

ERRATA SHEET

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>NOW READS</u>	<u>SHOULD READ</u>
20	2-4	...onsite, which are...	...onsite.

Basis: The original statement was in error.

PAGE IN ERROR

The lack of site involvement by corporate engineering contributed to design implementation problems onsite, which are now being resolved by formation of an engineering group onsite that reports to corporate engineering. Other observed modification design weaknesses included numerous design calculation errors and root-cause analyses that failed to pursue the generic aspects of problems.

The licensee's approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was generally good. The licensee routinely anticipated potential concerns and provided proper controls, for such problems as high lake ambient water temperatures and the use of sealant injection materials in safety-related systems, in advance of needs. The licensee's corporate staff conducted a thorough investigation into the problem of missed estimated critical position (ECP) calculations and subsequently refined the ECP calculations and updated computer codes for greater accuracy, which from a safety standpoint was very good. For EOP activities, technical deviations from the Emergency Response Guidelines were fully justified and appropriate. However, this was somewhat offset by inconsistent use of adverse containment setpoint values under adverse environmental conditions. The licensee routinely exhibited conservatism in modification calculations reviewed, and the technical approaches used were generally appropriate. Also, after several years of delay, the licensee has begun the implementation of an onsite system engineer concept.

The licensee's responsiveness to NRC initiatives was good. The licensee's submittals in response to NRC initiatives generally demonstrated an in-depth, conservative approach. Once design control inadequacies were identified, the licensee was very responsive in developing resolutions to all concerns including establishing an assessment task group to develop recommendations that include the performance of a detailed, technically oriented design process audit. Bulletin 79-14, "Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems," resolution activities were a concern when unacceptable conditions were found in work that had previously been considered acceptable. The licensee took timely corrective action to address these concerns and progress to date has been adequate. NRC concerns were resolved with recently missed ECP calculations and boron-10 depletion with the inspector's questions answered promptly, appropriate documents provided, and procedures revised, when necessary. Requalification concerns, identified in a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) issued during the previous assessment period, are considered resolved and the CAL closed. Further inspection revealed that the licensee has begun to successfully implement its requalification program. Reactor trip system reliability testing was thorough and responsive to the Generic Letter 83-28 requirements. However, one licensee weakness was noted in the design bases in that data is not readily retrievable, with a major effort required following NRC requests.

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AEP:NRC:09731

Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2  
Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316  
License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74  
RESPONSE TO SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE  
PERFORMANCE (SALP) & BOARD REPORT

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attn: A. B. Davis

September 29, 1989

Dear Mr. Davis:

Thank you for the opportunity on September 26, 1989, to discuss the SALP & Board Report for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Plant, covering the period from March 1, 1988, through June 30, 1989. We have taken note of the weaknesses you cited and will rigorously pursue corrective actions in these areas.

It should be noted, as discussed during our meeting, that there are no plans at this time to create a new engineering group onsite that reports to corporate engineering as stated on page 20 of the report. However, a corporate reorganization has taken place that consolidates all of the designers who work on Cook Nuclear Plant issues into one group within the Design Department. Prior to this reorganization, these designers, although knowledgeable about Cook Nuclear Plant, were occasionally called upon to work on issues involving other AEP System plants. These individuals are now dedicated exclusively to Cook Nuclear Plant. This follows a recent, similar consolidation of mechanical and electrical engineers supporting Cook Nuclear Plant into a new, integrated Nuclear Engineering Department. We believe that this increased focus on Cook Nuclear Plant within the Service Corporation will result in better design implementation on site, and more effective engineering support.

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
Mr. A. B. Davis

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AEP:NRC:0973I

This document has been prepared following Corporate procedures that incorporate a reasonable set of controls to ensure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.

Sincerely,



M. P. Alexich  
Vice President

ldp

cc: D. H. Williams, Jr.  
A. A. Blind - Bridgman  
R. C. Callen  
G. Charnoff  
NEC Resident Inspector - Bridgman  
NFEM Section Chief