

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV

IE Inspection Report No. 50-313/76-05

Docket No. 50-313

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company
Sixth & Pine Streets
Pine Bluff, Arkansas

License No. DPR-51

Category C

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1

Location: Russellville, Arkansas

Type of Licensee: B&W, PWR, 2568 Mwt

Type of Inspection: March 23-25, 1976

Dates of Previous Inspection: February 10-12, 1976

Principal Inspector:

D. G. Anderson

D. G. Anderson, Reactor Inspector

4/8/76
Date

Other Accompanying
Personnel:

R. Smith

R. Smith, Reactor Inspector

4-8-76
Date

E. H. Johnson

E. H. Johnson, Reactor Inspector

4-8-76
Date

Reviewed By:

G. L. Madsen

G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations
and Nuclear Support Branch

4/8/76
Date

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I. Enforcement Action

A. Violations

None identified by the inspectors.

B. Infractions

1. Technical Specification 6.7 requires in part that procedures be prepared, approved and adhered to for preventive or corrective maintenance operations involving nuclear safety of the facility.

Contrary to the above, procedures were not followed in the control of hold cards as required by procedure 1004.19, Hold, Caution and QC Tagging Procedure.

This item is an infraction. (DETAILS, paragraph 7)

2. Technical Specification 6.7.3 requires that temporary changes to safety related operating procedures which do not involve a change of intent be approved by two members of the plant staff, at least one of whom shall be a shift supervisor.

Contrary to the above requirement, two temporary changes to operating procedures for safety related systems, temporary change 1 to procedure 1104.03, revision 4, "Chemical Addition," and temporary change 2 to procedure 1103.06, revision 1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," were in effect but had been approved by only one plant staff member.

This item is an infraction. (DETAILS, paragraph 3)

C. Deficiencies

1. 10 CFR 50.59(b) requires in part that the licensee maintain records of changes to procedures as described in the safety analysis report and that such records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

(continued)

Contrary to the above requirement, no written safety evaluation to provide the bases for the determination that the change did not constitute an unreviewed safety question were maintained for three changes to procedures described in the FSAR, procedures 1102.06, revision 2, "Reactor Trip Recovery," 1202.32, revision 2, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," and 1202.03, revision 3, "CRD Malfunction Action."

This item is a deficiency. (DETAILS, paragraph 3)

2. Technical Specification 6.7 requires in part that detailed written procedures, covering Emergency and off-normal conditions shall be prepared, approved and adhered to for all systems and components involving nuclear safety.

Contrary to the above procedures were not provided for the action to be taken in the event of dropping a group of rods in the regulating or safety groups.

This item is a deficiency. (DETAILS, paragraph 5)

II. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

The licensee is still remiss in processing QC-2 forms for Job Orders as required by procedure 1004.08. (DETAILS, paragraph 6)

III. Design Changes

Not inspected.

IV. Unusual Occurrences

None reported to, or identified by the inspector.

V. Other Significant Findings

A. Current Findings

1. Deviations

7605/1 Failure to Provide Procedures Committed to in the FSAR

Procedures 1101.01, "Plant Limits and Precautions," and 1101.02, "Plant Set Points," are described in Amendment 28 to the FSAR (response item 12.11). The licensee representative indicated that these procedures did not exist. (DETAILS, paragraph 3.C.5)

(continued)

B. New Unresolved Items

1. Conflict between QCP 1004.21 and the QA Manual

The licensee's procedure 1004.21, "Handling of Procedures," contains information which conflicts with the requirements of the QA Manual.

2. Inadvertent Addition of Na₂S₂O₃ to the Sodium Hydroxide Tank

Two thousand pounds of Na₂S₂O₃ were inadvertently added to the NaOH tank. (DETAILS, paragraph 11)

3. Training

Formal training was not accomplished subsequent to multiple inadvertent group control rod drops. (DETAILS, paragraph 5)

4. LER Corrective Action

LER 75-10 and 76-01 did not document the corrective action taken and action to be taken to prevent recurrence. (DETAILS, paragraph 5)

C. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Unresolved Items

1. 7502/2 Halon Fire System acceptance tests are still to be completed. (DETAILS, paragraph 10)

2. 7502/5 Reactor building cooler backdraft damper breakers are still open. (DETAILS, paragraph 8)

3. 7509/1 Licensing is reviewing a Technical Specification change request related to annunciators and alarms for reactor building spray system tanks level indication. (DETAILS, paragraph 9)

VI. Management Meetings

A. Entrance Meeting

A pre-inspection meeting was conducted with Mr. J. W. Anderson, Plant Superintendent and members of his staff on March 23, 1976.

