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Docket Nos. 50-269  
50-270  
and 50-287

AUG 21 1972

R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for PWR's, L  
THRU: A. Schwencer, Chief, PWR Branch No. 4, L

Original Signed by  
Robert L. Ferguson

DUKE POWER COMPANY - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3

Enclosed is a summary of the meeting held with Bill Parker,  
Duke Power Company on August 16, 1972.

Original Signed by  
Irving A. Peltier

Irving A. Peltier  
PWR Branch No. 4  
Directorate of Licensing

Enclosure:  
Meeting Summary

cc: R. S. Boyd  
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R. Tedesco  
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M. Service, (2)  
V. Niel  
D. Davis  
S. Hou (MEB)

FOR CONCURRENCES SEE DOCKET NO. 50-269

OFFICE ▶	L:PWR-4 x7548	L:PWR-4			
SURNAME ▶	IAPeltier:ts	ASchwencer			
DATE ▶	8/18/72	8/18/72			

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269/270/287

MEETING SUMMARY - AUGUST 16, 1972

Discussion Items

1. Seismic Analysis of Jocassee Dam Spillway (Hulman, Site Safety, attended). This meeting is covered in a separate report.
2. Quality Assurance Program for Operations (Hildreth, RO, attended)
3. Thermal stresses induced by operation of the high pressure injection system in Oconee 1 during hot functional tests.
4. Fuel examination in the Oconee fuel storage pit (Davis, PWR-4, attended).
5. Primary pump mounting.
6. Additional requests for information from MEB.
7. Class II fluid system failure.
8. Industrial Security Plan (Van Niel, OR, attended).

Summary of Above Discussion Items

1. Covered by separate report.
2. Duke was looking for guidance on the preparation of a quality assurance for operations program manual. Since according to Quality Assurance Branch the proposed guide has not been developed and there are no models at this time. Duke was advised to cover all 18 criteria of Appendix B and to review what others like TVA and Millstone are doing in the development of a manual. Duke had already reviewed the TVA manual.
3. Parker was asked what Duke has done to assure themselves and us that the Oconee Unit 1 can go to Nuclear Operation safely after the inadvertent operation of the HPI system during hot function testing last March. He said B&W had analyzed the situation but he did not know the details. Duke will call to discuss what will become a matter of record on this matter.

4. Parker was told that we have received no information on the proposed PIE (post irradiation [fuel] examination) program and that we (DR) look unfavorably on the intentional violation of fuel clad in an operating reactor facility. If Duke (and B&W) wish to pursue this matter further it should make a formal request for our review but we discourage doing so.
5. Parker was not familiar with the details of the primary pump mounting. The system is designed so that the pumps are supported by the piping but other than seismic restraints he was not sure what other hanger arrangements exist. Duke will call on this item.
6. In one area concerning the acceptance criteria and vibration testing of piping and Class I equipment a MEB reviewer was not satisfied with Dukes response to the June 16, 1972 meeting questions. The concerns were passed on to Parker and Duke will call to discuss them.
7. According to Parker Duke has made flooding calculations and determined that adequate response time exists to take protective action in the event a condenser cooling water line should rupture via the turbine building and threaten safety equipment in the auxiliary building. These results will be discussed by phone.
8. Parker was told that the informal draft Industrial Security Plan reviewed by Van Niel is not adequate. The areas of deficiency were given to Parker. An October 2, 1972 date was set for formal submittal of the plan.