



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

OCT 25 1989

Report No.: 70-1151/89-07

Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division
Columbia, SC 29250

Docket No.: 70-1151 (Fuel Division)

License No.: SNM-1107

Facility Name: Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Inspection Conducted: October 5-6, 1989

Inspector: James L. Kreh
J. L. Kreh

23 Oct. 1989
Date Signed

Approved by: William H. Rankin
W. H. Rankin, Chief
Emergency Preparedness Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

24 OCT 1989
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted to observe and evaluate the licensee's annual radiological emergency response drill.

Results:

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The drill was a successful demonstration of the licensee's capability to respond to a major casualty with radiological implications at the Columbia Plant.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

- *J. Allen, Manager, Technical Services
- *R. Fischer, Senior Regulatory Engineer (Site Emergency Plan Coordinator)
- *W. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- *W. Hartnett, Acting Plant Manager
- *J. Hooper, Regulatory Engineer
- *E. Keelen, Manager, Manufacturing
- *E. Reitler, Manager, Regulatory Engineering
- *T. Shannon, Regulatory Engineering Technician
- *R. Williams, Technical Coordinator, Regulatory Affairs

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Radiological Emergency Response Drill (88050)

The licensee was required by Section 7.3 of the Site Emergency Plan (SEP) to conduct an annual radiological emergency drill, to include the active participation of offsite groups, for the purposes of: (1) testing the adequacy of the timing and content of the emergency procedures, (2) testing emergency equipment, (3) keeping personnel aware of their emergency responsibilities, (4) testing communications networks, and (5) mobilizing the emergency organization.

The annual drill for 1989 was held on October 6, commencing at 5:00 a.m. and terminating at approximately 6:25 a.m. The scenario involved a major fire in a peripheral structure and a consequent contaminated injured person. Further information on the scenario is available in the attachment to this report.

The inspector observed most aspects of the drill, including management of the simulated fire emergency by the on-scene Emergency Coordinator (a position filled by the on-duty Conversion Area Supervisor, in accordance with the SEP), notifications and communications, fire-fighting efforts by the Emergency Brigade and the Columbia Fire Department, search and rescue operations, handling and treatment of the contaminated injured "victim," health physics practices, and radiological monitoring. Activities not observed by the inspector included those at the Emergency Operations Center (minimally staffed) and Richland Memorial Hospital.

The onsite emergency response organization and the aforementioned offsite support groups responded adequately to the conditions postulated by the scenario. A degree of realism was imparted to the accident scene through the licensee's use of three five-gallon cans of a mixture of diesel fuel

and gasoline, placed on the ground and ignited at the outset of the drill. Consistent with the licensee's procedures, the Emergency Coordinator promptly declared an Alert and telephoned the Regulatory Affairs Manager, who in turn notified other plant management personnel, the State of South Carolina, and the NRC. The Regulatory Affairs Manager and the Manufacturing Manager (serving as Emergency Director) traveled to the EOC from their residences to lend management support, although activation of the EOC was optional at the Alert level.

The inspector attended the postdrill critique, which included observations and findings from controllers, evaluators, and principal players. Most of the deficiencies identified during the critique were minor in nature and should be easily correctable. Some of the problems resulted from the artificiality of the drill situation, in which there is often a lack of attendant urgency on the part of the responders. The critique was considered thorough, and corrective actions implemented in response to the substantive findings will be reviewed during future inspections.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

- a. (Closed) Violation 70-1151/88-14-01: Failure to properly maintain controlled copies of the SEP and Emergency Procedures.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's December 7, 1988 response to the Notice of Violation, and verified that the licensee had completed appropriate corrective action. Of a total of 70 copies of the SEP assigned in the new distribution, only 16 were controlled copies; the others were uncontrolled "information" copies.

- b. (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1151/88-14-02: Development of a periodic testing program for the backup telephone system.

The licensee developed an "Emergency Bypass Telephone Procedure" and performed the subject testing on December 20, 1988. Equipment problems requiring corrective action were identified as a result of the test. Annual surveillance will be performed henceforth.

- c. (Closed) IFI 70-1151/88-15-01: Development of a methodology for monitoring the radiological habitability of the EOC during a major emergency.

Emergency Procedure CSEP-0016-B (Revision 3), "Activation of Health Physics Response Team," specified habitability monitoring of the main guard desk and the EOC for an emergency declared above the Alert level (i.e., for a Site Area Emergency). The procedure specified that operations at the referenced facility would be relocated if radiological conditions warranted.

4. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 6, 1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. Although proprietary information was discussed during this inspection, none is contained in this report.

Attachment:
Drill Scenario

EMERGENCY PLAN DRILL SCENARIO

OCTOBER 6, 1989

5:00 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCIDENT OBJECTIVE

To fulfill the annual site emergency plan drill requirement.

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

A fire is initiated at the low-level radioactive waste building. Miscellaneous waste being compacted spontaneously ignites causing a major fire. Other combustible waste has also been ignited. A person was working in the old moly decon room is missing, requiring a search and rescue mission. The Site Emergency Brigade responds. The victim was overcome by smoke, contaminated and requires immediate transport to Richland Memorial Hospital by Richland County Emergency Medical Service. Outside help is solicited from the City of Columbia Fire Department to initiate backup fire response.

Initiate all external conversation with, "This is a drill."

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