(continued)

B. Exit Meeting

At the conclusion of the inspection on March 25, 1976, a management exit meeting was conducted with Mr. J. W. Anderson, ANO-1 Plant Superintendent, and members of his plant staff. Items reviewed at this meeting are as follows:

1. Items of noncompliance and the deviation noted as a result of this inspection.
2. Procedures. (DETAILS, paragraph 3)
3. Group 6 Ratchet Trips. (DETAILS, paragraph 5)
4. Maintenance. (DETAILS, paragraph 6)
5. Control of Hold Cards. (DETAILS, paragraph 7)
6. Reactor building cooler backdraft dampers and engineered safety feature valves blocked open. (DETAILS, paragraphs 3 and 8)
7. Inadvertent addition of $\text{Na}_2\text{S}_2\text{O}_3$ to the NaOH tank. (DETAILS, paragraph 11)

(continued)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)

W. Anderson, Jr., Plant Superintendent
G. H. Miller, Assistant Plant Supervisor
B. A. Terwilliger, Supervisor of Plant Operations
C. A. Halbert, Technical Support Engineer
T. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer
T. Martin, Maintenance Supervisor
R. G. Carroll, Health Physics Supervisor
C. L. Bean, Quality Assurance Inspector
L. W. Humphrey, Quality Assurance Engineer
J. D. Vandergrift, Shift Supervisor
B. Baker, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor
V. Kinsey, Secretary, PSC
M. Bishop, Records Supervisor
J. Crowe, Store Room Supervisor
L. Alexander, Quality Control Engineer
R. Owens, Health Physicist
R. Fishencord, Health Physicist
J. Bates, Radiochemistry Supervisor
C. Zimmerman, Reactor Operator
L. Long, Reactor Operator

2. Plant Status

The plant was shutdown during the time period encompassed by the inspection. The reactor vessel head was removed on March 24, 1976 in preparation for removal and inspection of reactor vessel surveillance test specimens. This action resulted from reported instances of wear problems in the surveillance specimen holder tubes at other Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants. On March 26, 1976 the licensee representative reported (LER 76-3) by telephone that one holder tube was found to be severed and the spring cartridge and push rod were not in place. Inspection of the other holder tubes and evaluation of this problem by the licensee representative is continuing at this time.

3. Procedures

a. Objective

The objective of this inspection effort was to ascertain whether changes made to approved procedures are in conformance with regulatory requirements and whether the technical adequacy of reviewed procedures is consistent with the intended mode of operation.

(continued)

b. Areas Reviewed

- (1) The inspector reviewed 19 facility procedures to verify that review and approval procedures and procedure changes covering the operation and maintenance of safety related systems were in accordance with the Technical Specifications and applicable regulations. These procedures are listed in Table 3-1.
- (2) The inspector reviewed 30 temporary changes to verify that these changes were being made in accordance with facility procedures and the Technical Specifications. These changes reviewed are listed in Table 3-2.
- (3) The inspector verified that procedures were changed to reflect Technical Specification changes.
- (4) The inspector reviewed the procedures in Table 3-1 to verify that their content was in conformance with ANSI N18.7 and selected specific procedures from this table for a detailed technical review to verify that these procedures would accomplish the desired evolution safely and within TS limitations.

c. Findings

- (1) The inspector reviewed the procedures listed in Table 3-1 to verify that the licensee's review and approval procedures and applicable regulations were being adhered to for these procedures and changes thereto. The following discrepancy was noted.

10 CFR 50.59(b) requires in part that the licensee maintain records of changes in procedures described in facility safety analysis, and specifies: "These records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change . . . does not constitute an unreviewed safety question."

Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee did not maintain a written safety evaluation describing the bases for the determination that the procedure change did not constitute an unreviewed safety question for the changes to the following procedures that are described in the FSAR as amplified by Item 12.11 of amendment 41:

(continued)

<u>Procedure</u>	<u>Title</u>
1102.06, Rev. 2	Reactor Trip Recovery
1202.32, Rev. 2	Loss of Decay Heat Removal
1203.03, Rev. 3	CRD Malfunction Action

- (2) The inspector reviewed the 30 temporary changes listed in Table 3-2 to verify that these changes were made in accordance with the Technical Specifications and that they were being reviewed on a timely basis by the Plant Safety Committee. The following discrepancy was noted.

