



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

November 17, 1971

A. Schwencer, Chief, PWR Project Branch #4, DRL

OCONEE 1 - CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE TEST (CLRT)

A routine inspection of Oconee 1 was conducted on November 11 and 12, 1971. During the inspection, information was developed which, in our opinion, indicates that the Oconee CLRT was conducted under conditions which cause the test results to be invalid.

We understand that you are currently evaluating the adequacy of the Oconee 1 CLRT results. In our view, the new information, which wasn't discussed in the licensee's submittal on the CLRT¹, will effect your conclusions. Mindful of the impact on the licensee of an unfavorable finding and to expedite your review, an advance summary of our inspection findings are enclosed for your information and possible action.

We would be interested in your views on this new information and shall be pleased to discuss it with you if you wish.

R. T. Carlson

R. T. Carlson, Acting Chief,
Reactor Testing and Operations
Branch
Division of Compliance

cc: R. C. DeYoung, DRL
J. G. Davis, CO:II
N. Moseley, CO:II
W. S. Farmer, CO

¹/Duke Power Company Report dated
October 29, 1971

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OCONEE 1 CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE TEST

The following summary information, which wasn't discussed in licensee report of CLRT results, was developed by Region II (Atlanta) during an inspection of Oconee #1 on November 10 and 11, 1971.

1. Strongback clamps were attached to both the inner and outer emergency escape airlock doors. There is no information available as to the amount of force these clamps exerted in forcing the doors against the resilient gaskets. The clamps were installed during the performance of an over-pressure strength test and a leak rate test of the airlock at 67.8 psig and 59 psig, respectively. They were not removed prior to performance of the containment leak rate test (CLRT).
2. Identified leaks were not adequately corrected prior to performing the CLRT. A normally open manual valve (CS-14) in the coolant storage system was closed for the test. This was reportedly (by licensee) done because check valves, CS-11 and 12, were known from the results of individual penetration leak rate tests to be leaking excessively and repairs had not been made.
3. The steam lines out to the turbine stop valves were not included in the test. Since steam generator leakage is an anticipated operational occurrence, it is our view that main steam lines should be considered as part of the containment boundary.
4. The CLRT procedure did not require that isolation valves be closed using their normal (electric motor or air) closure mechanisms. No written evidence is available to substantiate that the normal closure mechanisms were used; although, the Duke Test Coordinator said that, to the best of his knowledge, they were used. In view of the strong incentive to ensure a satisfactory test, the lack of a specific prohibition against additional manual closure of valves is of concern. In our view, the last factor is disquieting but not sufficiently definitive to be used to determine that the test was inadequate.

The information in this memorandum will also be documented in the normal manner in an inspection report.