 qualifications?

5 A I am currently chief of the Epidemiology Section,
6 Division of Biological Effects, Bureau of Radiological Health
7 of the Public Health Service.

8 I hold a B.S. in chemistry from Memphis State
9 University dated 1947. And a Ph.D. in physiology from the
10 University of Tennessee Medical School in Memphis, not in
11 Knoxville, where I worked initially on ion transport of
12 radionuclides, sodium 24 and potassium 42, in animals and in
13 man.

14 My thesis was on the effect adrenal cortical
15 hormones on ion transport.

16 In 1952 I went to the Navy Radiological Defense
17 Laboratory, where I was employed in radiobiological research
18 on weapons effects and worked with neutrons, X-rays, beta rays,
19 reactor gamma, and visible light.

20 And in 1961 I was employed by the Bureau of
21 Radiological Health, where I was director of an experimental
22 laboratory with both in-house and contractor laboratories.

23 I am currently chief of the Epidemiology Section.

24 Q Dr. Davis, have you co-authored with Dr. Kahn the
25 document which we have identified as Staff Exhibit No. 9,

1 which is entitled "A Critical Review of 'Infant Mortality
2 and Nuclear Power Generation'" by E. J. Sternglass?

3 A Yes.

4 Q In particular have you reviewed in your report
5 the epidemiological findings presented by Dr. Sternglass
6 in that paper?

7 A Yes, I have.

8 Q Do you agree with his findings?

9 A No, there are several places where I have marked
10 reservations and differences.

11 Q Would you then summarize the content of your
12 paper with respect to that portion of the report which you
13 authored?

14 A Yes, I will.

15 If you have a copy, I am going to talk from page 3
16 which is entitled "Epidemiology."

17 Sternglass' evidence of serious health effects
18 from the emissions of the Dresden reactor consist of an
19 analysis of the changes in infant mortality and respiratory
20 disease deaths, except pneumonia and influenza for all ages.
21 His initial evidence is that infant mortality in the State
22 of Illinois is greater than that in New York.

23 Our contention is that New York is not an adequate
24 comparison state for Illinois, as shown by the infant
25 mortality data from 1955 through 1961.

1 Furthermore, the principal population potentially
2 exposed is metropolitan Chicago, not the State of Illinois.
3 And when the City of Chicago is compared to a control city
4 with similar characteristics, St. Louis, the total infant
5 mortality for both areas follow the same pattern. At least
6 part of the difference between Chicago and New York City
7 is related to the few non-white births in New York.

8 Now if I could develop some of the ideas that are
9 presented here. Instead of looking at New York as a
10 control, we have chosen St. Louis primarily because there
11 is a marked difference between the infant mortality in
12 white and non-white portions of the population. This is
13 probably a socioeconomic difference that may be related
14 to nutrition, it may be related to the availability of the
15 current health benefits, availability of hospitals and so
16 forth. But this difference is of the order of magnitude of
17 a factor of two. That is, the infant mortality in the white
18 population shows values of between 20 to 25 deaths per
19 thousand live births as compared with 40 to 45 for the non-
20 white population.

21 Consequently, if the ratio between the white and
22 non-white births is changed, this changes the infant mortality.
23 And this is in fact what has occurred in comparing New York
24 and Illinois. It is presented in figure 2 of the appendix
25 if you would like to consult that.

1 In New York City the percent of non-white to total
2 births rises from about 22 to 30, whereas in Illinois,
3 specifically for Chicago, the percentage of non-white
4 births begins at about 40 and rises to about 45 from 1960 to
5 1968.

6 Now it is not, would not be fair to say that this
7 is the total picture, because if you examine the infant
8 mortality rate for the non-white population, you will find
9 there is a significant change in 1963, that runs from about
10 1963 through about 1966. And this is at a period in which
11 the Dresden reactor is putting out a significant -- the peak
12 of the gaseous discharge.

13 Now Sternglass suggests that a relationship
14 exists between the reactor effluent and the difference in
15 infant mortality between New York State and Illinois. And
16 he presents a plot of the excess, that is, the difference
17 between New York State and Illinois, as though if New York
18 State were zero, then the excess would be New York State
19 minus the infant mortality in Illinois.

20 Now this interpretation is questioned because
21 of two factors. First, the range of values is large; that
22 is, it goes from minus 0.7 to plus 3.4 deaths per 1,000
23 live births. And this maximum and minimum occur at the
24 single effluent level.

25 Secondly, a year's lag would be expected if infant

1 mortality resulting from in utero radiation is reflected
2 in the year following birth, that is, the dose is accumulated
3 over a period when the mother is carrying the infant.

4 Consequently, you would expect that the majority
5 of the effect would be seen in the year after, but since the
6 information is presented per year, this would prejudice the
7 results somewhat. But still the year following the radiation
8 would be the peak, would be closer to the dose than would be
9 the year in which the radiation actually occurred.

10 On this basis a comparison of the curves for
11 emission and infant mortality shows that the 1962 emission
12 peak is followed by a fall in infant mortality in Illinois
13 and the subsequent rise proceeds the peak emission, whereas
14 the fall occurs at the peak discharge. That is, there is
15 no correlation between emission and infant mortality if the
16 in utero irradiation period is the critical period as
17 Sternglass suggests.

18 In addition to looking at the state, Sternglass
19 has also looked at the counties surrounding the reactor. He
20 analyzes the Illinois counties with the highest potential
21 exposure.

22 Now here the number of infant deaths are few, and
23 consequently one must consider several years to determine the
24 basic rate for infant mortality. Sternglass uses a single
25 year, 1964 and in some cases this is not representative of

1 the yearly average.

2 It might be mentioned that it is also not an
3 irradiated control, since the reactor began emissions in 1960.
4 As a result of this, the increase in infant mortality in
5 Livingston County is an artifact that results from an unusually
6 low 1964 value. In fact the 230 percent increase or so
7 that he suggests for Livingston County can also be presented
8 as a 68 percent decrease, if you use 1963.

9 Grundy County is somewhat a different situation.
10 Grundy County is a county of only 20,000 people and the
11 number of deaths there in infants, infant mortality is
12 comparatively small. Because of this, the high variability
13 is characteristic of the data.

14 We have analyzed individual points instead of
15 trying to predict a trend, and we find that the rise in
16 infant mortality is significant at the 5 percent level for
17 Grundy County, if you consider only individual points.

18 Now whether radiation exposure is the cause of
19 this rise cannot be determined, because infant mortality has
20 many, many different causes, as Mrs. Tompkins emphasized.

21 The death rate for all ages due to respiratory
22 disease other than pneumonia and influenza is presented as
23 a change in rate. It can perhaps be better appreciated by
24 looking at the absolute numbers, that is, there were 10.9
25 deaths per 100,000 in Illinois, and 13.0 deaths per 100,000

1 in New York in 1960, and in 1967 both states had 18.6 and 18.7
2 respectively.