Technical Specification 6.73 allows temporary changes to be made to facility operating procedures, but requires that these temporary changes ". . . be approved by two members of the plant staff, at least one of whom shall be a shift supervisor."

Contrary to the above Technical Specification, the following temporary changes were approved by only one plant staff member.

<u>Procedure</u>	<u>Revision</u>	<u>Temporary Change</u>	<u>Title</u>
1104.03	Rev. 4	TC 1	Chemical Addition
1103.06	Rev. 1	TC 2	Reactor Coolant Pump Operation

- (3) The inspector reviewed TS amendments 2 through 8 which have been issued during the past year and verified that procedure changes have been made to reflect these amendments. There were no questions in this area.
- (4) The inspector reviewed the procedures in Table 3-1 to verify that their content was in conformance with ANSI N18.7 and selected several (as noted) from this table for detailed technical review. The inspector had no questions in this area; however, he did have some comments which are detailed below in subparagraph c(8).
- (5) In reviewing various facility procedures the inspector noted that many procedures referenced procedure 1101.01, "Plant Limits and Precautions" or procedure 1101.02, "Plant Set Points." When the inspector asked to review these procedures he was informed that these procedures did not exist, although one was in draft form.

Procedures 1101.01 and 1101.02 are described in amendment 20 to the FSAR, response items 12.11 as safety related procedures which will be provided.

(continued)

Failure to provide these procedures is in deviation to the above FSAR commitment.

- (6) In reviewing the licensee's quality control procedure 1004.21, "Handling of Procedures," the inspector noted several apparent contradictions to the licensee's Quality Assurance Manual and Technical Specifications.

Section 8.2 of QCP 1004.21 states that a temporary change, which involves an intent change, may be made during the hours when the Plant Superintendent or Assistant Plant Superintendent are not available provided, ". . . approval is obtained from one of the following: Nuclear Engineer, Supervisor of Plant Operations, Technical Support Engineer, Supervisor of Plant Maintenance."

This information conflicts with the Quality Assurance Manual (QAM), section 5 and TS 6.7.3, which state that a temporary change involving an intent change may be made with the approval of the Plant Superintendent (or in his absence, the Assistant Plant Superintendent).

QCP 1004.21, section 8.4, states that in an emergency a temporary deviation from a procedure may be made ". . . preferably with the approval of a shift supervisor."

This information conflicts with the QAM, section 5.4, which states that ". . . temporary deviations from established . . . procedures . . . may be made with the approval of the shift supervisor and one other individual holding a Senior Operator's license."

This area will remain unresolved.

- (7) The licensee's QAM, section 5.6.1, states that: "Applicable procedures, instructions and drawings shall be reviewed following any unusual incident (e.g., abnormal equipment malfunction or accident) and revised, as necessary to prevent recurrence of such incidents."

The inspector selected several items reported in the licensee's semiannual operating report and attempted to verify that a mechanism existed to ensure that the above requirement could be satisfied and that such revision had occurred for the items selected.

In his semiannual report for January through June 1975, the licensee reported maintenance (Job Order 568, dated 1/20/75) on two engineered safety feature valves CV3813 and CV3814

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which had failed due to insufficient lubrication. The inspector attempted to determine if changes to the lubrication schedule had been made to reflect these failures. The inspector was told that no nonconformance report had been issued on this occurrence although section 15 of the licensee's QA manual suggests that the nonconformance report is the appropriate management information vehicle for disposition of this type of problem.

The inspector reviewed Job Order 568 and could find no indication on it that this problem was dispositioned satisfactorily. The Job Order (JO) form receives a review from only the department head (e.g., maintenance supervisor) on the preparation and completion and does not indicate that the Plant Safety Committee is to review it for safety or to determine if procedure changes are necessary.

Subsequent to the completion of JO 568, another JO (867) was issued to inspect valves CV3813 and CV3814. These orders were signed off as complete on April 29, 1975, with the indication that CV3813 was operational and CV3814 was not operational. On April 30, 1975, JO 989 was issued to repair CV3814 which had now failed (stem to bushing galling) and would not shut or open.

The inspector expressed his concern that the failure to document this type of nonconformance may, by oversight, prevent the appropriate levels of management from reviewing this failure to determine if the problem has generic applications elsewhere in the facility or throughout the industry or if procedure changes are necessary to prevent recurrence.

This area will remain open and will be reinspected on a subsequent inspection.

- (8) The inspector had some additional comments which he referred to the licensee for resolution.
 - (a) The Plant Safety Committee meeting minutes of August 15, 1975 indicate that procedure 1102.04, Rev. 1, was reviewed and approved on that date. The procedure cover sheet for 1102.04 indicates that Rev. 2 was the applicable revision approved on August 15, 1975.

