



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUN 18 1980

In Reply Refer To

RII:JPO

70-1201

Babcock and Wilcox Company  
ATTN: Mr. W. F. Heer, Manager  
Virginia Operations, Nuclear Materials  
and Manufacturing Division  
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant  
P. O. Box 800  
Lynchburg, VA 24505


Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-15 which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility(ies) and/or fuel facility(ies) with an operating license.

In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.

Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

  
James P. O'Reilly  
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 80-15
2. List of Recently Issued  
IE Bulletins

8007020725

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6820  
Accessions No.:  
8005050072

June 18, 1980

IE Bulletin No. 80-15

POSSIBLE LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (ENS) WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

In the past year, there have been two occurrences where a loss of off-site power has resulted in a loss of communications between a power reactor facility and the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The most recent occurrence was at Indian Point Unit 2 on June 3, 1980. The earlier event occurred at the Davis Besse facility on October 15, 1979 and resulted in the issuance of IE Circular 80-09.

The installation of the ENS requires a station package which operates on 110 VAC. In some cases, the station package is located at the local telephone company which supplies the required power for normal operation and emergency power for operation during abnormal occurrences, but in many cases, the package is located at the site and is served by on-site power. In some cases where the station package is served by on-site power, the station package has not been backed up by emergency power.

NRC data indicates that the station packages for each facility are powered in the manner described in the two enclosures.

Actions to be taken by all licensees:

1. Within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin, verify by direct inspection, in conjunction with the appropriate telephone company representative, that the ENS at your facility is powered in the manner described in the two enclosures.
2. Those facilities which have station packages requiring on-site power, but which are not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus which is backed up by batteries and an inverter or equally reliable power supply, shall make necessary modifications and provide such a connection.
3. All facilities are to develop and conduct a test, within 60 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, to verify that all extensions of the ENS located at your facility(ies) would remain fully operable from the facility(ies) to the NRC Operations Center in the event of a loss of offsite power to your facility(ies). This is not intended to mean that an actual loss of offsite power be executed.

4. If it is determined that a station package requiring on-site power is not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus backed up by automatic transfer to batteries and an inverter or an equally reliable power supply, notify the NRC Operations Center via the ENS within 24 hours after such determination.
5. Prepare and issue an administrative procedure or directive which requires notification to the NRC Operations Center by commercial telephone or relayed message within one hour of the time that one or more extensions of the ENS located at your facility(ies) is subsequently found to be inoperable for any reason.
6. Provide a written report, within 75 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, describing the result of the reviews required by items 1 and 2 above, the results of the testing required by item 3 and the procedures required by item 5.

This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time periods specified in item 6 above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.

Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072): clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

Enclosures:

1. Facilities With "Hotline" Powered  
By Local Telephone Company
2. Facilities With "Hotline" Using  
On-Site Power

Facilities With "Hotline" Powered By Local Telephone Company

Region I

B&W Leechburg/Apollo  
Beaver Valley 1  
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2  
Fitzpatrick  
Ginna  
Indian Point 2  
Indian Point 3  
Millstone 1 & 2  
NFS-West Valley  
Nine Mile Point 1  
Three Mile Island 1 & 2  
TI-Attleboro  
Westinghouse Cheswick

Region II

Hatch 1 & 2  
NFS-Erwin

Region III

Cook 1 & 2  
Dresden 1, 2 & 3  
Duane Arnold  
Kerr McGee Crescent  
La Crosse  
Monticello  
Palisades  
Point Beach 1 & 2  
Quad Cities 1 & 2

Region V

Exxon Richland  
General Atomics LaJolla  
Rockwell Canoga Park  
San Onofre  
Trojan

Facilities With "Hotline" Using On-Site Power

Region I

Haddam Neck  
Maine Yankee  
Oyster Creek  
Peach Bottom 2 & 3  
Pilgrim 1  
Salem 1 & 2  
UNC-Montville  
UNC-Wood River Junction  
Vermont Yankee  
Yankee Rowe

Region II

B&W LRC-Lynchburg  
B&W Navy-Lynchburg  
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3  
Brunswick 1 & 2  
Crystal River  
Farley 1  
North Anna 1 & 2  
Oconee 1, 2 & 3  
Robinson 2  
Sequoyah 1  
St. Lucie 1  
Surry 1 & 2  
Turkey Point 3 & 4

Region III

Big Rock Point  
Davis-Besse  
Kewaunee  
Prairie Island 1 & 2  
Zion 1 & 2

Region IV

Arkansas Nuclear One, 1 & 2  
Cooper  
Fort Calhoun  
Fort St. Vrain

Region V

Diablo Canyon  
Rancho Seco



IE Bulletin No. 80-15  
June 18, 1980

Enclosure

RECENTLY ISSUED  
IE BULLETINS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
80-15	Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS) With Loss of Offsite Power	6/18/80	All nuclear power and fuel facilities holding OLs
80-14	Degradation of Scram Discharge Volume Capability	6/12/80	All BWR's with an OL
80-13	Cracking In Core Spray Spargers	5/12/80	All BWR's with an OL
80-12	Decay Heat Removal System Operability	5/9/80	Each PWR with an OL
80-11	Masonry Wall Design	5/8/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL, except Trojan
80-10	Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment	5/6/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-09	Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies	4/17/80	All power reactor operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits
80-08	Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds	4/7/80	All power reactors with a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980
80-07	BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure	4/4/80	All GE BWR-3 and BWR-4 facilities with an OL
79-03A	Longitudinal Weld Defects In ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe	4/4/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-06	Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls	3/13/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL
80-05	Vacuum Condition Resulting In Damage To Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks	3/10/80	All PWR power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those with a CP