3 So two considerations indicate that radiation
4 exposure is unlikely to be the sole cause of this change.
5 First, there are many diseases with various causes included
6 in this category and they are affected by a multiplicity of
7 agents, smoking being one, pollution perhaps, air pollution
8 perhaps being another. But at any rate the rise in death
9 rate from this cause is occurring throughout the U. S.

10 More important, radiation exposure is reduced by
11 diffusion of the gaseous emissions and the dose to the
12 lungs of the exposed population is considerably less than
13 0.4 milliroentgen per year.

14 As the variance in background was measured over
15 the Dresden reactor site, it is 46 to 120 mr, it appears un-
16 likely we could detect such changes regardless of the size
17 of the population. It is highly unlikely that this dose
18 could contribute significantly to respiratory deaths in
19 adults.

20 In summary, this analysis shows that radiation
21 exposure has been grossly overestimated and in addition, the
22 changes in infant mortality do not correlate with the
23 radioactive emissions from the reactor site.

24 If I could read on page 16: "This analysis of
25 the epidemiologic data presented by Sternglass does not

1 support his contention that an association exists between
2 exposure to radioactive emissions from Dresden and infant
3 mortality.

4 "In contrast," -- and I think this is equally
5 important -- "the data cannot be interpreted to mean that
6 no effects were produced by the radiation exposure. However,
7 if radiation from the Dresden reactor contributes to infant
8 mortality or respiratory deaths in Illinois or Chicago,
9 it has not been demonstrated by this study."

End #13

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2 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to
3 offer in evidence as Staff Exhibit 9 the document we
4 previously identified, "A Critical Review of Infant Mortality
5 and Nuclear Power Generation by E. J. Sternglass, as Authored
6 by A. K. Davis and Bernd Kahn."

6 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Any objection?

7 MR. CHARNOFF: No, sir.

8 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: It is so ordered.

9 (The document referred to,
10 heretofore marked Staff Exhibit
11 No. 9 for identification, was
12 received in evidence.)

13 MR. ENGELHARDT: Our next witness is Dr. Marvin
14 Goldman.
15 Whereupon,

16 MARVIN GOLDMAN

17 was called as a witness on behalf of the Atomic Energy
18 Commission and, having been first duly sworn, was examined
19 and testified as follows:

20 DIRECT EXAMINATION

21 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

22 Q Dr. Goldman, would you state your full name and
23 address?

24 A My name is Marvin Goldman. I live in Davis,
25 California.

XXX

XXXXX₂₁

ln2 1 Q Would you please state your present responsibilities
2 and give a summary of your educational and professional
3 qualifications?

4 A I am the biophysics group leader at the radio-
5 biology laborator of the University of California at Davis.
6 I am also an adjunct professor of physiology in the School of
7 Medicine there, as well as a lecturer in radiobiology in the
8 Department of Physiological Sciences.

9 I have a bachelor's degree from Adelphi University,
10 a master's degree in physiology from the University of
11 Maryland, I hold a Ph.D. degree from the University of
12 Rochester, School of Medicine, from the Department of Radiation
13 Biology and Biophysics.

14 Over the past 20 years I have been engaged in
15 radiation research. I was a biologist with the National
16 Institutes of Health, a physicist with the New York City
17 Department of Hospitals. I held a fellowship and scholarship
18 at the University of Rochester during my graduate training
19 and was later an assistant scientist in their Radiation
20 Toxicology Section.

21 In 1958 I went to the University of California,
22 where I assumed the responsibility I just mentioned. I have
23 been the author or co-author of over 100 scientific articles
24 and technical reports relating to biological effects of
25 irradiation.

ln3

1 I am a member of the Radiation Research Society,
2 the Health Physics Society, the New York Academy of Sciences,
3 the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, the
4 American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the
5 Sigma Psi Honorary Scientific Society.

6 I am currently a member of the National Council on
7 Radiation Protection, Committee No. 31, which is evaluating
8 the biological and physical properties of the radionuclides.
9 I am a member of the Advisory Committee on Long-Term Radiation
10 Effects of the United States Public Health Service, Bureau
11 of Radiological Health, now the Environmental Protection
12 Agency.

13 I am a co-investigator to and consultant in
14 radiation ecology at the University of California, a full
15 investigator with a NASA program investigating the effects
16 of weightlessness on calcium and bone. And I currently have
17 a research grant from the University Cancer Coordinating
18 Committee on the comparative ultrastructure of animal and
19 human tumors.

20 Q On page 800 of the Transcript, Dr. Sternglass
21 stated, "And the evidence that I simply want to cite is that
22 we have seen again and again in animal studies and otherwise
23 strontium-90 which was believed to reconcentrate only in the
24 bone of animals, actually leading to severe damage to the ova,
25 to the testes, and other organs that had not been anticipated."

ln4

1 Have you performed any experiments, Dr. Goldman,
2 that relate to the effects of strontium-90 on animals?

3 A The program with which I am associated at Davis
4 is almost exclusively dedicated to investigating the possible
5 hazards from radiostrontium. And the experimental animal model
6 in which we do our research is the beagle dog.

7 We are currently studying over 420 animals for
8 their entire lifetime, to document the spectrum of effects
9 which might be expected from strontium-90 fed daily from
10 mid-gestation to maturity, which in the dog is about one and
11 a half years and roughly corresponds to perhaps 20 years in
12 adult humans. The strontium doses that are fed at this con-
13 stant daily rate to a calcium content in their diet differ
14 by factors of three in concentration from adjacent levels.

15 The highest amount of strontium-90 that we have
16 been studying is 36 microcuries per day fed to dogs, which
17 delivers a daily dose to the bone of about 18,000 to 20,000
18 millirads per day. The lowest level that we are studying is
19 approximately 1-1/1000th of this, or perhaps 10 to 20 millirads
20 per day.

21 The study is now in its tenth year and a clear
22 spectrum of the kind of effects is available. First of all,
23 I should like to point out that no pathologic effects have
24 been seen at doses below about 2,000 millirads per day. At
25 doses of over 2,000 millirads per day, hematologic effects in

Ln5

1 the bone marrow are noted, and cause death from myeloprolifera-
2 tive disorders, which include anemias, and myelogenous
3 leukemia. The higher the dose rate, the earlier the effect and
4 the greater the incidence. But these are nonlinear, and in
5 our experience the earliest cases at any of the dose levels in
6 which effects are seen are seen by about one to one and a half
7 years following the initiation of the exposure.

8 Tumors of the bone tissue are also seen and these
9 include osteosarcomas, and fibrosarcomas. These are solid
10 tumors which are generated in the skeleton. And these are
11 at doses of over 2,000 millirads per day.