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- (b) Procedure 1104.02, "Makeup and Purification System Operation," section 8.2.1, lists the purification system resin replacement criteria and states that resin should be replaced when "DF exceeds that established during initial operations." The inspector questioned whether this was an adequate acceptance criteria within the definition of ANSI N18.7.
- (c) Procedure 1104.28, "ICW System Operation," steps 6.1.3, 6.1.4 and 6.2.8, do not specify adequate quantitative control guidelines within the definition of ANSI N18.7, section 5.3.2.6 but merely indicate to check that parameters are "normal."
- (d) Procedure 1104.24, "Instrument Air System Operation," indicates to check air compressor sump level and add oil to restore level to normal. No oil type is specified although numerous lubricants are in use within the facility.
- (e) Procedure 1203.12, "Loss of Instrument Air," states "If loss of air impairs operation of any system, attempt to bypass or hand jack such components as necessary until air supply is restored." The inspector expressed his concern that this procedure does not give any priority list of such equipment to aid the operator so that those components for which a loss of instrument air may cause equipment damage are attended to promptly.

4. Containment Closeout

a. Objective

The objective of this inspection effort was to review the licensee's administrative controls for ensuring that manually operated valves of the emergency core cooling systems located within the containment are in the required position prior to closeout.

b. Findings

The inspector determined that the licensee has manual valves installed in the containment on the High Pressure Coolant Injection System. Although these valves have no remote valve position indication they are padlocked in the required position. The key is under the control of the shift supervisor.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

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5. Licensee Event Reports

The inspectors reviewed plant records related to the following Licensee Event Reports:

AO 75/10	Group 6 Ratchet Rod Drop
AO 75/11	Failure of Building Isolation Valve to Close
AO 75/12	Failure of Decay Heat Valve to Open
AO 76/01	Group 6 Ratchet Rod Drop

This review was performed to verify that:

- a. The cause was identified, evaluated, and corrective action taken.
- b. The details were clearly reported to the NRC and facility management as required by the Technical Specifications.
- c. Each report was submitted for distribution and review was performed as required by the Technical Specifications.
- d. Follow-up action is in progress.
- e. Limiting conditions for operation were not exceeded.

The inspector noted three events that occurred which were related to AC 75/10 and AO 75/01,

- a. A group 6 rod drop and subsequent recovery of this group with the reactor remaining at power.
- b. A group 6 rod trip and the operator manually tripping the other groups.
- c. A group 6 rod trip followed by a low pressure reactor trip.

After the first ratchet trip of December 20, 1975, the operator on duty thought that he had experienced a rod run back and his immediate action of pulling the group 6 control rod bank allowed him to return the plant to power without tripping the other control groups. After the ratchet trip of December 21, 1975, none of the group 6 rods would latch, however, after partial cooldown of the plant all group 6 rods were withdrawn except one. The licensee then made the decision to completely cooldown and inspect the CRDM of the single group 6 rod. The lead screws for all eight group 6 CRDM's were repaired for ratchet damage. All maintenance was completed on December 30, 1975 and the plant returned to operation. On January 5, 1976, after a third ratchet trip, and subsequent cooldown of the plant, a computer analysis of the startor coil firing sequence resulted in pinpointing the problem to failure of reed relays in the gate drive assembly. The defective relays were replaced and

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additional redundant relays were added in series prior to return to power on January 18, 1976. During this shutdown, all CRDM's of group 6 were removed, disassembled, deburred, and cleaned. One CRDM from group 7 was also inspected and resulted in no indication of ratchet trip damage.

The above corrective action was orally reported to the inspector during this inspection and during inspection 76-02. This corrective action was not documented in the LER nor was a commitment established to provide a supplemental report. During the exit interview the licensee stated a supplemental LER would be provided to document all corrective action taken and the action to be taken to prevent recurrence. This item is unresolved.

These different actions taken during the three events were not formally provided to the operators in a training program to ensure that all personnel were trained in the correct action to be taken on a controlling rod group drop. This item is unresolved.

In oral discussions with the licensee and procedure review it was determined that the procedure for multiple rod drops had been cancelled during August of 1975. The reason for deleting this procedure as stated by the licensee was to allow corrective maintenance on a group of rods that were not in the controlling groups (such as group 7) when the core age was such that group 6 was being used for control and group 7 normal position was at the bottom of the core. Regulatory Guide 133 requires that procedures be provided for combating emergencies and other significant events. This list of procedures includes mispositioned control rod or rods and rod drops. Technical Specification 6.7 requires in part that detailed written procedures, covering emergency and off-normal conditions shall be prepared, approved and adhered to for operations of all systems and components involving nuclear safety.

