UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUN 10 1980

Report Nos. 50-369/80-10 and 50-370/80-~~10~~ 06

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

License Nos. CPPR-83 and CPPR-84

Inspection at Corporate Offices and McGuire Site near Lake Norman, North Carolina

Inspector: J. K. Rausch for
M. D. Hunt — 6-10-80 Date Signed

Approved by: J. K. Rausch
J. K. Rausch, Acting Chief, RCES Branch — 6-10-80 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 14-16, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine announced inspection involved 20 inspector-hours onsite and in Duke Power Company (DPC) corporate offices in the areas of noncompliances, unresolved items, IE Bulletins and Circulars, and licensee identified items.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. C. Rogers, Project Manager
M. Starnes, Senior QC Engineer
*E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
*K. S. Kisida, QA Engineer
*L. J. Bare, Assistant Engineer, Licensing
T. Heitman, Jr., Engineer, Licensing

Other licensee employees contacted included 6 technicians, 2 security force members and 5 office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 16, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Deviation 369/79-34-01 & 370/79-20-01, Inadequate fire protection system for QA records storage vault. A halon system has now been installed in the QA records vault.

(Closed) Infraction 370/79-18-01, Modifications to safety related motors without approved drawings. The licensee issued Installation Specification #74 which detailed approved additional seismic bracing for pump motors. The bracing used meets this specification.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 369/79-34-08 & 370/79-20-08, Inadequate QA procedures for auditing fire protection systems installations; DPC site QA has developed a Surveillance Checklist Serial No. S-6 which covers quarterly QA audits of "Fire Protection Activities Not Covered By Other Surveillances".

(Closed) Deficiency 370/79-22-01, Failure to properly inspect cable routing installation; A new routing card which adds two exit points on the cable tray has been issued. Documented retraining of electrical QC inspectors was reviewed and found adequate.

(Closed) Unresolved Item, 370/79-22-02, Safety-related cable separation at safety injection valve number 2NI136B. Cable number 2NI717 has been deleted and replaced with cable number 2NI959 which is routed with only the red safety-related cables.

(Closed) Deficiency 370/79-15-01, Failure to perform receiving inspection prior to installation. DPC's response dated September 24, 1979 advises that all persons involved including the NSSS vendor have been instructed in the proper receiving procedures. This appears to be an isolated case.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. IE Bulletins (IEB) & IE Circulars (IEC)

(Closed) IEB 79-15, Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies. DPC's letter dated August 30, 1979 advised that the "deep draft" type pumps are not utilized at McGuire Nuclear Plant.

(Closed) IEB 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping. The licensee's response dated May 29, 1979 advised that the algebraic summation techniques for combining responses were not used in the piping analysis.

(Closed) IEB 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineering Safety Systems. DPC's letter dated June 25, 1979 advised no Westinghouse type DB-75 or DB-50 circuit breakers are in use at McGuire.

(Closed) IEB 79-23, Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer. The licensee's November 1, 1979 response advised that connections have not been made between the low and high KVA rated transformers without adequate limitations on the flow of circulating currents.

(Closed) IEB 79-25, Failure of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems. DPC advised RII on January 4, 1980 that the Westinghouse BFD/NBFD relays are not used or planned for use at McGuire.

(Closed) IEB 79-27, Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation. The licensee's response dated February 28, 1980 advised that the requirements of this bulletin have been met at McGuire.

(Closed) IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray Absorber Cells. The licensee's March 21, 1980 response advised that the charcoal filters are two inch vertical bed type with the screens welded instead of riveted.

(Closed) IEB 79-16, 79-17, 79-18, and 79-26, These bulletins did not require a response as related to this site.

6. Inspector Followup Items (IFI)

(Closed) IFI 369/79-11-02, Water found in instrument connection boxes. Specification MCS 139-01-00-067 covering termination and sealing requirements for cables installed in containment are now being implemented.

7. Licensee Identified Items (LII) - 10 CFR 50.55(e)

(Closed) LII 369/79-28-03, Barton Transmitter environmental Qualification Testing. The DPC response dated August 24, 1979 advised that the seven Barton transmitters would be returned to the manufacturer or replace them from acceptable units in Lot 1 or Lot 2. The corresponding transmitters assigned to Unit 2 (which are part of Lot 2) will be installed in Unit 1 under the construction QA program.

Closed) LII 369/79-28-02 & 370/79-16-02, Personnel Air Lock Seal. The inspector examined the repairs that had been made to the seal mounting bolt holes. The bolt holes that were drilled completely through were welded and PT'ed.

(Closed) LII 369/79-28-01, Steam Generator Level Errors. The detailed requirements for correction of this LII are now incorporated in IE Bulletin 79-21.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-01 & 370/80-06-01, Rotork Valve Operator improperly specified. The licensee reported September 11, 1979 that commercial grade valve operators had been purchased for 19 valves in Unit 1 and 15 valves in Unit 2. The operators will be replaced with operators qualified for safety related application.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-02 & 370/80-06-02 Environmental Qualifications of Valve room equipment. The licensee reported October 9, 1979 that some of the equipment located in the valve room does not meet the conditions created by a steam line break.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-03, Westinghouse Part 21 - 7300 Series process cards. The licensee reported October 30, 1979 that they had identified circuit cards in Unit 1 that were included in the Westinghouse report to NRC.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-04 & 370/80-06-03 Electrical cable not to qualification requirements. DPC reported December 5, 1979 that the hypalon insulated RTD cables had no documentation and believes that the wire may not meet the requirements for radiation effects.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-05 & 370/80-06-04, Nelson motor control centers. DPC reported December 11, 1979 that cable failures inside a safety related motor control center revealed improper stripping of wire insulation before installing the wire lugs. A complete inspection of Nelson supplied equipment was scheduled.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-06 & 370/80-06-05 Power separated relief valve (PORV) block valves. DPC reported December 17, 1979 that during prototype testing of the PORV block valves, the valves would not close due to excessive frictional forces. Further examination indicates that larger motor operators are required.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-07 & 370/80-06-06, ITE - Gould overcurrent relay SCR failure. On January 31, 1980, DPC reported that during testing the SCR's failed in Model 516 and 514 overcurrent relays. The manufacturers informed the NRC on February 11, 1980 that the potential problem existed.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-08 & 370/80-06-07, Electrical cable qualifications. The licensee informed RII on February 26, 1980 that 16 signal cables for the steam generator level transmitters did not meet the aging requirements. These cables are to be replaced.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-09 & 370/80-06-08, Control rod drive deficiency, Westinghouse Part 21. On March 26, 1980 DPC advised RII of the potential for cracking in the control rod guide tube support pens. This condition was reported to the NRC by Westinghouse Corporation on March 14, 1980 as a Part 21.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-10 & 370/80-06-09 Socket welds do not meet applicable quality standards. The licensee reported April 3, 1980 that undersized socket welds had been identified in five safety systems. Weld buildup has been completed and will be inspected during a future inspection.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-11, Cutler-Hammer auxiliary relay failure. On April 15, 1980 the licensee reported a single failure of the type M relay, top block D 26 MF. The failed relay along with other similar relays are being returned to the supplier for evaluation.

(Open) LII 369/80-10-12 & 370/80-06-10, Fire protective systems valve misapplication. DPC reported April 17, 1980 that a review of "as built" drawing revealed that a class H valve had been installed in a class F system.