12 And they occur a bit later than the hematological
13 or marrow effects which I just mentioned.

end 14

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14 Thus the minimum cumulative total radiation dose
15 in which bone tumors are seen is 800,000 millirads, where the
16 average is over 1 million millirads. In these toxic levels,
17 bone tissue injury is also seen. Marrow cells are affected
18 and a depression in their numbers is seen and is reflected
19 by a lower than normal number of white blood cells circulating
20 in the blood.

21 And secondly, bone cells themselves are killed
22 and lead to microscopic changes in the distribution of living
23 bone cells within the compact bone, but usually not affecting
24 the gross or radiographic appearance of bones examined by
25 X-ray films. There have been no effects seen in our studies

ln6

1 indicating that strontium-90 and its daughter product,
2 yttrium-90 has been detrimental to fertility. The number of
3 dogs or young puppies in the litter, their growth rate, their
4 body size or in other organs than the two that I mentioned
5 that are at risk from the strontium deposition.

6 Our work using the daily feeding intake of
7 strontium-90 has shown that a 1,000 to 10,000 reduction in the
8 strontium-yttrium concentration in soft tissues, including
9 the testes, seminal fluid and ovaries, is seen compared to
10 that which accumulates in the bone.

11 It is physiologically impossible to get substantial
12 doses to such tissues without first seeing rapid and lethal
13 effects from the bone and bone marrow irradiation.

14 For example, at the very highest dose level, we
15 have tested, which killed all of the animals in about three
16 years, their bone and bone marrow cells, as I mentioned,
17 were receiving about 20,000 millirads per day, but the genetic
18 tissues, testicles and ovaries, contained almost no strontium
19 and yttrium-90 and at the most received a measured dose of
20 about two millirads per day.

21 Again we see this factor of 1,000 to 10,000. We
22 were able to breed some of these dogs and their introductive
23 performance was not different than that of the unirradiated
24 control animals.

25 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Excuse me, at the beginning

ln7

1 I don't recall whether your question included a reference to
2 the Transcript where Dr. Sternglass made this comment?

3 MR. ENGELHARDT: Yes, sir, page 800.

4 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you.

5 BY MR. ENGELHARDT:

6 Q Dr. Goldman, what is the relation between the
7 dosage level at which these effects were found and the radia-
8 tion protection guides found in FRC Report No. 2?

9 A The lowest level which has caused radiation deaths
10 in the dogs at this time is at doses of about 2,000 millirads
11 per day, or multiplying by the number of days in the year,
12 approximately 700 and 30,000 millirads per year. This is
13 compared to the Radiation Protection Guide in the FRC Report
14 No. 2 limit of one-third of .5 rem per year, or about one-half
15 millirem per day on the average.

16 These two values, thus, differ by a factor of
17 4,000. Thus in the dogs it takes about 4,000 times more than
18 strontium-90 related dose to produce the effects that I have
19 described than the limit in the protection guide.

20 Q Dr. Goldman, on page 800 of the Transcript
21 Dr. Sternglass also states, "And now comes the kind of thing
22 that we must take into account.

23 "Strontium-90 does not stay strontium-90. When
24 it decays radioactively, it changes it into yttrium-90, which
25 is another chemical substance, and it has different chemical

ln8 1 reconcentration properties and it tends to seek out the kidney,
2 the liver, the glands, the pituitary, and all of the various
3 chemical factories in the body that produce the hormones.

4 "And, as a result, growth is affected, especially
5 in the early embryo and the fetus."

6 Have you done any work on the effects of yttrium-90?

7 A Yes. It is impossible to work with strontium-90
8 and not also be working with its daughter product, yttrium-90.
9 The strontium-90 and yttrium-90 ingested is metabolized such
10 that most of the yttrium-90 present in the diet is not
11 assimilated and is excreted in the feces.

12 A small fraction of ingested strontium-90, which
13 is absorbed and deposited in bone, -- by the way this amounts
14 to about one to two percent of all of the strontium that we
15 feed an animal in this one and a half year period -- decays.

16 This strontium-90 decays with a half-life of
17 about 28 years to its daughter product, yttrium-90. This
18 new yttrium-90 is thus in the bone and tightly bounds in the
19 mineral structure. It cannot easily be translocated and
20 almost none escapes.

21 The yttrium-90 available depends upon the parent
22 strontium-90 content and the yttrium-90, I should point out,
23 if it hasn't already been brought out, has only a 64-hour
24 half-life, so that most of it decays very rapidly in the bone
25 in which it is generated.

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Only if the strontium and yttrium is artificially

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injected into a body cavity can any appreciable amount of

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yttrium-90 be available to other tissues.

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1 Q Dr. Goldman, are you familiar with the work of
2 others in this field on the effects of strontium 90 and the
3 yttrium 90 on animals?

4 A Yes, I am personally familiar with a goodly number
5 of other studies. And the one that I am most familiar with
6 at my laboratory is certainly not the only one. Mice and
7 dogs have been studied for a great number of years at the
8 Argonne National Laboratory. A large experiment on swine,
9 which are fed strontium 90 daily, not only for their lifetime,
10 but for the full lifetime of two subsequent generations are
11 being studied at the Battelle Northwest Laboratory in the
12 State of Washington.

13 There is a large study on beagles, somewhat
14 similar to our own at Davis being conducted at the University
15 of Utah, in which a host of bone-seeking radionuclides are
16 being intercompared.

17 In addition to this, rabbits have been studied
18 at the University of Oxford in England, with injection of
19 radionuclides, and about 300 rats also have been studied
20 and reported for strontium 90 effects from the Biophysics
21 Institute in Moscow, the work of Yuri Moskalev.

22 Q Dr. Goldman, how do the results of these studies
23 which you have identified relate to your work?

24 A There is a very similar pattern of response. The
25 effects that have been reported in all of these studies are

1 confined solely to those resulting from the irradiation of
2 cells in the bone and bone marrow. And again in each of
3 these other studies pathologic effects are seen only at
4 very high doses, approximately 5 to 10,000 rads of cumulated
5 radiation exposure. That is 10 million millirads, if that
6 is the unit you are more familiar with.

7 Now as I mentioned before, if one artificially
8 alters this physiologic route of delivery of the strontium
9 to cells other than the absorption from food through the
10 bloodstream and then into forming bone, different effects can
11 be seen.

12 For example, in one study in Sweden by Professor
13 Lunning, massive doses of strontium and yttrium were
14 injected into male mice, into their peritoneal cavity, into
15 their abdomen. The peritoneal cavity or abdomen drains into
16 the inguinal canal.

