

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I

631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket No. 50-293

June 18, 1980

Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear ATTN: Mr. G. Carl Andognini, Manager Nuclear Operations Department 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-15, "Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System (ENS) With Loss of Off-Site Power," is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required.

In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely.

Director

Enclosures:

IE Bulletin No. 80-15

List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins

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cc w/encls:

P. J. McGuire, Pilgrim Station Manager

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6820 Accessions No.: 8005050072

June 18, 1980

IE Bulletin No. 80-15

POSSIBLE LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (ENS) WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

In the past year, there have been two occurrences where a loss of off-site power has resulted in a loss of communications between a power reactor facility and the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The most recent occurrence was at Indian Point Unit 2 on June 3, 1980. The earlier event occurred at the Davis Besse facility on October 15, 1979 and resulted in the issuance of IE Circular 80-09.

The installation of the ENS requires a station package which operates on 110 VAC. In some cases, the station package is located at the local telephone company which supplies the required power for normal operation and emergency power for operation during abnormal occurrences, but in many cases, the package is located at the site and is served by on-site power. In some cases where the station package is served by on-site power, the station package has not been backed up by emergency power.

NRC data indicate that the station packages are powered in the manner described in the enclosures.

Actions to be taken by all licensees:

- Within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin, determine by direct inspection, in conjunction with the appropriate telephone company representative, the manner in which the ENS at your facility is powered.
- Those facilities which have station packages requiring on-site power, but which are not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus which is backed up by batteries and an inverter or equally reliable power supply, shall make necessary modifications and provide such a connection.
- 3. All facilities are to develop and conduct a test, within 60 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, to verify that all extensions of the ENS located at your facility(ies) would remain fully operable from the facility(ies) to the NRC Operations Center in the event of a loss of offsite power to your facility(ies). This is not intended to mean that an actual loss of offsite power be executed.

- 4. If it is determined that a station package requiring on-site power is not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus backed up by automatic transfer to batteries and an inverter or an equally reliable power supply, notify the NRC Operations Center via the ENS within 24 hours after such determination.
- 5. Prepare and issue an administrative procedure or directive which requires notification to the NRC Operations Center by commercial telephone or relayed message within one hour of the time that one or more extensions of the ENS located at your facility(ies) is subsequently found to be inoperable for any reason.
- 6. Provide a written report, within 75 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, describing the result of the reviews required by items 1 and 2 above, the results of the testing required by item 3 and the procedures required by item 5.

This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time periods specified in item 6 above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.

Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072): clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

Enclosures:

 Facilities With ENS Powered By Local Telephone Company

 Facilities With ENS Powered Using On-Site Power

Region I

B&W Leechburg/Apollo
Beaver Valley 1
Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2
Fitzpatrick
Ginna
Indian Point 2
Indian Point 3
Millstone 1 & 2
NFS-West Valley
Nine Mile Point 1
Three Mile Island 1 & 2
TI-Attleboro
Westinghouse Cheswick

Region II

Hatch 1 & 2 NFS-Erwin

Region III

Cook 1 & 2 Dresden 1, 2 & 3 Duane Arnold Kerr McGee Cresent La Crosse Monticello Palisades Point Beach 1 & 2 Quad Cities 1 & 2

Region V

Exxon Richland General Atomics LaJolla Rockwell Canoga Park San Onofre Trojan

Facilities With ENS Powered Using On-Site Power

Region 1

Haddam Neck
Maine Yankee
Oyster Creek
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
Pilgrim 1
Salem 1 & 2
UNC-Montville
UNC-Wood River Junction
Vermont Yankee
Yankee Rowe

Region II

B&W LRC-Lynchburg
B&W Navy-Lynchburg
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
Brunswick 1 & 2
Crystal River
Farley 1
North Anna 1 & 2
Oconee 1, 2 & 3
Robinson 2
Sequoyah 1
St. Lucie 1
Surry 1 & 2
Turkey Point 3 & 4

Regfon III

Big Rock Point Davis-Besse Kewaunee Prairie Island 1 & 2 Zion 1 & 2

Region IV

Arkansas Nuclear One 1 & 2 Cooper Fort Calhoun Fort St. Vrain

Region V

Diablo Canyon Rancho Seco

RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS

Bulletin Subject Date Issue No.	ued Issued To All BWR's with an
	All BWR's with an
80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 Discharge Volume Capability	0 <u>r</u>
80-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 Spargers	All BWR's with an OL
80-12 Decay Heat Removal System 5/9/80 Operability	Each PWR with an OL
80-11 Masonry Wall Design 5/8/80	All power reactor facilities with an OL, except Trojan
80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 Deficiencies	All power reactor operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits
80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 Liner Penetration Welds	All power reactors with a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980
80-07 BWR Jet Pump Assembly 4/4/80 Failure	All GE BWR-3 and BWR-4 facilities with an OL
79-03A Longitudinal Weld Defects 4/4/80 In ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe	All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP
80-06 Engineered Safety Feature 3/13/80 (ESF) Reset Controls	All power reactor facilities with an OL
Vacuum Condition Resulting 3/10/80 In Damage To Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks	All PWR power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those with a CP