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Docket No. 50-346

Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20055

Gentlemen:

ISSUANCE OF DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (SER)

Sixteen copies of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER), prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in the matter of the application filed by the Toledo Edison Company and the Cleveland Electric Illumating Company for a license to operate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, are enclosed for review by the Committee.

There are still some outstanding issues to be resolved. These issues are identified in the enclosure. We hope to be able to discuss the resolution of a number of these issues at the Subcommittee meeting and subsequent full Committee meeting.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

D. B. Vassallo, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors Division of Project Management

Enclosures:

1. Outstanding Issues

2. Safety Evaluation Report

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OUTSTANDING REVIEW ITEMS

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1

- Acceptability of the second year of onsite reterological data (Section 2.3.4)
- (2) Analysis of reactor coolant system response to pressure transients that can potentially occur during startup and shutdown (Section 5.2.2)
- (3) Leakage Detection System (Section 5.2.4)

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- (4) Performance of surveillance caosule specimen holder tube based on reactor internals virbration test assessment (Section 5.3)
- (5) Analysis of the decay heat removal system relief capacity (Section 5.5.3)
- (6) Evaluation of the reactor cavity pressure response analysis (Section 6.2.1)
- (7) Analysis for pressure response of the shield building following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (Section 6.2.3)
- (8) Evaluation of emergency core cooling system performance considering minimum containment pressure, submerged valves, effects of boron precipitation, and single failure criteria (Section 6.3 3)
- (9) Review of door seals and control room pressure tests to verify control habitability (Section 6.4). Applicant has been requested to provide additional information.
- (10) Review of the safety related electrical logic and schematic diagrams and the verification of the implementation of the design (Section 7.1)
- (11) Verification of the reactor protection system equipment qualification testing (Section 7.2). Applicant will submit results in December 1976.
- (12) Modification on redundant reactor coolang flow transmitters in order to meet single failure criteria (Section 7.2).
- (13) Evaluation that inadvertent closure of the low pressure to high pressure valves will not preclude decay heat removal to cold shutdown (Section 7.3.4 and 5.5.3).

(14) Evaluation of the modified steam and feedwater line rupture control system (Section 7.4.1).

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- (15) Evaluation of separation criteria for redundant safety related electrical cables in trays, wireways, and conduits (Section 7.4.2).
- (16) Evaluation of backup protection and short circuit interrupt tests for containment electrical penetrations (Section 7.10).
- (17) Evaluation of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment in a postulated main streamline break accident environment (Section 7.7).
- (18) Equipment failures due to degraded grid voltage drop (Section 8.2). The applicant has provided information which the staff is presently evaluating.
- (19) Evaluation of the applicant's financial qualifications to operate the facility (Section 20.0).