

Commonwealth Edison LaSalle County Nuclear Station Rural Route #1, Box 220 Marseilles, Illinois 61341 Telephone 815/357-6761

November 13, 1989

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Licensee Event Report #89-024-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1).

G. J. Diederich Station Manager LaSalle County Station

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Enclosure

xc: Nuclear Licensing Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III Administrator INPO - Records Center

PDR ADOCK 05000373

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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 13, 1989 with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in Cold Shutdown an unsealed opening in the main control room floor was discovered. Subsequently on October 30, 1989 with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in operational condition 1 (Run) another unsealed opening in the main control room west wall was discovered. Based on a visual inspection of the openings and the fact that they were not intended penetrations, it was determined that the openings had existed since the barriers were constructed. Work to seal these openings was quickly performed. In addition, smoke tests and visual inspections of the entire control room floor, wall, and ceiling were performed to verify that no other openings which could compromise the fire rating of the barriers existed. During this inspection, it was observed that a control room penetration had an excessive gap between a ventilation duct passing through it and the wall. The reason for this was that the angle iron designed to seal this gap had moved away from the wall. A work request to repair the penetration was immediately written. No other deficiencies in the barrier were observed. This event is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) due to a deviation from the plant Technical Specifications.

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#### PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

#### A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): _1/2	Event Date:	10/13/89	Event Time:	1500 Hours
Reactor Mode(s):	Defueled/4	Mode(s) Name:	Defueled/ Cold S	hutdown
Power Level(s):	0%/0%			

# B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 13, 1989, at 1500 hours, with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 shutdown at 0% power, work associated with modification M-1-1-87-031 was being performed in the control room. This work involved smoke testing the electrical floor penetration located underneath panel 1PM13J prior to pulling the electrical cable running through the penetration. While the smoke test was being performed, ar unsealed opening located underneath panel 1PM13J was discovered. This opening compromised the 3 hour fire rating on the floor.

Similarly, on October 30, 1989, at 1800 hours, with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in Condition 1 (Run) at 99.7% power a control room ventilation walkdown revealed a five inch diameter hole through the west wall of the Main Control Room. This opening compromised the 3 hour fire rating of the wall. During a subsequent inspection of all control room fire barriers, a ventilation duct penetration located on the same wall was found to have an inadequate seal around the duct.

This event is reportable pursuant to be requirement of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) due to a deviation from the plant Technical Specification.

### C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

This event resulted from the discovery of unsealed openings which compromised the fire rating of two control room fire rated barriers. The first unsealed opening that was found was not an intended penetration. Rather, the opening was a result of a wide gap between a structural beam web surface and one end of a cable tray. It appeared that the section of a cable tray which runs horizontally between panels 1PM13J and 1PM15J terminated on one side due to a structural beam interfering with its path. At this intersection a wide gap between the beam and the cable tray was left unsealed. It is located at a concealed area and believed that this opening has existed since the barrier was constructed.

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### C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVEN" (Continued)

The second opening, located on the west wall of the control room, was also determined to be an unintendec penetration. This was based on the fact that this penetration was not identified in any structural drawings and had no cables passing through it. Since there were no visible indications that this hole had ever been sealed it was concluded that this hole had existed since the barrier was constructed.

A control room ventilation duct penetration located on the west wall of the room had an inadequate seal around the duct. The gap between the duct and the wall penetration was found unsealed because the angle iron designed to seal this gap had been pushed away from the wall.

# D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The safety consequences of this event are minimal because both of the affected fire barriers are components of Fire Zone 4Cl (Main Control Room) which is continuously manned. Furthermore, each of the affected fire zones has a dedicated fire detection system. Therefore, the possibility that a fire in any of the affected zones would have spread into an adjacent zone through the unsealed openings before being detected is highly unlikely.

Control room pressurization was still acceptable in that the required pressure was maintained with these leakage paths existing.

#### E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

In accordance with the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.6, LaSalle verified the operability of the fire datectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and established an hourly fire watch patrol. This fire watch will be maintained until all the openings are properly sealed.

The floor and wall openings were sealed per Work Requests L94057 and L64348 respectively within seven days of being identified. Work to seal the duct penetration is currently being performed per Work Request L94102. Action Item Record 373-200-89-09901 will track completion of this Work Request. In addition to initiating the necessary repair work, all control room walls, floor, and ceiling were visually inspected and smoke tested. Although fire barrier penetrations are not required to be airtight, the smoke test was performed to locate all gaps through the floor. A close visual inspection of these gaps was then performed to determine their acceptability. No other unacceptable openings through these fire barriers were found.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

LER Number

373/84-24-00 Electrical Cable Penetration Inoperable

Title

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G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None