(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Field	Value
0 1 LICENSEE CODE (2)	O H D B S 1
LICENSE NUMBER (3)	Ø Ø - Ø Ø N P F - Ø 3
LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1 REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
DOCKET NUMBER (7)	Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6
EVENT DATE (8)	Ø 3 2 5 7 8
REPORT DATE (9)	Ø 4 2 Ø 7 8

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 After shutting down the unit to Mode 3 and raising Steam Generator (SG) 1-2 level,
0 3 SG 1-2 level continued to increase even after closing the Startup Feedwater Valve.
0 4 At 0455 hours on 3/25/78, the level exceeded the maximum limit. This placed the unit
0 5 in Action B of T.S. 3.4.5. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public
0 6 or unit personnel. No steam line break occurred during the short period of time the
0 7 Steam Generator level slightly exceeded 86%. (NP-33-78-36)
0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	C H	X	Z	V A L V O P	A	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	Ø 3 3	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
E	Z	Z	Z	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y	Y	A	1 2 Ø Ø

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An operator entered containment and opened one SG drain on SG 1-2. This caused the
1 1 level in SG 1-2 to decrease very slowly. Control of SG 1-2 level was obtained at
1 2 0517 hours on 3/25/78 by manually closing the motor operated Main Feedwater Block
1 3 Valve FW 779 which had not been completely closed by its motor operator. Adjustments
1 4 were then made to the motor operator of the valve .

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	D	Ø Ø Ø	NA	A	Operator Observation of SG level

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	Ø Ø Ø	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	Ø Ø Ø	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

8002060903

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

DVR 78-046 NAME OF PREPARER James Marley PHONE 419-259-5000, Ext. 276

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-36

DATE OF EVENT: March 25, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Steam Generator 1-2 level exceeded 86%

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: While performing a reactor shutdown to Mode 3 for maintenance work, Steam Generator 1-2 (SG 1-2) level was raised to between 35% and 70% on the operating range per SP 1102.10, "Station Cooldown and Shutdown Procedure". Reactor power was reduced to 0%. SG 1-2 level continued to increase even though the Startup Feedwater Valve SP7A was closed. An operator then closed the Startup Feedwater Isolation Valve FW 162. The level in SG 1-2 continued to increase. At 0455 hours on March 25, 1978, SG 1-2 level exceeded the 86% maximum limit and increased to a level of 88%, which placed the unit in Action Statement B of Technical Specification 3.4.5.

At 0500 hours, an operator entered containment and opened one drain on each Steam Generator. The level in SG 1-2 decreased very slowly until the operator manually closed the Main Feedwater Block Valve FW 779, which had not closed tightly even though Control Room indication showed a green light indicating FW 779 was closed. After manually fully closing FW 779, SG 1-2 level decreased rapidly. At 0517 hours on March 25, 1978, SG 1-2 level was less than the 86% limit on Steam Generator Feedwater Level. On the operating range instrumentation, 86% corresponds to 348 inches.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause for the SG 1-2 level to exceed 86% was the failure of FW 779's motor operator to completely close the valve causing the overfilling of SG 1-2.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or unit personnel. No steam line break occurred during the short period of time the Steam Generator level slightly exceeded 86%.

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Corrective Action: The operator closed the Startup Feedwater Isolation Valve; he entered containment and opened a drain on SG 1-2. Both actions had relatively little effect on SG 1-2's level. The operator manually closed FW 779 tightly causing the level to drop quickly. At 0517 hours on March 25, 1978, SG 1-2 level was less than 86% which removed the unit from Action Statement B of Technical Specification 3.4.5. A Work Request, MWO 78-740, was written and under Maintenance Work Order 78-191, Maintenance investigated the problem with FW 779. Adjustments were made to the number two rotor contact in the valves motor operator.

Failure Data: This is not a repetitive occurrence. One prior occurrence of Steam Generator level exceeding 348 inches was due to personnel error while preparing for a turbine roll (see Licensee Event Report NP-33-77-30).

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