17 Without getting into an anatomy lesson, it is
18 easy to visualize that this literally results in bathing the
19 testes of these mice with the strontium 90 containing fluid.
20 This does if injected into the bloodstream would have proven
21 lethal to the mice and this lethal dose did cause some
22 effects on the sperm of these mice. But this injection
23 method is not realistic, and it is more like observing the
24 effects on sperm put into a test tube full of strontium 90
25 contaminated culture media.

1 Professor Lunning himself has denied that the
2 experimental methodology is at all applicable to the problem
3 of biospheric contamination or the normal physiological
4 method of entry of the radionuclides into the body.

5 Q Dr. Goldman, how does your work and the work of
6 others in this field relate to man?

7 A In all of the mammals tested, the metabolism and
8 chemistry of ingested radio strontium is quite similar.
9 This element is what we call an alkaline earth element and
10 it behaves very similarly to calcium and barium and radium.
11 It concentrates only where calcium concentrates and thus
12 its effect is seen only in the cells near bone mineral
13 deposits, that is, the bone and bone marrow.

14 The radioactive strontium 90 and its yttrium
15 90 daughter product emit electrons, beta particles. These
16 have a range in tissue which is rather short, perhaps only
17 a few millimeters.

18 In a mouse with strontium 90 in its bone, this
19 range might include a slightly larger fraction of tissues, but
20 very close to bone than one would see in larger animals, since
21 the atoms behavior is independent of where it finds itself
22 at the time of decay.

23 In the dog and in man, about 50 percent of the
24 radiation energy and consequently the radiation dose is
25 totally absorbed within the skeleton. That is why we choose
the dog. The dog also has a bone and bone marrow that is

1 similar in anatomy and physiology to man.

2 An example of this is seen in a parallel study
3 which we are in the midst of with the strontium 90 study in
4 which radium 226 is given to dogs in a manner quite similar
5 to that which occurred earlier in this century with the
6 radium dial painters, they used to tip the brushes with their
7 lips to get a fine point and consequently ingested small
8 quantities of radium over a short occupational period
9 of time.

10 The results of this radium deposition in the human
11 is very well documented and the results that we have found
12 in our dogs are almost identical. They are very similar
13 to that which we have seen in man. That is, the radium
14 deposits in bone, the cells of bone are at risk and the
15 consequences are seen in those regions in which the radium
16 is concentrated.

17 So that our intercomparison then would merely be
18 to take the results of the strontium we see in the dog,
19 compare them to the results of the radium that we see in
20 the dog, we know what the effects of radium are in man, and
21 so it is quite simple and realistic to then project to the
22 possible effects of strontium 90 in man by having this inter-
23 species comparison.

24 None of the animals studies about which I am aware
25 have indicated any pathologic effects at levels anywhere near

1 the human guidelines. These effects have been seen only at
2 doses that are about 1,000-fold higher than these guidelines.

3 Also the similar results seen in all of the animal
4 species studied give me added confidence in extrapolating
5 from these animal data to possible human situations. These
6 thousands of animals studied over the past 25 years have
7 not shown any radiation hazards at permissible levels or even
8 at rather large multiples of those levels.

9 MR. ENGELHARDT: That completes Dr. Goldman's
10 testimony.

11 DR. JORDAN: First of all I am a little confused
12 about the strontium-yttrium relationships to dose. Since the
13 yttrium half-life is of course very short compared to
14 strontium, it should be in radioactive equilibrium and therefore
15 there would be the same number of curies of yttrium as
16 strontium. Is that right?

17 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

18 DR. JORDAN: Now, then -- here is where my health
19 physics has lost me -- the half-life of the yttrium is
20 short, and in one way I would think therefore, since there
21 is an yttrium disintegration, every time there is a
22 strontium disintegration, that the dose from the yttrium would
23 be about the same as the dose from the strontium.

24 On the other hand, if I consider it in terms of
25 biological half-life, then I would say it is very much less

1 from the yttrium.

2 Would you straighten me out on that, please?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I will try.

4 I think a simple way to do that would be to merely
5 state that when strontium 90 decays, the electron it gives
6 off has an average energy of about 0.2 MEV per disintegration
7 of strontium 90. The yttrium on the other hand is a much more
8 energetic electron and has an average energy of approximately
9 0.9. In equilibrium then the sum of these two would be the
10 dose. So it would be 0.9 plus 0.2 and actually it is 1.13.

11 Well, the yttrium, therefore, accounts for about
12 80 percent of the radiation dose for the equilibrium dis-
13 integration. The strontium, however, determines where that
14 will occur.

15 DR. JORDAN: Thank you.

16 DR. WINTERS: And your dose is calculated on the
17 1.13?

18 THE WITNESS: The dose is calculated on the total
19 energy, yes, sir.

20 DR. JORDAN: You are saying that you have not seen
21 effects for small doses could have two implications. One
22 is there is a possible threshold, or the other is that
23 there is no linearity, or the other is the number of animals
24 you are using is small compared to the population of the
25 U.S. and therefore there would be no chance of seeing any

1 effect.

2 Would you like to comment on that?

3 THE WITNESS: The number of animals that I am
4 personally using is quite small. The number of animals in
5 Russia was quite small and so forth. When you add them all
6 up though the number is considerable. In every instance
7 there were large numbers of animals put at risk at lower
8 levels than the ones I have discussed in which no effects were
9 seen.

10 If you wish to interpret this as a practical
11 threshold, this seems to me to be reasonable.

12 Secondly, the lowest doses at which these effects
13 are seen are not constant multiples of the amount of effect.
14 That is to say that as the dose goes up, the effect is not
15 proportional. So that a considerable increase in dose is
16 required. This is what I would call a nonlinear response.
17 It probably would best be called in scientific parlance a
18 sigmoid response or a curvilinear response.

19 By definition this never reaches zero. There are
20 practical limits. And whether one confines himself to the
21 10,000 animals or 200 million Americans there is always
22 a difference between the theoretical infinity and the actual
23 population that is studied.

24 DR. JORDAN: But you feel then that a linear curve
25 response versus dose would not fit the data? It would take a

1 sigmoid curve?

2 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. Not only in our
3 laboratory, but in all of the others in which strontium 90
4 has been studied either by acute injection at one time or
5 continuous feeding, the results are nonlinear.

6 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you, Dr. Goldman.

7 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, before I call the
8 final Staff witness could I ask for a brief recess?

9 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: We will take a 10-minute
10 recess.

End #16

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(Recess.)

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1 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: The hearing will come to
2 order, please.

3 There is a phone call for Dr. Ralph Lapp. Is he
4 present?

5 NO response.

6 Mr. Engelhardt?

7 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, we have completed
8 our rebuttal case with the exception of two remaining un-
9 finished pieces of business and that is some additional
10 material that we would like to present through Dr. Nelson
11 who has previously testified as a rebuttal witness. And we
12 have some additional testimony to provide through Lester
13 Rogers in response to a question by the Board.

