

POOR ORIGINAL

AUG 30 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors,
 Division of Project Management

FROM: J. P. Knight, Acting Assistant Director for Engineering,
 Division of Systems Safety

SUBJECT: CONTAINMENT VENT AND PURGE SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES

Plant Name: Davis Besse Unit 1
 Licensing Stage: OL
 Docket No.: 50-346
 Responsible PM Branch & Project Manager: LWR-1, L. Engle
 Responding SS Branch and Technical Reviewer: MEB, R. Kiessel
 Review Status: Awaiting Information

Recent conversations between the Mechanical Engineering and Containment Systems Branches have indicated that the containment purge system isolation valves are identified in Table 6-8 of the Final Safety Analysis Report as containment isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur while the valves are open they will be called on to close while experiencing the LOCA pressure and temperature conditions within the containment. The attached request for additional information solicits verification that the valves are, in fact, capable of closing following the LOCA event.

Original signed by:
 James P. Knight

James P. Knight, Acting Assistant Director
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 Division of Systems Safety

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MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH

DIVISION OF SYSTEMS SAFETY

DAVIS BESSE UNIT 1

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Table 6-8 of the FSAR indicates that the containment purge system isolation valves are containment isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur while these valves are open they will be called on to close while experiencing the LOCA pressure and temperature within the containment.

It is the staff's position that the containment purge isolation valves are active valves. Therefore, describe the valve operability program applicable to these valves. Demonstrate that this program is capable of verifying the ability of these valves to close when subjected to the pressure and temperature profiles shown in Figures 6-5 and 6-6 respectively, of the FSAR. Your attention is directed to Section II.2 of Standard Review Plan 3.9.3 for a description of an acceptable operability program.