

November 1, 1989

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Byron Station Units 1 and 2

Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2

Zion Station Units 1 and 2

Generic Letter 88-17 Supplemental Information

Loss of Decay Heat Removal

NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455, 50-456/457, and 50-295/304

References: (a) September 15, 1989, letter from R. A. Chrzanowski

to T. E. Murley

Dear Dr. Murley:

Commonwealth Edison provided the status of the Generic Letter 88-77. Loss of Decay Heat Removal, implementation for Byron, Braidwood, and Zion Stations in reference (a). This letter provides an update on the Residual Heat Removal system iconic display.

Zion Station has a main control board annunciator titled "RHR Pump Suction Pressure Lo". The purpose of this alarm is to alert the operators of impending Residual Heat Removal pump cavitation prior to air entrainment. The specific annunciator response procedure is contained in Attachment A. With the use of this alarm and the other system indications, Commonwealth Edison believes that the requirements of the Generic Letter regarding RHR monitoring at Zion Station is satisfied. Therefore, the iconic display will not be implemented at Zion Station.

Byron and Braidwood Stations are continuing to review the implementation of the iconic display. A decision will be forthcoming by January 30, 1990.

Please direct any further questions regarding this matter to this office.

Very truly yours,

RACLantus

R. A. Ohrzanowski

Nuclear Licensing Administrator

Attachment

cc: Byron Resident Inspector Braidwood Resident Inspector Zion Resident Inspector L. N. Olshan - NRR S. P. Sands - NRR C. Patel - NRR Region III Office Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - IDNS

ATTACHMENT A ANNUNCIATOR LOCATION 18

UNIT 2

RHR PUMPS

SUCTION

PRESSURE LO

Setpoint: 11.5 psig

Origin: RHR low suction pressure switches

2PSL-601 or 2PSL-602

(Multiple Input - No Reflash)

* This Annunciator is valid ONLY when the plant is in * cold shutdown with RCS pressure less than or equal * to 100 psig.

Probable Cause:

1. Reactor vessel level too low

2. RHR suction valves 2MOV-RHB700A, 2MOV-RHB700B, 2MOV-RHB701 or 2MOV-RHB702 have closed.

Automatic Action: N

None

Immediate Action:

- IF due to loss of reactor vessel level THEN refer to ADP-6.3 as appropriate.
- IF due to closure of suction valves 2MOV-RHB701 and 2MOV-RHB702, THEN attempt to open the valve AND refer to AOP-6.3.
- 3. Check reactor vessel level.
- 4. Check RHR pump amps.
- Verify RHR pump is not out of service for maintenance.

Supplementary Action:

- Monitor reactor vessel level until alarm is cleared.
- 2. If the pump is isolated for maintenance THEN turn alarm off at junction box 2HS601 or 2HS-602 on the Aux Bldg elevation 542'. Take switch 0.0.5. per the work request.

Inoperable Annunciator Action: No additional surveillance required.

References:

1. M-520

2. 22E-2-4840 page RH16 and 22E-2-4643

0044 Revision Date: JUN 1 8 1989