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DEC 13 1976

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R. C. Knop, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 1,  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, NRC:III

THRU: J. H. Sniezek, Chief, Light Water Reactor  
Programs Branch, IE:HQ

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT NO. 1 - PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES

50-346

In response to your memo to B. H. Grier, dated October 13, 1976,  
relating to the Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 pressurizer safety valves,  
the following information is provided:

Question 1:

What specific steps should we follow in applying Technical Specifica-  
tions 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.7.1.1 to Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 in light of  
the information we have on temperature dependence of safety valve  
settings?

Response:

The licensee cannot be permitted to knowingly violate the requirements  
of the Technical Specifications. He should take immediate steps to  
have any changes made that are required. If the inspector knows of a  
condition which violates the Technical Specifications, the licensee  
should be cited for an item of noncompliance.

We have sent a memo to Licensing that identifies the problem with the  
apparent temperature dependency of the pressurizer safety valves, and  
have asked for their prompt attention to this problem. (Sniezek to  
Goller dtd 12/9/76, copy enclosed.)

Question 2:

What generic implications, if any, exist with regard to the need to  
revise existing and Standardized Technical Specifications?

Response:

We have asked Licensing to review the Standardized Technical Specifica-  
tions with regard to the temperature dependency problem. (Sniezek to  
Goller memo dtd 12/9/76.)

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Question 3:

Should additional information be required to be included in the FSAR to document the "agreement" between the licensee and NRR on conducting the safety valve tests inferred by PTC 25.2-1966?

Response:

No. PTC 25.2 establishes the requirements for a wide spectrum of possible tests, and Section 3 merely requires agreement on which tests are intended to be performed, and how.

The "agreement" is between NRR and the licensee, and consists of information now provided in the FSAR, supplemented by the TS requirements for set point, etc. IE's responsibility is to determine whether the testing is being performed in accordance with the "agreement."

In addition, as is the case for our entire inspection program, if in examining testing procedures or results, the inspector identifies a problem which requires resolution beyond Regional Office capabilities, the matter should be referred to IE Headquarters.

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