14 If the schedule of events will not be disrupted
15 entirely, we would propose to offer these two gentlemen
16 tomorrow morning at the opening session and thus would now
17 be prepared to bring back our panel of expert rebuttal
18 witnesses for such cross examination by the parties as may
19 be desired.

20 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Let us have a conference with
21 counsel.

(Discussion off the record.)

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1 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Will the hearing please
2 come to order. We just had a conference in order to
3 expeditiously proceed with the balance of the hearing, and
4 next we will hear Mr. Rogers and after that Miss Evans will
5 cross examine the Applicant's rebuttal. At 9:30 tomorrow
6 we will reconvene and the Coalition will cross examine the
7 Applicant's rebuttal and Commission rebuttal. At one o'clock
8 LIFE will continue its cross examination of Applicant's
9 rebuttal and undertake examination of Commission rebuttal.

10 We will adjourn at 4:15 because the building
11 will be used for other purposes, and we will reconvene at St.
12 Johns Lutheran Church at 7:00 in the evening to hear Mr.
13 Lau's case and to continue with cross examination that
14 evening until a reasonable hour and for the balance of the
15 week until the case is terminated.

16 Is this a correct understanding?

17 MR. CHARNOFF: I believe that is correct, sir.

18 MR. ENGELHARDT: Mr. Chairman, there is one
19 matter we have to include in that schedule and that is Dr.
20 Nelson has been asked by the Board to provide some additional
21 information on the chart which we will be ready for tomorrow
22 at any convenient time you want to put it into the schedule.

23 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: If he is prepared, let him
24 appear at the beginning of the hearing tomorrow.

25 MR. ENGELHARDT: Fine.

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1 Whereupon,

2 LESTER ROGERS

3 resumed the stand as a witness on behalf of the Regulatory
4 Staff and, having been previously duly sworn, was examined
5 and testified further as follows:

6 THE WITNESS: This is in response to the Board's
7 request for clarification on the relationship between the
8 various sections of Part 20 and their applications.
9 Section 2.106, 10 CFR Part 20, sets forth the AEC
10 regulatory requirements for controlling releases of radioactive
11 material in effluents to unrestricted areas from all AEC-
12 licensed activities.

13 The basic objective of the regulations is to
14 limit releases of radioactive material to the environment
15 from each licensed activity so that radiation exposures of
16 the general public from the cumulative effects of all
17 licensed activities, when added to exposures from other sources,
18 not including exposures from natural background and medical
19 procedures, are not likely to exceed radiation protection guides
20 recommended by the Federal Radiation Council, now in the Environ-
21 mental Protection Agency, and approved by the President, that
22 is, 500 millirems per year for individuals in the population,
23 170 millirems per year to the average of suitable samples of
24 the population groups.

25 Part 20 applies to a broad variety of licensed

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1 activities such as use of radioisotopes in hospitals,
2 universities, research institutions, industry, research
3 reactors, power reactors, chemical reprocessing plants, et
4 cetera.

5 These activities differ greatly with respect
6 to the types and volumes of effluents generated. For
7 this reason flexibility is provided in Section 2.106 in the
8 application of release limits to various types of activities
9 in achieving the basic objective of limiting exposures off-
10 site.

11 Section 2.106 of Part 20 sets forth concentration
12 limits that are generally applied directly at the point of
13 release through a stack pipe or conduit prior to any
14 environmental dilution and without taking into account the
15 specific characteristics of a particular site and environment.

16 These release limits generally assure that taking
17 into account environmental dilution, radiation exposures to
18 individuals in unrestricted areas will not exceed more than
19 a small fraction of radiation protection guides.

20 For many licensed activities, such as medical,
21 research and industrial uses of radioisotopes, the volumes
22 of effluents are small, the concentrations of effluents
23 are extremely low and it is entirely practicable for these
24 kinds of activities to meet the restrictive limits under
25 2.106(a). For some licensed activities it is not practicable

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1 to meet these restrictive limits. Section 2.106(b)
2 provides that application for a license or amendment may include
3 proposed limits higher than those specified in 2.106(a).
4 The Commission will approve the proposed limits if the
5 Applicant demonstrates that (1) he has made a reasonable
6 effort to minimize the radioactivity contained in effluents
7 to unrestricted areas, and (2) that it is not likely that
8 radioactive material in the effluent would result in the
9 exposure of an individual to concentrations of radioactive
10 material in air and water exceeding the limits specified in
11 Appendix B, Table 2 of Part 20.

12 In the case of noble gases released from power
13 reactors, exposure to these concentration values result
14 in a whole body exposure of 500 millirem per year. Section
15 2.106(b) allows one to establish release limits taking into
16 account the specific characteristics of a particular site and
17 environment such as meteorology, hydrology, topography, popu-
18 lation density, et cetera.

19 It is under this provision that technical
20 specifications, which are conditions imposed on operating
21 licenses, are developed to limit releases of radioactive
22 material in effluents from nuclear power reactors. 2.106(c)
23 spells out some of the detailed information that must be
24 included in an application to establish release limits under
25 this section.

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1 Section 2.106(e) is a generally applicable provision
2 that is designed to assure that for any licensed activity
3 operating under either 2.106(a) or 2.106(b), the total
4 quantities of radioactive material released in air or
5 water during a specified period of time do not result
6 in intakes of radioactive material from air, food and water
7 that would result in doses to the critical organ of a suitable
8 sample of an exposed population group from all sources of
9 exposure in excess of one-third the dose limits recommended
10 by the NCRP and ICRP.

11 Finally, Section 2.106 (C) provides that in accor-
12 dance with recommendations of the Federal Radiation Council
13 approved by the President, persons engaged in activities
14 under licenses issued by the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant
15 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended should, in
16 addition to complying with the requirements set forth in
17 this part, make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation
18 exposures and releases of radioactive materials in effluents
19 to unrestricted areas as far below the limits specified
20 in this part as practicable.

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Section 50.34(a) sets forth requirements specifically applicable to nuclear power reactors that are designed to keep radioactive material in effluents from such reactors as low as practicable. In applying all of these basic provisions of the regulations to different licensed activities, the detailed license requirements and technical specifications would vary because of differences in the design of facilities, differences in operating characteristics, and differences in the characteristics of the environment in which the facilities are operating.

For example, in establishing release limits for nuclear power reactors under Section 2.106(b), technical specifications may very well include limitations on procedures such as periods over which release limits may be averaged, that would not necessarily be applied universally to all types of licensed activities that differ widely in nature.

The procedure of applying a factor of 700 to calculations of stack release limits for halogens and particulates with a half-life greater than eight days is an administrative procedure used in implementing Section 2.106(e) which, of course, allows for full consideration of the biological concentration mechanisms which seem to concern Dr. Tamplin.

