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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 19 1980

Docket Nos.: 50-327
and 50-328

Mr. H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

SUBJECT: REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON SEQUOYAH

Enclosed are requests for information that is needed to continue our reviews. The enclosures have been discussed with your staff and they were submitted on an informal basis. We suggest a submittal date of July 1, 1980.

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

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c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 699
Hixson, Tennessee 37343

331.03

(12.2.1)
(12.3.2)

Provide a summary of the shielding design review required by our letter dated November 9, 1979, implementing the lessons learned item 2.1.6.b of NUREG-0578, and provide a description of the results of this review. Include in your description:

a. source terms used in the evaluation (NUREG-0578 specified that source terms in Regulatory Guide 1.3, 1.4 and 1.7 be used).

b. systems assumed to contain high levels of radioactivity in a post-accident situation including, but not limited to, containment, residual heat removal, safety injection, CVCS, demineralizers, charging systems, reactor coolant filters, seal water filters sample lines, liquid radwaste systems, gaseous radwaste systems, and standby gas treatment systems. If any of these systems or others that could contain high radioactivity were excluded, explain why such systems were excluded from review.

c. specify areas where access is considered necessary for vital system operation after an accident. Your evaluation of areas to determine the necessary vital areas should include but not be limited to, consideration of the control room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, recombiner hookup and control stations, hydrogen purge control stations, containment isolation reset control area, sampling and sample analysis areas, manual ECCS alignment area, motor control centers, instrument panels, emergency pow supplies, security center and radwaste control panels. If any of these areas were not considered areas where access was necessary after an accident, explain why they are excluded.

d. Designation of the codes used for analysis, such as ORIGEN, ISOSHIELD, QUAD or others.

e. The projected doses to individuals for necessary occupancy times in vital areas.

f. A brief description of the proposed plant modifications resulting from the design review and confirmation that these modifications will be complete by January 1, 1981 or full power, whichever is later.

331.04
(12.3.4)
(NTOL)

Revise and broaden your response of 1/24/80 to provide a description of the two high range containment monitors required by our letter of November 9, 1979, implementing the Lessons Learned item 2.1.8.b of NUREG-0578, and specify the location of these monitors (inside containment). The description of the monitors should include:

a. type of radiation measured;

b. the range or ranges of the monitors. If two or more monitors are required to span the range in Table 2.8.1.b.3 of our November 9, 1979 letter (10^8 rad/hr total radiation or 10^7 R/hr photons only), the ranges of the subsystem monitors must overlap (i.e., upper value/lower value of overlap) by at least a factor of 10;

c. location of and type of readout (continuous and recording);

d. energy response (sensitive to 60 kev);

e. calibration frequency and methods (refueling frequency);

f. verification that the monitors are powered by separate vital instrument buses;

g. verification that the monitors will be operational by full power;

h. verification that the monitors meet the seismic qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.100 (Seismic Category I) and are environmentally qualified to survive an in-containment LOCA in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.89.

The location of the monitors should be shown on plant layout drawings. The monitors should be located in a manner as to provide a reasonable assessment of radiation levels inside containment. Monitors should not be placed in areas which are protected by massive shielding.

331.05 Your response to previous request 331.1 is incomplete. Provide drawings and description of means provide o insure against inadvertent access to very high radiation areas through inspection entry ways adjacent to the spent fuel transfer tube.

Enclosure

Request for Additional Information - Containment Sump

Background

The safety issue of containment emergency sump performance under post-LOCA conditions can be viewed as two parts: (1) containment sump hydraulic performance (i.e., providing adequate NPSH to the recirculation pumps with up to 50 percent of the sump screen area blocked) and (2) the effects of debris. The first part, sump hydraulic performance, has previously been addressed in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, and has been acceptably resolved as is stated in Section 6.3.4 of the SER. The problem addressed herein is the potential for debris from insulation and other sources within containment to collect and compromise the ability of the ECCS to recirculate coolant from the containment sump through the RHR heat exchangers to the vessel. Please respond to the following items with the desired information.

