Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960 • 539-6111

October 6, 1972

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Inoperable Standby Liquid Control System

The purpose of this letter is to report to you an incident that occurred at Oyster Creek on September 26, 1972 in which it was discovered that the two pumps in the standby liquid control system were inoperable at the same time.

At 10:45 a.m. on September 25, 1972, the "A" standby liquid control pump was removed from service for replacement of the pump packing. The pump was taken out of service using Technical Specification 3.2.C.3 as the basis. It states, "If one standby liquid control system pumping circuit becomes inoperable during the run mode and specification 3.2.A is met, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven days, provided the pump in the other circuit is demonstrated daily to be operable". Specification 3.2.A is met, therefore, the "A" pump breaker was racked out and the pump secured in accordance with plant safety procedures. The work was not completed by the end of the day shift, and the "A" pump was left in an inoperable condition. At 4:20 a.m. on September 26, 1972, the "B" liquid control system pump was to be run to comply with Technical Specification 3.2.C.3. When the operator depressed the start button, the pump did not start.

An interlock in the starting circuitry prevents two standby liquid control pumps from being run simultaneously. This interlock also prevents the "B" pump from starting when the "A" pump breaker is in the racked out position. The interlock is composed of a normally closed contact in the starting circuit of each pump. This contact is operated from a relay in the opposite pump circuit. If the "A" standby liquid control pump is started either from the control room with the key lock switch or locally from the

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The results of your review are requested within sixty days. This information should be provided with one signed original and thirty-nine additional copies.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Pressurized Water Reactors
Branch No. 4
Directorate of Licensing

Enclosures:
Licensee's reports on
occurrences

cc: Leslie Henry, Esquire
Fuller, Seney, Henry & Hodge
800 Owens-Illinois Building
405 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43604

Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge
and Madden
910 - 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Donald H. Hauser, Esquire
The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company
P.O. Box 5000, Room 610
Cleveland, Ohio 44101

The logic circuit was restored by disconnecting the motor leads from the breaker and racking-in the breaker. At 9:20 a.m. on April 11, 1972, an operability check of Reactor Building Isolation was conducted and proved to be satisfactory. A caution tag was placed at the fan control switches in the Control Room to notify operators that if a supply fan breaker is racked-out, the Reactor Building supply damper isolation control logic is defeated unless a jumper is installed in the breaker cabinet. A similar caution note is being stenciled locally on the supply fan breakers.

As noted in the FDSAR, the primary objective of the Secondary Containment System is to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive materials and to provide for controlled elevated release of the building atmosphere under accident conditions. The containment systems, Primary and Secondary, provide the principle mechanism for mitigation of accident consequences. The off-site accident consequences, however, are relatively insensitive to the Reactor Building in-leakage rate as long as the Standby Gas Treatment System can maintain the building at a vacuum. In this particular instance, the supply and exhaust fans tripped, the exhaust dampers closed, and the Standby Gas Treatment System was initiated. With the above situation, the air supply to the building was not only via the various in-leakage paths but also, and no doubt primarily, via the Reactor Building supply dampers.

Any accident conditions postulated that require secondary containment in determining environmental releases would, under these conditions, have a second path permitting release of the Reactor Building air at approximately a 60-foot elevation.

In order to prevent a reoccurrence of this incident, a circuit design change will be implemented that will permit a Reactor Building supply fan breaker to be racked-out for maintenance without defeating the Reactor Building supply damper isolation logic. Until this design change can be implemented, a standing order will be issued instructing plant personnel in the appropriate practice to be followed to avoid defeating the Reactor Building supply damper isolation logic.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

IRF/pk
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Division of Compliance, Region I

push button station, a relay is picked up which opens the normally closed contact in the "B" standby liquid control pump starting circuit which prevents this pump from operating with the "A" pump running. The reverse is true if the "B" pump is started. The problem developed when the breaker for the "A" pump was racked out. It disabled the pump and at the same time it physically removed the contact in the starting circuitry for the "B" pump which simulated an open contact. This prevented the "B" pump from starting.

As soon as the Shift Foreman was aware of the inoperability of both pumps, he started a normal shutdown of the plant. In the meantime, he received permission to clear the maintenance safety tags and rack the "A" pump breaker to its normal position. He then ran a successful operability check on the "B" pump. The load reduction was stopped and the plant returned to full load.

In order to prevent a recurrence of this event, operating procedures have been changed so that operability tests of redundant engineered safeguards system components will be made immediately following any action that requires one of the systems to be inoperable for maintenance purposes.

We are enclosing forty copies of this letter.

Very truly yours,

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.

Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President

IRF/pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1