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JAN 2 6 1972

R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for PWRs, DRL THRU: Albert Schwencer, Chief, PWR Branch No. 4, DRL

MEETING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY CONCERNING REVIEW OF THE OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATION FOR OCONEE UNITS NOS. 1, 2, and 3, DOCKET NOS. 50-269/270/287

Enclosed is a summary of the meeting held on January 19, 1972 with Duke Power Company. An attendance lis also enclosed.

15/ I. A. Peltier, Project Leader PWR Branch No. 4 Division of Reactor Licensing

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Enclosures: 1. Meeting Summary 2. Attendance List

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ENCLOSURE NO. 1

DUKE POWER CORPORATION - OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50/269/270/287


SUMMARY OF MEETING - JANUARY 19, 1972

Summary

A meeting with Duke Power Company was held in Bethesda in January 19, 1972, to discuss the steps being taken by Duke to improve the instrument and control cable installation in Occnee Unit No. 1 and the steps to be taken by Duke to assure that the original cable separation criteria are met in Units Nos. 2 and 3. Principal concern is that in REG's opinion Duke has violated the cable separation criteria contained in the FSAR on Unit 1 but Duke feels that it met the criteria by using armored table and by running redundant safety cables in separate trays. Duke is making improvements in the Unit 1 installation by adding fire barriers where separation is three inches or less and will institute a temperature (cable) monitoring program of limited duration but including full power operation conditions. Duke will commit, by FSAR change, to meeting the original separation criteria in Units 2 and 3 and has started to widen cable trays, provide different means for routing vertical cables, and devised a system for separating safety cables from others in the trays in Unit No. 2.

Discussion

1. Unit No. 1. Duke admitted the overfill situation and blamed an unanticipated increase in the number of cables as the job progressed and workmanship problems due to outside contractor personnel for the situation, but felt that, considering their exclusive use of armored cables, the criteria for separation had been met. However, there is no documented justification that armored cable satisfies the original criteria. As a partial cure, Duke is installing "Glastic," a flame retardant glass polyester, as a fire barrier in all areas where cable separation between vertically adjacent trays is less than three inches.



Duke will take a look at the seismic situation resulting from adding the weight of the barriers (probably insignificant). Duke will institute a temperature measuring program to monitor cable temperatures during initial startup and at other times, such as full power operation, adverse air conditioning situations in the cable spreading room, etc. Details of the program were not firm but there was some discussion of the program being in effect during the first year of operation and periodically thereafter to assure that normal and abnormal operating conditions will not cause undue heating. A program of reasonable but limited time duration is preferred by Duke.

Duke had decided against extending the side rails on the Unit 1 trays to meet the fill criteria. We agreed noting that, while it would not accomplish anything positive, it tended to reduce ventilation and cable accessibility.

Duke will modify the FSAR to reflect the actual installation changes and to commit that a temperature monitoring program will be instituted for the overfilled areas. Details of the temperature monitoring program will be provided to the Division of Compliance for onsite inspection prior to its implementation.

- 2. Units Nos. 2 and 3. Changes being made to Unit 1 would not be appropriate for Units 2 and 3 and so it was agreed that Duke would state the criteria for Units 2 and 3 in the FSAR. Essentially this would be maintaining the minimum five inch separation between cable trays (clearance between side rails) and no fill above the tray rails throughout the plant.
- 3. <u>Schedules</u>. Duke stated that the earliest date it would be able to load fuel in Unit 1 is April 1, 1972. (A more realistic date is May 1, 1972.) The target date for fuel loading in Unit 2 is December 1972 with commercial operation to begin in February 1973.

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ATTENDANCE LIST

OCONEE UNITS NOS. 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50/269/270/287

JANUARY 19, 1972

Duke Power Company

- P. Barton C. Wylie K. Canady J. Hall <u>AEC - DRL/DRS/CO</u> A. Schwencer, DRL P. Pollard, DRS
- R. Pollard, DRS O. Parr, DRL I. Peltier, DRL J. Henderson, CO V. Thomas, CO C. Murphy, CO:II

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