1. As stated in Section 6.3.4 of Supplement No. 1 to the SER, a scale model test of the SNP sump design has been successfully conducted to show that adverse hydraulic phenomena which could impede long-term cooling of the core following a LOCA will not occur. This testing was performed with up to fifty percent of the sump screens blocked. The responses to the following concerns are required to support this assumption.
   a) For each type of thermal insulation used in the containment, provide the following information:
      (1) The manufacture, brand name, volume and area covered.
      (2) A brief description of the material and an estimate of the tendency of this material either to form particles small enough to pass through the fine screen in the sump or to block the sump trash racks or sump screens.

(3) Location of the material (metal mirrored, foam glass, foam rubber, fiberglass, etc.) with respect to whether a mechanism exists for the material to be transported to the sump.

b) Part four of the response to question 6.28 does not provide an estimate of the amount of debris that the sump inlet screens may be subjected to during a loss-of-coolant accident. Provide this information including the results of an analysis of the worst break in terms of the amount of insulation blown off by pipe whip and hydraulic jet forces, indicating where the insulation would come to rest. If a blockage problem is identified, propose corrective actions.

c) Discuss the basis for the conclusion that debris with a specific gravity greater than unity will settle before reaching the sump cover. Consider the potential for flow paths which may direct significant quantities of debris laden coolant into the lower containment in the vicinity of the sump and the availability or lack of sufficient horizontal surface areas or obstructions to promote settling or holdup of debris prior to reaching the sump .

d) Discuss the significance of containment coating, e.g., paint, as a source of debris over the long term post-LOCA recirculation phase. Have the coatings been environmentally qualified for the long term post-LOCA environmental conditions?

e) Does metal mirror insulation house other materials, fibrous or otherwise, which could become debris if the insulation were blown off as a result of a LOCA?

f) Expand the discussion in response to question 6.28 on loose insulation to include examples of how the insulation will be precluded from reaching the sump.

g) Expand the discussion on containment and ice condenser insulation to include details on the reaction of various insulation types to the post-LOCA environment and to include examples of the use of foam concrete. What is the density of foam concrete and what tendency does it have to be broken up into small sized particles? Discuss the bases, including any analyses performed, for the protection of insulation from the effect of a LOCA.

2. The resolution of the concerns noted above plus the provision of adequate NPSH under non-debris conditions, and adequate housekeeping practices are expected to reduce the likelihood of problems during recirculation. However in the event that RHR recirculation system problems such as pump cavitation or air entrainment do occur, the operator should have the capability to recognize and contend with the problems.

Both cavitation and air entrainment could be expected to cause pump vibration and oscillations in system flow rate and pressure. Show that the operator will be provided with sufficient instrumentation and appropriate indications to allow and enable detection of these problems. List the instrumentation available giving both the location of the sensor and the readout.

The incidence of cavitation, air entrainment or vortex formation could be reduced by reducing the system flow rate. The operator should have the capability of throttling or terminating flow as required. Show that the emergency operating instructions and the operator training consider the need to monitor the long-term performance of the recirculation system and consider the need for corrective actions to alleviate problems.

3. Discuss the effect of debris entrained in the recirculating coolant on the long term operability of the RHR, safety injection and charging pumps and motors.

For each pump/motor type discuss the applicable operating experience and the design aspects of the seals, bearings and other components with respect to whether the design is susceptible to failure resulting from interaction of the components with debris entrained in the recirculating coolant. Include in the response information on the means of lubricating and cooling the pump and motor bearings and on the means of cooling the pump seals, e.g., is seal cooling water at a higher pressure than the pumped fluid during the recirculation mode?

4. Provide a schematic drawing of the post-LOCA water level in the containment during the recirculation mode relative to the elevation of the ECCS sump floor (elevation 667.0 ft) as shown on FSAR Figure 1.2-13. Include on this drawing the location of the containment water level sensor and the elevations which correspondsto readings of zero and 100 percent of range on the control room indicator.

5. Provide several large scale drawings of the containment structures, systems and components at elevations ranging from 679 to 732 feet.

6. Does the SNP utilize sand or similar materials in the containment during power operation for purposes such as reactor cavity annulus biological shielding (e.g., sand tanks or sand bags) or reactor cavity blow out sand plugs?