For example, biological concentration of iodine and cesium in abalone will be taken into account in establishing

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1 the release limits for a reactor now under construction on the
2 West Coast. Other detailed requirements may be included in
3 technical specifications in implementing Section 50.34(a) to
4 keep levels of a radioactivity in power reactor effluents
5 as low as practicable.

6 While the detailed administrative requirements
7 applied to various facilities will vary, they all have the
8 common objective of providing reasonable assurance that
9 exposures to the public of well within FRC radiation protection
10 guides and the limits set forth in Part 20.

11 That completes my statement.

12 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

13 We will study it in the Transcript.

14 Miss Evans, are you prepared to proceed?

15 MISS EVANS: Yes, I am.

16
17 MISS EVANS: On behalf of Intervenor LIFE and
18 William E. Reany, I will be cross-examining this afternoon
19 the applicants --

20 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Would you hold it a second,
21 please?

22 Would you move the microphone in front of you,
23 please.

24 MISS EVANS: On behalf of Intervenor LIFE and
25 William E. Reany, I will proceed with cross-examination of

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1 the applicant. I would just like the record to reflect that
2 after it was indicated that LIFE had no additional witnesses,
3 that the Atomic Energy Commission and the utility company had
4 all last week to prepare their rebuttal witnesses' testimony.

5 Although we had anticipated some rebuttal testimony
6 to be offered by the AEC and the applicant, we did not antici-
7 pate to be given such a short time to prepare cross-examination
8 of these rebuttal witnesses.

9 With the tremendous amount and complexity of the
10 subject matter presented here, it is very unfair to expect
11 Intervenor, in this case a citizens' group, to prepare with
12 their limited resources in such a short amount of time.

13 But, perhaps there are some questions I have
14 prepared today that I can go ahead with and tomorrow
15 Mrs. Bleicher will resume cross-examination on our behalf.

16 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: I would like to make a
17 statement at this point, and that is that your counsel is
18 not here today and your counsel missed some other sessions of
19 this hearing and one of the, I think, tested ways of preparing
20 for cross-examination is to take notes at the time the direct
21 testimony is being given.

22 So that to a degree you may have been at a dis-
23 advantage, but this is because of the choosing of your counsel
24 and I for one do not think that you have been prejudiced.

25 MISS EVANS: Well, it is just that in our case we

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1 don't have scientific expertise that perhaps the other parties
2 have. It takes just more than me taking notes to be able to
3 cross-examine in the capacity we would like to be able to
4 participate in in these hearings.

5 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Well, you have to use the
6 resources available to you.

7 MISS EVANS: We are trying. I will proceed then.

8 The question is for, I believe, Mr. Lowell Roe.

9 In reference to his statement on the design of
10 the liquid radioactive processing system for the Davis-Besse
11 station. This is a question that I would like to have
12 clarified for our information and for the record.

13 With reference to the first sentence, "The design
14 of the liquid radioactive processing system for the Davis-
15 Besse station incorporates the most effective efficient proven
16 technology for reducing the radioactive contents of the pro-
17 cessed liquid," I would like to have Mr. Roe, if he could,
18 provide me the evidentiary basis, or at least outline a summary
19 of the evidentiary basis for the statement I just quoted on
20 the adequacy of the liquid radioactive waste system in
21 Davis-Besse.

22 MR. CHARNOFF: I am going to ask Mr. Roe to
23 respond to that question. I would like to observe,
24 Mr. Chairman, that this question addressed to Mr. Roe was
25 in response to some statements made by Dr. Sternglass on

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1 behalf of the Coalition that we had expressed some reservation
2 as to its relevance to their contentions.

3 But in any event, there is a question and I won't
4 make a point of it now but there is a question as to whether
5 this area of inquiry is within LIFE's contentions. But I
6 am going, for purpose of the record at least, to ask Mr. Roe
7 to respond to the question, noting, however, that there is a
8 question as to the relevance of this question to LIFE's conten-
9 tion.

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: I have serious doubts whether
11 it is relevant to you contention. And I would ask whether
12 you really have a clear idea of the scope of your contention.

13 MISS EVANS: Yes, I do. If I could offer a
14 comment here, our question is if -- not question but statement
15 if such advanced technology exists and is tested to limit the
16 effluents of nuclear plants to the lowest possible amount and
17 if this is the case for reactors to be constructed and those
18 operating now, perhaps at least for our nuclear power plants
19 they could be, they could operate under a limit lower than
20 Part 20.

21 We are trying to establish perhaps what part this
22 would be, you might say as a solution to the problem we are
23 presenting here. By saying that we feel the standards are
24 inadequate, we are trying to see what possible dosages or
25 effluent levels the nuclear power industry, power plants

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1 industry, could operate under.

2 MR. CHARNOFF: I won't proceed further with the
3 argument on this. I would just like the record to show the
4 remarks I made before and ask Mr. Roe at this point to
5 respond to the question.

6 WITNESS ROE: Yes. The equipment for the
7 liquid rad waste system is outlined in Section 11 of the PSAR.
8 This includes the type of equipment which I had discussed in
9 the statement yesterday, the degasification, filtration, ion
10 exchange and distillation equipment.

11 Also included are the decontamination factors
12 assumed for this equipment.

13 MISS EVANS: Well, I know what the components of
14 the system are. I am asking you to outline the basis for
15 that statement that you made concerning the most efficient
16 proven technology, because perhaps outline the basis for this,
17 and I don't know if you have it at your fingertips, but I am
18 interested in what is the most efficient proven technology?

19 For instance, it was brought out earlier in the
20 hearings, in reference to another type of radioactive waste
21 in the Oak Ridge system that was being investigated. I am
22 trying to establish what the most efficient proven technology
23 is they are going to operate under.

24 If he could outline this, I know what the components
25 are --

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MR. ROE: The first part of your question there, I simply don't know of additional equipment beyond what we have outlined that is available. The Oak Ridge system which I believe we had commented on before is an unproven system and it bears no relationship to the liquid rad waste treatment system.

MISS EVANS: I understand that. But I had wanted you to provide me with assurance that the evidence, the evidential assurance of the statement you made yesterday that you are operating under the most efficient proven technology.

I am aware of what is in Part 11 of the PSAR. I am aware of the components of the rad waste system. But I am trying to establish the background for the fact that you stated yesterday.

MR. ROE: This equipment that we have outlined to be installed here compared with many other plants, we would expect that to be at this low release and as low or lower than anybody else that is installing this equipment.

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1 MISS EVANS: All I am trying to establish here is
2 the evidential basis for the statement that you made yesterday
3 that this is the most efficient proven technology. I don't
4 have the documents that you cite in the PSAR. But if you
5 have or can describe to me -- I am not interested in dates --
6 but perhaps the experimental, the evidential basis for the
7 statement you made. How is this the most efficient proven
8 technology?

