

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | N | P | F | - | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 36

CONT

01 | R | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 9
7 8 REPORT SOURCE 90 91 DOCKET NUMBER 98 99 EVENT DATE 104 105 REPORT DATE 110

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | At 2100 hours on October 10, 1977, the Decay Heat Valve Pit cover was
03 | removed to inspect the Decay Heat Isolation Valves (DH11 and DH12) and
04 | to perform a wiring change on motor operated valve DH12. This placed
05 | the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.
06 | (NP-33-77-77)
07 |
08 |

09 | S | F | 11 | X | 12 | X | 13 | V | E | S | S | E | L | 14 | X | 15 | Z | 16 |
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 10 11 CAUSE CODE 12 13 CAUSE SUBCODE 14 15 COMPONENT CODE 16 17 COMP SUBCODE 18 19 VALVE SUBCODE 20
17 | 7 | 7 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 27 | 28 | 29 | L | 30 | 31 |
18 | X | 19 | Z | 20 | C | 21 | Z | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 24 | 25 | N | 26 | A | 27 | X | 28 | 9 | 9 | 29 | 30 |
17 18 LER NO REPORT NUMBER 19 20 EVENT YEAR 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORTING NO. 23 24 OCCURRENCE CODE 25 26 REPORT TYPE 27 28 REVISION NO. 29 30
ACTION TAKEN 31 FUTURE ACTION 32 EFFECT ON PLANT 33 SHUTDOWN METHOD 34 35 HOURS 36 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 38 39 NRC-4 FORM 100-B 40 41 WRINE COMP SUPPLIER 42 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The Decay Heat Valves were inspected for leakage for preventative
11 | maintenance. The wiring change was completed to prevent inadvertent
12 | closure of valve DH12, while switching the source of power for DH12.
13 |
14 |

15 | B | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | Z | 31 | NA | 32 |
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 11 N POWER 12 13 OTHER STATUS 14 15 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 16 17 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 18 19

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36 |
7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 12 13 LOCATION OF RELEASE 14 15

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 |
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSED NUMBER 10 11 TYPE 12 13 DESCRIPTION 14 15

18 | Z | 36 | Z | 37 | NA | 38 |
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 10 11 TYPE 12 13 DESCRIPTION 14 15

19 | Z | 39 | NA | 40 |
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 10 11 DESCRIPTION 12 13

20 | N | 41 | NA | 42 |
7 8 9 PUBLICITY NUMBER 10 11 DESCRIPTION 12 13

NAME OF PREPARER Stan Batch PHONE 419-259-5000, Ext. 235

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-77

DATE OF EVENT: October 10, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Decay Heat Valve Pit opened to perform wiring change.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0. RCS pressure approximately 300 psig.

Description of Occurrence: At 2100 hours on October 10, 1977, the Decay Heat Valve Pit cover was removed to inspect the Decay Heat Isolation Valves (DH11 and DH12), and to perform a wiring change on DH12. This placed the station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.

At 2100 hours on October 13, 1977, the valve pit testing was not yet completed. In compliance with the Action Statement, the plant began preparations to enter Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, within the next twelve hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The valve pit cover was removed to inspect the Decay Heat Valves for leakage and to perform a wiring change on Isolation Valve DH12 per Facility Change Request, 77-034. This wiring change was initiated to prevent inadvertent closure of motor operated valve DH12 while switching the source of power for DH12.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The valve pit's sole purpose is to protect the valves after a major loss of coolant accident. These valves comprise one of the two boron dilution flow paths used after a major loss of coolant accident. The redundant boron dilution flow path was available and no loss of coolant accident occurred.

Corrective Action: The wiring change was completed and at approximately 2115 hours on October 13, 1977, Surveillance Test ST 5051.07 was completed which verified operability of the Decay Heat Valve Pit. This removed the station from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.

Failure Data: One previous entry into the valve pit was made for inspection purposes (NP-33-77-50).