LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
OHDBS1 (9–14)	Ø-ØØNPF-Ø3 (15–25)	4111 (26–30)	Ø3 (31–32)

CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
CON'T (57–58)	L (59)	L (60)	Ø5Ø-Ø346 (61–68)	Ø62277 (69–74)	Ø71977 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Essential Inverter YV1 was accidentally tripped causing loss of Essential Bus Y1. This resulted in a loss of SFAS Channel 1 and RPS Channel 1. (NP-33-77-14)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
ZZ (9–10)	A (11)	ZZZZZZ (12–17)	Z (43)	ZZZZ (44–47)	N (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

Personnel error caused a short to ground while closing a slide link. The subsequent loss of Y1 has been determined to be a design problem and is being investigated by the vendor.

FACILITY STATUS	POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
B (9)	ØØØ (10–12)	NA (13–44)	A (45)	NA (46–80)

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z (9)	Ø (10)	NA (11–44)	NA (45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
ØØØ (9–11)	Z (12)	NA (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
ØØØ (9–11)	NA (12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES: NA (9–80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Z (9)	NA (10–80)

PUBLICITY: NA (9–80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS: NA (9–80)

[ ] (9–80)

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-14

DATE OF EVENT: June 22, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of Safety Features Actuation System Channel 1 due to loss of Y1

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 5, with power MWT = 0, MWE = 0.

Description of Occurrence:

On June 22, 1977 at 0640, an Instrument and Control Technician shorted to ground a slide link which supplied AC voltage to the Decay Heat Essential Flow Instrumentation Cabinet. This caused a loss of Essential Instrumentation Distribution Panel Y1, resulting in the tripping of Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 1 and Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 1. The Essential Instrumentation Distribution Panel Y1 was supplied by its alternate source YAR, and RPS Channel 1 and SFAS Channel 1 were re-energized at 0720 hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The shorting of the slide link supplying the Decay Heat Essential Flow Instrumentation Cabinet was due to a personnel error on the part of the Instrument and Control Technician. The loss of Essential Instrumentation Panel Y1, and subsequent trip of SFAS Channel 1 and RPS Channel 1, however, can be attributed to a design problem in the Inverter YV1.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Since three of four SFAS channels were still operable, and SFAS Channel 1 was tripped, the SFAS would operate if required. The health and safety of the public and station personnel were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

Panel Y1 was supplied by its alternate source, YAR, and SFAS and RPS Channels 1 were re-energized within an hour after tripping occurred. This removed the station from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. The manufacturer has been previously notified as to the defective inverter design, and is working to modify it.

Failure Data:

Shorting of slide link has not previously occurred, but defective inverter design was partial cause in another event: NP-33-77-6