

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report No. 50-271/89-08

Docket No. 50-271

License No. DPR-28

Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation  
RD5, Box 169  
Ferry Road  
Battleboro, Vermont 05301

Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Type of Meeting: Management Meeting

Meeting Date: September 6, 1989

Prepared by:

Thomas W. Dexter  
for W. K. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

10-20-89  
date

Approved by:

R. R. Keimig  
R. R. Keimig, Safeguards Section  
Facilities Radiological Safety and  
Safeguards Branch

10-20-89  
date

Meeting Summary: A Management Meeting was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 6, 1989, to discuss the findings of Inspection No. 50-271/89-08 and other matters as requested by Region I in a July 12, 1989 letter to the licensee. The nature of the five violations identified during the inspection raised a concern about a possible decrease in management attention to the program, particularly with respect to equipment and hardware, from that which previously existed. The licensee maintained that this was not the case and discussed actions already taken and those planned to correct the identified problems and improve the effectiveness of the program. The meeting lasted about two hours.

## DETAILS

### 1. Meeting Attendees

#### a. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

W. Murphy, Vice President and Manager of Operations  
J. Sinclair, Director of External Affairs  
J. Pelletier, Plant Manager  
R. Pagodin, Technical Services Superintendent  
J. Moriarty, Security Supervisor

#### b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards  
R. Bellamy, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards  
R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section  
R. Blough, Chief, RPS3A, Division of Reactor Projects  
E. Sylvester, Senior Reactor Engineer-Physical Security  
W. Olsen, Reactor Engineer-Physical Security  
T. Dexter, Physical Security Inspector  
W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

### 2. Summary of Discussion

Dr. Knapp opened the meeting and the attendees were introduced. Dr. Knapp described the purpose of the Management Meeting and summarized the findings of the routine physical security inspection conducted on May 15-19, 1989.

Mr. Murphy stated that he was concerned because the inspection report and its transmittal letter from the NRC implied that a decrease in management's attention to the security program had occurred. He maintained that no such decrease in attention had occurred. He also stated that the licensee perceived a change in NRC inspection methodology and that this change had caught them by surprise. He then introduced Mr. Pelletier who discussed each of the violations at length and answered questions posed by the NRC attendees.

The following is a brief summary of each violation discussed:

- Violation 1 - failure to provide adequate assessment capabilities on the protected area perimeter barrier and inner isolation zone. The licensee basically agreed with this violation. Mr. Pelletier stated that they had been remiss in maintaining certain aspects of the assessment system. He also assured the NRC attendees that the performance of the assessment system had been corrected by the vendor subsequent to the inspection. Mr. Sinclair stated that they were aware of several limitations in the assessment system after it was

recently modified and believed that the NRC was also aware of these limitations. Mr. Keimig explained that any system limitation must be described in the licensee's physical security plan, along with compensating measures, and be approved by the NRC; otherwise, it could not be sanctioned. Mr. Keimig expressed doubt that any such limitation was addressed in the licensee's plan change that had been approved by the NRC.

Mr. Moriarty added that security officers previously were not always initiating corrective repair requests when deficiencies were identified by them, but stated that such actions are now required.

- Violation 2 - failure to provide an adequate intrusion detection system (IDS) on the protected area perimeter. The licensee basically agreed with this violation, but indicated some reservations with the NRC inspectors testing methodology because it appeared to be subjective.

Mr. Pagodin stated that they had contacted the IDS vendor to pursue a standard, uniform testing device and methodology. He stated that the vendor has a testing device and that the licensee is considering procuring one. Mr. Keimig cautioned the licensee's representatives that it was incumbent upon them to ensure that the vendor's testing device provides an effective test of the system.

- Violation 3 - failure to adequately secure a vital area barrier. The licensee agreed with this violation. Mr. Pagodin stated that they had failed, through oversight, to ensure the integrity of the vital area barrier in question.
- Violation 4 - failure to lock a protected area perimeter gate. The licensee basically disagreed with this violation. Mr. Pagodin stated that the licensee's interpretation of the NRC-approved physical security plan did not specifically identify a requirement for this particular gate to be physically locked when not in use. Mr. Pagodin also stated that this gate is presently being locked when not in use because, since the inspection, the method previously used to secure this gate has been deemed ineffective. Mr. Keimig indicated that an ineffective security method would not prevent unauthorized entry into the protected area and stated that an effective security program should be identifying and correcting items such as this, before they are found by NRC inspectors.
- Violation 5 - failure to conduct an adequate search of a hand-carried item at the protected area access portal. The licensee basically disagreed with this violation. Mr. Moriarty stated that the licensee's investigation determined that the hand-carried item in question item had been visually inspected by a security officer. He also stated that the licensee considered a visual inspection of such

items to meet the search requirements of the NRC-approved physical security plan. Both Mr. Dexter and Mr. Lancaster stated that they did not observe a security officer visually inspect the item prior to placing it inside the protected area.

Mr. Pelletier concluded by stating that the security program was not receiving less attention as implied by the NRC. He stated that station management was actively involved in implementing the security program. Mr. Pagodin stated that they are constantly upgrading the security program at the station and provided the following examples:

- replacement of the security systems computer;
- replacement of all door access control devices;
- upgrading of a) security procedures, post orders, and training lesson plans;
- analyzing quarterly security event logs; and,
- adding an additional security shift supervisor to each shift.

Mr. Pagodin also stated that he was disappointed with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's security program, as reflected in the inspection report, and commented that he perceived a change in the way NRC is conducting security inspections.

#### Conclusion of Meeting

Dr. Bellamy stated that the Vermont Yankee security program received the same type of inspection as all other Region I licensees receive. He noted that all NRC security inspectors had recently participated in an intensive three week security systems training program, consequently, their inspection skills should be sharper and that they are expected to be looking at security systems more critically than, perhaps, they had in the past. Mr. Keimig commented on the need to have effective security systems. He emphasized the importance of implementing an effective program rather than merely complying with the requirements of the security plan, which will not always ensure the most effective program.

Mr. Keimig also commented that an NRC team inspection, as was the case with this inspection (89-08), usually finds more problems than an inspection conducted by just one inspector due to the interaction of inspectors with varying degrees of knowledge and experience in different aspects of physical security. Mr. Keimig stated that it was his goal to conduct team inspections whenever possible.

Mr. Knapp concluded the meeting by stating that the Region I staff would evaluate the information presented by the licensee during the Management Meeting, and that a decision resulting from the licensee's request to reassess two of the violations would be forthcoming. Mr. Knapp also emphasized that the licensee should attempt to challenge their security systems and program to ensure their effectiveness as the Region I inspectors had done during the inspection.