The failure to provide these procedures is considered an infraction item of noncompliance.

6. Maintenance

The maintenance of safety related equipment was examined and compared against the requirements of 1004.10, "Calibration Control," 1004.13, "Nonconforming Material, Parts or Components," and 1004.17, "On-site Fabrication and Modification Control," ANSI 18.1, "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel" and the Technical Specifications.

The inspector selected the following recently completed Job Orders for review:

(continued)

CRD Repair Job Orders 1146, 1302, 1306, 1307, 1324 and 1325
1407 RPS Reactor Coolant A Pressure Buffer Amplifier Trouble
Shooting
1328 Valve CV4803 Reactor Building Isolation Valve
1322 Waste Gas Compressor
1362 Inverter Preventive Maintenance
1338 Addition of Sodium Thiosulfate

Each Job Order was evaluated relative to the following:

- a. Were limiting conditions for operation met while the equipment was removed from service for maintenance?
- b. Were administrative approvals obtained prior to initiating the work?
- c. Were the maintenance activities accomplished using approved procedures when specified?
- d. Were the maintenance activities inspected as required?
- e. Were Surveillance Testing calibrations and functional tests completed as required prior to returning the equipment to an operating status?
- f. Were required quality control records generated?
- g. Were maintenance activities accomplished by qualified personnel?

The inspector noted that these Job Orders did not have QC 2 forms completed. This is an open item of noncompliance identified in inspection 75-15. This item will remain open until satisfactory action is taken on this item.

The inspector had no additional questions in this area of inspection.

7. Review of Plant Operations

During this inspection, the conduct of plant operations since the last routine inspection was reviewed to ensure that all phases of facility operations conform to the requirements of the facility license and the licensee's administrative procedures.

(continued)

The inspection effort included:

- a. Observation of control room operations and verification that the number of on-duty operators complied with TS requirements.
- b. Observation of control room indications, alarms, and valve position switches.
- c. Tour of selective areas of the reactor building, turbine building, control room and reactor auxiliary building to verify that:
 - (1) Monitoring instrumentation is being recorded as required.
 - (2) Radiation controls have been properly established.
 - (3) Plant housekeeping conditions are adequate.
 - (4) There are no significant fluid leaks.
 - (5) There is no excessive piping vibrations.
 - (6) Pipe hanger/seismic restraint setting and oil levels are satisfactory.
- d. The reactor vessel head was removed and the inspectors observed that tools and equipment were being controlled to prevent inadvertent entry of foreign materials in the reactor vessel.

During the tour it was noted that red hold card tags were not being controlled as specified in procedure 1004.19, "Hold, Caution and QC Tagging Procedure." The cards serialized 7035 were found lying in the B decay heat removal pump room. Procedure 1004.19 requires that after hold cards have been removed they shall be destroyed or securely accounted for by the person authorizing removal to preclude reuse. This failure to follow this procedure is considered an item of non-compliance. Further, the review of the hold card index revealed that verification for installation signatures were not included for all hold cards. This was discussed with the licensee at the exit interview.

8. Reactor Building Cooler Back-Draft Dampers

The licensee representative indicated that tests have been performed which confirmed that reactor building air flow is not appreciably affected by maintaining the back-draft damper breakers in the open position. Technical Specification 4.5.2.1.2 requires that surveillance be performed on this system during each refueling period to establish operability. The licensee representative indicated that these tests will be performed as scheduled.

(continued)

This item remains unresolved pending further NRC review.

9. Annunciations and Alarms

On October 7, 1975, AP&L submitted a Technical Specification change to NRC/DRL concerning the previously reported Reactor Building Spray System tanks level indication in the reactor control room. Additional information was requested by Licensing on November 6, 1975 and AP&L replied on December 22, 1975. This reply included a B&W safety evaluation related to level indication. The inspector contacted Licensing by telephone and it appears that additional information has been requested and received related to this subject.

This item remains unresolved until final action is completed.

10. Halon Fire System

The licensee indicated that the Halon Fire System acceptance tests were scheduled to be conducted during the week of March 29, 1976.

The inspector will review the results of these tests at the next inspection.