9 MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Chairman, I think the testimony
10 has shown that the PSAR, which is part of the record in this
11 case and which has been made available to LIFE, describes
12 the system.

13 Mr. Roe has testified that the system that we are
14 going to install here and that is described in the PSAR would
15 produce as low quantity and quality of effluents as any
16 system now in operation.

17 If LIFE is interested in pursuing the point
18 of demonstrating that there are alternate systems that are
19 more efficient, without regard at the moment as to whether that
20 is relevant to their contention, LIFE was free to bring on
21 direct testimony to this effect.

22 I think the question has been asked several times
23 and it has been answered several times. At this point I would
24 object to the repetitive nature of the question.

25 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: I think the repetitive nature

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1 of the question is due to the fact that she hasn't had an
2 answer as to why Mr. Roe believes that this is the most
3 efficient number of units to be employed. What comparison
4 have you made, for example, with other systems? And upon
5 what do you base your opinion that it is the most efficient?

6 MR. CHARNOFF: I am going to let Mr. Roe answer
7 that, but I think he stated in his testimony that the
8 expected effluent releases from this plant will be as low
9 or lower than the operating experience at other plants,
10 which suggests to me that he has compared the results of this
11 system with other plants and therefore it is the best proven
12 technology.

13 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Then Mr. Roe should say so.

14 MR. CHARNOFF: I think he did say so, sir.
15 But I would be glad to have Mr. Roe affirm that.

16 MR. ROE: If I didn't say it in those words, that
17 is certainly what I intended, that the equipment that we have
18 installed or plan to install has been compared with other
19 plant installations, and for this reason we believe that
20 our effluents will be as low or lower than operating plants
21 now.

22 MISS EVANS: Could you give me the evidential
23 matter you used to come to this conclusion that your system
24 is the most efficient proven technology for reducing the
25 radioactive content of the processed liquid from Davis-Besse?

1 MR. ROE: The operating reports from existing
2 stations outlining the releases that they have made over a
3 period of time.

4 MISS EVANS: Is there a system -- is there a plant
5 in operation at the present time with the same sort
6 of system? I believe you answered that. Have all of these
7 systems to be utilized in Davis-Besse fully demonstrated their
8 performance in nuclear station operations elsewhere?

9 MR. ROE: The individual components that make up
10 the complete rad waste stream, yes. I can't say that it
11 has been demonstrated that all of the components that we plan
12 to have have been demonstrated in a complete stream.

13 MISS EVANS: So then perhaps all the evidence, the
14 operating evidence, does not exist for every component that
15 you are going to use in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant?

16 MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Chairman, I think we should
17 establish how this relates to the LIFE issue. It seems to
18 me that we have testified before that our releases will
19 be well below Part 20.

20 If the point that Miss Evans wishes to argue is
21 that, as I understood her to say, that if the plant can operate
22 at less than Part 20, the Part 20 standards ought to be
23 lower, the evidence is already in that this plant is expected
24 to operate below Part 20. The nature of the questions
25 that I believe she is asking are directed to the question
as to whether we have a system, or whether there is a system

1 that can work at still more efficient performance than the
2 one we are proposing. But that kind of question then would
3 go to the issue as to whether we are conforming with Part 20,
4 namely, the lowest practical standard that is in Part 20.
5 That is not the issue of LIFE nor of any other Intervenor in
6 this particular case.

7 MISS EVANS: You mentioned earlier that --

8 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Off the record.

9 (Discussion off the record.)

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: On the record.

11 MISS EVANS: I would like to resume with a
12 question that relates to what Dr. Goldman said on behalf of
13 the Applicant yesterday or in response to a question asked
14 by Mr. Charnoff and this was considering Dr. Gofman's and
15 Dr. Tamplin's statements with respect to the present AEC
16 standards.

17 I would like to have Mr. Goldman read section 2.106
18 (e), the first sentence, to me, please.

19 MR. MORTON GOLDMAN: 2.106(e). "In addition to
20 limiting concentrations in effluent streams, the Commission
21 may limit quantities of radioactive materials released in
22 air or water during the specified period of time if it appears
23 that the daily intake of radioactive material from air, food
24 or water by a suitable sample of an exposed population group
25 averaged over a period not exceeding one year would otherwise

1 exceed the daily intake resulting from continuous exposure
2 to air or water containing one-third the concentration of
3 radioactive materials specified in Appendix B, Table 2 of this
4 Part."

5 That is the entire section.

6 MISS EVANS: Thank you. Then in reference to
7 your statement yesterday in the testimony, and I don't have
8 the transcript page, you said "Section 2.106(e) limits the
9 quantity discharged from facilities of intake of radioactive
10 materials from air, water or food by a suitable sample of an
11 exposed population group would exceed one-third of the intake
12 represented by the MPC values."

13 I would like to ask you is it correct that 2.106(e)
14 does not necessarily mean the AEC requires the limiting of
15 MPC concentrations according to -- concentrations in the
16 appendix for air and water, it only gives authority to the
17 Commission to do so under certain circumstances after it is
18 deemed necessary?

19 MR. MORTON GOLDMAN: It does say the Commission
20 may limit if it appears that, yes. But it is
21 not necessarily after the fact. It may be prospective, that
22 is based on analyses before the plant goes into operation.

23 MISS EVANS: Would you clarify your last two
24 statements. I am lost.

25 MR. MORTON GOLDMAN: I think this section has

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1 been interpreted by some people, certainly by Drs. Gofman
2 and Tamplin in other cases, that this only applies after a
3 situation has developed, that the Commission may limit
4 quantities based on the one-third intake. In other words,
5 on the basis of monitoring of the environment, or other
6 bases for estimation of dose of an existing situation.
7 What I am saying is that based on my own experience with
8 the licensing process that this section has been invoked
9 prior to the operation of a plant if in fact it appears on
10 the basis of analyses and calculations that this situation
11 may exist before the plant goes into operation.

12 So it is something that can be applied in advance
13 of an actual situation developing, rather than after the fact
14 of a situation having developed.

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MISS EVANS: But it seems to me this is not what
2 the Commission regulations are saying, that this is only
3 an instance that must have been done outside of these
4 regulations. This regulation states that this will be done
5 after these samples have been taken and after the intake
6 from the air, water and food samples by exposed population
7 groups has been established to exceed one-third the con-
8 centration of .5 millirems.

9

DR. MORTON GOLDMAN: I would be very happy if the
10 Staff would interpret it that way, because it would make
11 life a lot simpler, at least at the beginning. But unfortunately
12 they don't, from my own experience. They do apply this before
13 the fact.

14

I think Mr. Rogers stated in his response to the
15 Board's question just a few moments ago that the Staff
16 was going to consider the reconcentration in abalone in a
17 West Coast plant in setting the technical specifications
18 for that plant prior to the plant's going into operation.

