AUG 1 8 1975

R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors,
Group 1, RL

DAVIS-BESSE SER INPUT CORRECTION

PLANT NAME: Davis-Besse Unit 1
LICENSING STAGE: OL
DOCKET NUMBER: 50-346
MILESTONE NUMBER: 24-31
RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LWR 1-4; L. Engle, LPM
REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: N/A
REVIEW STATUS: AAB Input Complete

The enclosed pages should be substituted for the first page of the enclosure to my August 14, 1975 memo.

/s/

Harold R. Denton, Assistant Director
for Site Safety
Division of Technical Review
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/o enclosure:
A. Giambusso
W. McDonald
J. Panzarella
cc w/enclosure:
S. Hanauer
R. Heineman
R. Boyd
TR A/D's
TR T/C's
RL A/D's
SS B/C's
D. Eisenhut
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A. Schwencer
L. Engle
W. Pasedag
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DATE ▶	8/18/75	8/18/75	8/ /75			

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

15.4 Steam Line Break, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, & Control Rod Ejection Accidents

We have analyzed the radiological consequences of the steam line break, steam generator tube rupture, loss of offsite power, and control rod ejection accidents. In performing the dose calculations, it was assumed that the primary and secondary coolant equilibrium activity concentrations were at the maximum levels permitted by the standard Technical Specifications, i.e., 1.0 uCi/gm I-131 equivalent and 100/$\bar{E}$ uCi/gm for isotopes with half lives greater than 15 minutes for the primary coolant, and 0.1 uCi/gm I-131 equivalent for the secondary coolant. F accidents postulated to occur in coincidence with an iodine spike, the primary coolant concentration was assumed to be at the level permitted by the standard Technical Specifications for 48 hour time periods; i.e., 60 uCi/gm I-131 equivalent at 100% power. The dose results are shown in Table V and the assumptions employed in the analysis of these accidents are listed in Table VI. We find that the calculated doses are well within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 and are acceptable.

15.5 Waste Gas Decay Tank Accident

The maximum activity permitted in a waste gas decay tank at any given time will be limited by appropriate technical specifications so that any single failure such as lifting or failure to close of

15.5 Waste Gas Decay Tank Accident (Cont'd.)

a relief valve will not result in doses that exceed small fractions of 10 CFR Part 100 guideline doses. The maximum allowable activity for any pressurized tank not containing charcoal will therefore be 14,200 curies of Xe-133 equivalent.