LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION PLEASE PRINT OR TY CONTROL BLOCK: (1)58 (5) 0 H D B S 1 2 Ø Ø N P F - Ø 3 3 4 1 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 11 1 1 (4)3 Ø 0 1 LICENSE TYPE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE co 7 0 16 12 5 7 18 8 0 7 12 0 7 8 (9) REPORT 6 0 5 0 6 0 1 Ø 2 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During the performance of surveillance testing, Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B 0 2 and CC 1411B did not operate when actuated from an automatic test signal. The valves 0 3 There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or were thus inoperable. 0 4 unit personnel. Each inonerablue value is one of two double isolation values. The 0 5 [redundant valve would, therefore, have provided containment isolation at each location 0 6 if required. (NP-33-78-88) 0 7 0 8 COMP VALVE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE IIB TIR U 1014 Z (16) X (15 NSI X (12 X (13) 0 9 19 18 10 REVISION REPORT OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL NO. LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE 013 Ø (17) 8 Ø 17 14 REPORT 7 NUMBER 7 32 28 COMPONENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. ATTACHMENT EFFECT ON PLANT METHOD ACTION ACTION HOURS (22) SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER FORM SUB 25 C151610 Y (24) A (28 Z (21) 0 0 0 0 0 Y (23) (18) Z Z B (20 (19 11 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Several wires were found broken at connectors. The wire breaks were most probably 10 caused by working in close proximity to the connectors during the outage. The broken 1 1 wires were repaired. 1 2 1 3 1 4 80 9 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) FACILIT (30) OTHER STATUS S POWER (31) Surveillance Test ST 5031.07 B 0 0 0 (29) G (28) NA 5 80 44 17 10 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE 2 34 Z (33) NA 6 80 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE Z (38) 10 10 Ø NA 7 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER (40) NA 0 10 Ø 8 80 12 1.1 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION TYPE Z (42) NA 80 10 NAC USE ONLY PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION (45 SSUED, N (44) NA 2 0 68 69 NAME OF PREPARER \_\_ Sue Kovach/Jim Albert 419-259-5000, Ext. 239 PHONE .. DVR 78-113

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-88

DATE OF EVENT: June 25, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 1411B inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 1300 hours on June 25, 1978 during performance of Surveillance Test ST 5031.07, "Safety Features Actuation System 18 Month or Refueling Test", Containment Isolation Valves CC 1407B and CC 1411B did not operate when actuated from an automatic test signal. The valves were thus inoperable.

Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that these containment isolation valves be operable in Moders 1, 2, 3 and 4. Since the unit was in Mode 5 at the time of the occurrence, the Action Statement was not applicable. This occurrence is being reported as documentation of a component failure.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: CC 1407 had a broken wire external to the cabinets in cable spreading room. This appears to be an isolated failure. Several wires were found broken at connectors which link Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channels 2 and 4. The broken wires were on the cabinet side wiring in Channel 4. The wire breaks were probably caused by strain on the wire due to the jumpering of DH-11 for testing during the outage, or possibly due to other routine access to cabinet 4 during the outage.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. Each inoperable valve is one of two double isolation vavles. The redundant valve would, therefore, have provided containment isolation at each location if required. If an event requiring these valves to be closed had occurred, the operator would have been able to close these valves using the control room switch.

Corrective Action: The broken wires were repaired. All wires, except those which are part of spare circuits or have yet to be functionally tested in other tests, were scheme checked. The valves were returned to operability on June 30, 1978.

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Failure Data: There have been no previous reportable occurrences.

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