11. Inadvertent Addition of Na₂S₂O₃ to the NaOH Tank

The licensee reported the inadvertent addition of approximately 2000 pounds of Na₂S₂O₃ to the NaOH tank. The circumstances leading to this action are as follows:

On January 27, 1976, during routine quarterly surveillance tests required by Technical Specification 4.1.b (Table 4.1-3, Items 6 & 7), the Na₂S₂O₃ concentration in the Sodium Thiosulfate tank was found to be 36,824 lbs. (Technical Specification 3.3.4(B) requires 37,500 lbs). Technical Specification 3.3.6 requires shutdown with the reactor being in the hot shutdown mode within 36 hours if the condition cannot be corrected. After the sampling, 3000 lbs. of 64% Na₂S₂O₃ was then inadvertently added to the Sodium Hydroxide tank by mistake. The Na₂S₂O₃ tank was then recirculated and resampled. The concentration was then found to be 38,237 lbs. of Na₂S₂O₃ without any Na₂S₂O₃ being added to the Sodium Thiosulfate tank. The only action taken by the licensee after this incident was to label the tanks. The inspector expressed concern that no attempt had been made by the licensee to bring this matter to the attention of the Plant Safety Committee or the Safety Review Committee. The inspector expressed further concern that no documentation exists at the plant which analyzes the effect of the corrosion to the carbon steel NaOH tank resulting from the Na₂S₂O₃ being left in the tank indefinitely. (The Na₂S₂O₃ tank is stainless steel.)

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The inspector further addressed the lack of detailed procedures related to sampling, chemical analyses, and subsequent addition of $\text{Na}_2\text{S}_2\text{O}_3$ or NaOH to either of these safety related tanks.

The inspector will evaluate the licensee's detail to documentation, review, and procedures related to this item during a future inspection.

This item is unresolved pending further NRC review.

TABLE 3-1

PROCEDURAL REVIEW FOR APPROVAL AND CONTENT

<u>Procedure Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Approval</u>	<u>ANSI N18.7 Content</u>	<u>Technical Content</u>
1004.18	Material Identification	Acceptable	Acceptable	
1004.21	Handling of Procedures	"	"	
1102.06	Reactor Trip Recovery	"	"	
1102.04	Power Operation	"	"	Acceptable
1103.06	Reactor Coolant Pump Operation	"	"	"
1105.04	Control Rod Drive System	"	"	"
1104.28	ICW System Operation	"	"	"
1106.08	S/G Fill Drain & Layup	"	"	"
1104.02	Makeup and Purification System Operation	"	"	"
1104.32	Fire Water System	"	"	"
1104.24	Inst. Air System	"	"	"
1104.36	D/G Operations	"	"	"
*1203.12	Annunciator Correction	"	"	20 subprocedures reviewed & acceptable
1203.12	Loss of Instrument Air			
1202.09	Loss of Condensor Vacuum	"	"	"
1202.32	Loss of Decay Heat Removal.	"	"	"
1203.03	CRD Malfunction Action	"	"	"
1401.01	Replacement of Important Strainers & Filters	"	"	"
1401.16	Removal & Installation of CRDM Motor Seal Screw	"	"	"

*20 Subprocedures reviewed.

TABLE 3-2

TEMPORARY CHANGES REVIEWED

<u>Procedure Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>	<u>Temp. Change</u>	<u>Approval/PSC Review</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1005.01	Administrative Controls Manual	2	1-6	OK	
1004.01	Design Control	3	1-4	OK	
1004.02	Initiation & Processing of Trouble Tickets	1	1	OK	
1004.04	Turnover of QA Documents from Construction to AP&L	1	1	OK	
1004.10	Calibration Control	1	1	OK	
1004.13	Nonconformance & Corrective Action	3	1	OK	
1004.14	Initiation & Processing of Job Orders	1	1-2	OK	
1103.06	Reactor Coolant Pump Operation	1	2	No	See Details
1103.11	Draining & N ₂ Blanketing of RC System	1	2	OK	
1103.16	Heat Balance Calculation	0	1	OK	
1102.01	Plant Preheatup & Precritical	4	2	OK	
1102.02	Plant Startup	4	1	OK	
1102.04	Power Operations	1	1	OK	
1102.08	Approach to Criticality	3	1	OK	
1104.36	Emergency Diesel Generator Operation	2	1	OK	
1105.01	NI and RPS Operations	1	1-2	OK	
1106.09	Turbine Startup, Warmup & Roll	3	1	OK	
1107.01	Electrical System Operation	2	1	OK	
1104.03	Chemical Addition	4	1	No	See Details