CONTROL BLOCK
LICENSEE LICENSE NIMES LICENSE EVENT
[[] [O] H D B S 1
CATEGORY 1796 SHARE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT THATE BEFORE DATE
[5] CON'IL L L 0 5 0 0 3 4 6 0 7 2 7 7 7 . 0 8 1 9 7 7
EVENT DESCRIPTION *
[07] Control Room Operator observed that a power indication light for Contain-
ment Vacuum Relief Valve CV 5074 was off. The valve was believed inopera-;
ble, and power was removed from the valve. This is not a repetitive
[0]S occurrence. (AP-33-77-38)
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[0]7] SID FI VIALLY EIX IZI IZI ZIZI INI
0 7 S D F V A L V E X Z Z Z Z Z N N 48
CAUSE DESCRIPTION
A local/remote switch, the function of which is to remove Control Room
power and indication for the valve in the event of loss of Control Room
operability, was found in the "local" position.
STATUS STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
111 B 0 0 NA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
HELLASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
112 12 NA NA NA SS
TID DI DI I ZI NA
PERSONNEL INJURIES
TI 0 0 0 0 1 NA
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES
LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
I O Z ONA
ruericity .
[I] LNA
ADDITIONAL FACTURS
I D NA
1 6 9
Jacque Lingenfelter/ Sue Vallade (419) 259-5000, Ext. 25

DAVI BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER TION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-77-38

DATE OF EVENT: July 27, 1977

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valve CV 5074 was inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On July 27, 1977 at 1638 hours, an operator in the Control Room observed that a power indication light for Containment Vacuum Relief Valve, CV 5074, was off. Investigation revealed that the valve was open, however, and the breaker closed. Electricians who checked the control circuit in the Control Room found no problem.

Since CV 5074 was believed to have been inoperable, power was removed to the valve (making it inoperable). CV 5074 was closed at 1800 hours on July 27, 1977. This was done in compliance with Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The local/remote switch, the function of which is to remove control power and indication from the Control Room for the valve in the event of loss of Control Room operability, was found in the "local" position. The exact reason that the switch was in the "local" position is not known. Since construction personnel were working in the area with scaffolding (at the level of the local/remote switches) at the time of the occurrence, it is suspected that they inadvertently repositioned CV 5074 from "remote" to "local".

Since power indication to the Control Room was lost, the valve was believed inoperable, and power to the valve deliberately removed as required by the Action Statement.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. From 1638 hours to 1800 hours on July 27, 1977, the Safety Features Actuation System would have been able to close CV 5074, and thus, ensure Containment integrity if it was needed. At 1800 hours, the valve was closed and power removed, returning Containment integrity.

Corrective Action: CV 5074 was returned to service at 0800 hours on July 28, 1977, removing the station from Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. To prevent recurrence, construction personnel have been instructed of the necessity of caution while working in the area of switches.

In addition, station personnel have been instructed to be observant of situations which may lead to the changing of disconnect panel switch positions, so that proper management personnel may be contacted.

Failure Data: No previous similar events have occurred.