## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK LICENSEE LICENSE TYPE LICENSE NUMOER 10:01-10101 NIPIF1-10131 141111111 OF OH DBSS1 DOCKET NUMBER 1015101-101314161 0 7 0 6 7 7 L OI CON 10181011717 EVENT DESCRIPTION []] The surveillance requirement that primary containment internal pressure 8 90 031 be determined once per 12 hours in Mode 4 was not being followed. Con-[0]] tainment internal pressure was not being monitored. E 03 (NP-33-77-16) 8 30 0 6 80 D Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z SIA . ZIZ ZIZ N 071 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION The cause was an omission of the Mode 4 requirements in the surveillance OIE test procedure. The procedure has been changed to include the Mode 4 00 30 101 requirements. iO STATUS OTHERSTATUS DISCOVERY S POWER 11 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 10 B 10101 1 NA LZ NA 80 I UNM OF MELLASED OF RELEASE ANDUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE 12 . (-Z) Z NA NA RO PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 1 - PE [ Z] 12 OF.SCRIPTION NA 30 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OLSCRIPTION Paraiai 14 L NA 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES 15 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY NA NA 10 2 10 60 PUBLICITY NA 1 7 AU ADDITIONAL FACTURS 18 NA 101 20 NAME\_Jacque Lingenfelter/Stan Batch (419) 259-5000, Ext. 251 PHONE

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## TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-16

DATE OF EVENT: July 6, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Primary containment internal pressure was not determined as required in Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 4 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: The station entered Mode 4 at 2300 hours on July 2, 1977. On July 6, 1977, at 0630 hours, it was discovered by the Shift Foreman on duty that Surveillance Test "Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check", ST 5099.01, did not conform to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4 of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4. The surveillance requirement states that primary containment internal pressure is to 1.5 maintained between the specified limits of +25 and -14 inches of water, and monitored at least once every 12 hours while in Mode 4. Containment internal pressure was not being monitored.

<u>Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence</u>: The cause of this event can be attributed to a deficiency in the surveillance test procedure which failed to include the check for containment internal pressure in Mode 4.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the time period the pressure differential was not monitored, there was frequent usage of airlocks for surveillance of equipment. Pressure differentials of even one or two inches of water can be noticed by personnel using the airlocks. Personnel who have frequently used the airlocks indicate that the containment pressure continually increased over the period in question. Since the containment pressure at the end of the period was significantly less than the limit, we believe the pressure in containment could not have exceeded the limit during the time the pressure differential was not being monitored. Therefore, there was no threat to the health and safety of the public or station personnel.

<u>Corrective Action</u>: A modification was made to the procedure and was in effect at 1200 hours on July 6, 1977. The primary containment internal pressure has been monitored in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 surveillance requirements since 1200 hours on July 6, 1977. The Davis-Besse Station was thus removed from non-conformance with Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4 and the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

Failure Data: On May 13, 1977, there was a similar occurrence in which a deficiency occurred in the channel check reading sheets required for Mode 6. This occurrence, however, was in violation of the surveillance requirements of Technical Specifica-tion 4.3.2.1.1.