19

MISS EVANS: But it would still seem to me that
20 the regulations indicate that they do not do so until
21 afterwards. It may be a matter of record, what we talked
22 about this morning, Mr. Rogers' testimony, the technical
23 specifications, that come out before the plant. But in
24 Part 20 there is no provision for this on the record that
25 they do this beforehand.

1 MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Chairman, this is not a
2 question, this is an interpretation of the regulation
3 by Miss Evans which Dr. Goldman has suggested is in error.
4 But in any event, it is a question for LIFE to propose as
5 a matter of legal argument, it seems to me.

6 The regulation is clear on its face, they interpret
7 it one way, Dr. Goldman suggests it is interpreted another
8 way, but it is certainly not a question to be asked of
9 Dr. Goldman in his technical expertise.

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: That is correct.

11 MISS EVANS: Then I will rest with the cross-
12 examination until Mrs. Bleicher is able to assist me tomorrow
13 at 1 o'clock.

14 MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Chairman, this is consistent
15 with the schedule we have talked about. I would like the
16 record to show of course that as of yesterday it had been
17 reported to us by Mrs. Bleicher that she would be here this
18 afternoon to conduct cross-examination of the Applicant.

19 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Are there any other matters?

20 MR. BARON: If you want to keep on going for a
21 few minutes, I might be able to get in some questions right
22 now. They wouldn't be very long and they wouldn't require
23 a lengthy answer I am sure.

24 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Proceed.

25 MR. BARON: It is with regard to Applicant's

1 Exhibits 5 and 6, the letters received from the Adjutant
2 General's Department and the Secretary of Defense.

3 I assume these were received as a result of Mr.
4 Roe or someone from the Applicant requesting this information.

5 My question: What information was given in the
6 request for assurance? In other words, was it explained
7 that the plant would stand and operate for 40 years?
8 That is one of the items that I am looking for.

9 If somebody says "Give me some assurances," I
10 would assume it would also be proper to give a basis for
11 the question or reason for the question. Maybe there are
12 copies available of the letters that went out to these
13 two departments.

14 To put it another way, if you will permit me,
15 were the two addressees of the original requests fully
16 apprised of what will be sitting there? They don't have a
17 copy of the PSAR, and they may have as little familiarity with
18 this area of science as any layman.

19 MR. ROE: We were talking to competent people
20 in both areas here who were fully aware of the type of
21 plant that we were talking about, it being a nuclear plant.
22 I believe the Staff had said in the Secretary of Defense letter
23 that their copy had been forwarded to them through --

24 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: Mr. Walske. Do you have the
25 Walske letter?

1 MR. BARON: I didn't see that. Here it is, I have
2 it here, it is Exhibit 3.

3 Mr. Roe, what you are saying though is that a
4 full explanation or full appraisal was given to these two
5 departments of what the plant consists of, or would consist
6 of, so that they understood the significance of the thing,
7 so that in the forming of these answers they are telling
8 you that no matter that this is going to sit there for 40
9 years and be as powerful as anything could be for the 40
10 years, we understand this, and we are going to take all
11 of the precautions necessary? That is what I am getting at.

12 MR. CHARNOFF: May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that
13 if Mr. Baron would examine the letter from Mr. Walske,
14 for example, on page 1716, the letter speaks for itself,
15 and it says 'On January 14, 1971, Mr. Packard, Deputy
16 Secretary of Defense, wrote to Mr. Davis, President of
17 Toledo Edison Company confirming the Department of Defense's
18 awareness of the plans for the construction and operation of
19 the Davis-Besse facility.'

20 It suggests that the Department of Defense is
21 aware of the Davis-Besse facility. We have to assume that
22 when people talk about a power plant, it is not something
23 that goes into operation for several days or weeks, but
24 it has some life.

25 Mr. Walske is Assistant to the Secretary of

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Defense.

CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: For atomic energy.

MR. CHARNOFF: Yes.

End #20

end DB-1

1 MR. BARON: Do you have a copy of the letter that
2 Howard Fox wrote to the Adjutant General?

3 MR. ROE: There was no letter written.

4 MR. BARON: What did he do, just call?

5 MR. ROE: Yes. There were personal contacts made
6 with the Adjutant General to reaffirm their awareness of the
7 Davis-Besse station.

8 MR. BARON: But you don't know to what extent
9 their awareness was? The awareness of an individual as to
10 what Davis Besse stands for could be quite different from one
11 person to another.

12 MR. ROE: No. The reaffirmation on the letter
13 from the Adjutant General -- most of the material was a
14 restatement of the material contained in an August letter,
15 I believe, of the Commandant of Camp Perry. So that it was
16 a restatement on the Adjutant General's level and some amplifi-
17 cation of that information.

18 MR. BARON: Was there any effort made with regard
19 to the Uniroyal people or the TRW people? It seems to me
20 there was some indication that Uniroyal owned that Erie
21 testing ground and at the present time it was leased to TRW,
22 which lease had perhaps months to go.

23 Was there any further contact made with those people
24 as to what possible useage they might want to make of it?

25 MR. ROE: There was some contact with TRW. There

DB-2

1 war an indication from them that they would not be renewing
2 their lease.

3 However, the second page of the Adjutant General's
4 letter does state that all of the firing, any firing from the
5 Erie Industrial Park there would be in strict accordance
6 with -- I can quote it.

7 "Any firing from the Erie Industrial Park must be
8 conducted in accordance with strict safety precautions and
9 in accordance with the same procedures in force for firing
10 from Camp Perry."

11 This gives the assurance from the Adjutant General
12 that any operations there will be under strict control.

13 MR. BARON: The way I interpret this letter then
14 is that the Industrial Park is under the control of Camp
15 Perry. Is that what you are saying?

16 MR. ROE: The firing, any firing from Camp Perry
17 using the restricted areas is under their control.

18 MR. BARON: That is what this joint use agreement
19 is that is referred to on the first page, the last paragraph?
20 "TRW Jet and Ordnance Division has entered into a joint use
21 agreement with us which permits them to test their weapons
22 on Tuesday and Thursday each week."

23 MR. ROE: This is my understanding.

24 MR. BARON: All I am getting at obviously is
25 that that particular location will be controlled by somebody

DB 3

1 and it is your interpretation of this letter that it is
2 controlled by Camp Perry?

3 MR. ROE: That is correct.

4 MR. BARON: That is a fact to which you are
5 attesting, is that right?

6 MR. ROE: Yes.

7 MR. BARON: Those were the easiest things I could
8 come up with at the moment. You are going to have to allow
9 me to wait until tomorrow for the rest.

10 CHAIRMAN SKALLERUP: That being the case, we will
11 adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow at this place.

12 (Thereupon, at 4:45 p.m. the hearing was
13 recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m. the
14 following day)

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