

some questions which could only be answered in a general or qualified manner since the appropriate Technical Review representatives were unavailable for the meeting. The majority of questions raised appeared to have been answered satisfactorily.

The following are the major areas of concern which could be addressed by the Staff at the meeting in only a general manner:

1. One member of the Committee asked if changes in flow conditions after the core is installed could introduce adverse effects not present during the preoperational vibration tests. The Staff noted that flow would be reduced but did not speculate on the consequences. The Staff pointed out that the applicant plans to continue to monitor for loose parts by external electronic "listening" systems during reactor operations. One member of the Committee appeared to be interested in means to assure that flow changes would not result in adverse effects.
2. Another member of the Committee asked how B&W had calculated vortex shedding frequencies before and after modification and on what basis did it conclude that failure induced by vortex shedding was possible originally and now eliminated. The Staff stated that vortex shedding is calculated by a "textbook" formula and that it was from additional tests in the "1/6 scale" model tests that B&W concluded that local flow velocities could put the vortex shedding frequencies in the critical range for the original internals (in the range of the natural frequencies of the components). By shifting the natural frequencies of the new components by design B&W separated the natural frequencies from the calculated vortex shedding frequencies.
3. One question was what would have happened if the core had been in place at the time the internals failed. The Staff did not speculate on the potential damage but anticipated that the loose parts monitoring system would detect the failure.
4. The Staff verified for the Committee that the 5% power restriction, to be in effect until the Staff is satisfied with the adequacy of the preoperational vibration tests, would permit the reactor to be operated at full flow.

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- 5. The Staff presented a table which showed that the measured stresses in the redesigned internals were well below the allowable stresses. The Committee asked if B&W had compared these values against previous test data from the original internals. The Staff was not prepared to answer this question because the original internals were not instrumented in the same manner or to the same degree.
- B. The project manager made a presentation on the status of the flow limiters which will be installed in the Oconee Unit 1 flood lines.
 - 1. The Committee's main concern appeared to be whether or not the restrictors would stay in place during a LOCA after experiencing inservice environment for many years (chemical attack etc.). The Staff pointed out that it has not completed its review of the structural aspects of this design but that it is not unlike the thermal sleeve situation. Thermal sleeves have been approved for plants in operation.
- C. The project manager made a presentation on the status of the Staff's steamline break review. Preliminary information had been provided by the Staff to the ACRS but had not reached the individual Committee members by the time of the meeting. The Committee had no questions.

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