NAC FORM 36	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
co	INTROL BLOCK:
0	H     D     B     S     1     2     0     0     -     0     N     P     F     -     0     3     3     4     1
	REPORT LG SI S S - 0 3 4 6 7 1 2 0 7 7 7 3 0 1 0 3 7 8 9 SOURCE $_{60}$ S S COCKET NUMBER $_{68}$ $_{69}$ EVENT DATE $_{74}$ $_{75}$ REPORT DATE $_{80}$ $_{90}$ ENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES $_{10}$ At 1130 hours on December 6, 1977 and at 0230 hours on December 7, 1977, the Reactor
The second se	Protection System (RPS) Channel 3, Flow Loop B failed low. This placed the unit in
	Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. The channel was tripped to
Parameter and a second s	comply with the above Action Statement. There was no danger to the health and
	safety of the public or to unit personnel. The only system affected was the RPS,
	which was now a one out of three trip logic. (NP-33-77-105).
	08
	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CUDE SUBCODE SUBCOD
	D       LER/RO       EVENT YEAR       REPORT NO.       CODE       ITTRE         0       AEPOAT       1       9       5       27       28       30       31       31       32         THON PUTURE       21       22       23       24       26       27       28       30       31       32         THON PUTURE       EFFECT       SHUTDOWN       HOURS       22       ATTACHMENT       NPRD-4       PRIME COMP.       COMPONENT         AL       0       1       1       0       0       0       0       1       1       23       24       30       31       32         ATTACHMENT       NPRD-4       FORM SUB.       SUPPLIER       MANUFACTURER       SUPPLIER       MANUFACTURER       MANUFACTURER         A       33       34       19       2       2       1       10       0       0       1       1       23       42       43       25       44       47         CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)       36       37       40       41       23       42       43       43       44       47         CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)       The cause of both occurrances
	power to RPS Channel 3, Loop B, Flow Transmitter, had faulty contact. Power was
12	restored and the applicable portion of the RPS Monthly Test was performed satisfac-
131	torily. The channel was declared operable at 0359 hours on December 7, 1977, remov-
	ing the unit from Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. 80 COLUTY OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
	LEASED OF RELEASE     AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (3)       Z     (32)       Z     (32)       10     11       44     45
1 7 7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSITION (39) NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
	NUMBER DESCRIPTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 g	Z @ NA       30         PUBLICITY       8002040732         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (45)         N @ NA       30         N @ NA       30         N @ NA       30         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (45)         N @ NA       30         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (45)         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (45)         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (45)         SSUEC       DESCRIPTION (500
	1 NAME OF PREPARER Dean Hitchens/Sue Nordan PHONE

## TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-105

DATE OF EVENT: December 6 and 7, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Reactor Protection System Channel 3, Loop B, Flow Indication Failed Low

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: On December 6, 1977, the unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 554 and Load (MWE) = 135. On December 7, the unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 1100 and Load (MWE) = 365.

Description of Occurrence: On December 6, 1977 at 1130 hours and on December 7, 1977 at 0230 hours, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel 3, Loop B, Flow Indication failed low. These occurrences placed the unit in Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1. In accordance with Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, RPS Channel 3 was tripped within one hour. The Instrument and Control Section was notified of the occurrences.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of both of these occurrences was component failure. On December 6, 1977, Instrument and Control personnel found that the spring in the base of the fuse holder which supplies power to RPS Channel 3 Loop B, Flow Transmitter FT-RC1B3 was making poor contact. On December 7, 1977, the cap of the same fuse holder was found to be making poor contact. Thus, in both occurrences, the flow transmitter had lost its AC power supply.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. When RPS Channel 3 was tripped, the Reactor Protection System was placed in a "one out of three" condition. Had any one additional channel tripped, the plant would have been shutdown.

Corrective Action: On December 6, 1977, the spring in the base of the fuse holder was replaced. After Surveillance Test ST 5030.02 "RPS Monthly Test" Section 6.11 was completed, the channel was declared operable, and reset at 1450 hours. On December 7, 1977, the fuse holder cap was replaced. At 0359 hours, ST 5030.02, the RPS Monthly Functional Test, Section 6.11 was completed and RPS Channel 3, Loop B, flow string was declared operable. These actions removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.

Failure Data: There have been no previous failures of springs in fuse holders.

