

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 81-14  
Docket No. 50-309  
License No. DPR-36 Priority -- Category C  
Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company  
1671 Worcester Road  
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Inspection at: Wiscasset, Maine

Inspection Conducted: June 8 - July 13, 1981

Inspectors: <u>E. C. Cerne, Jr., Sr.</u>	<u>7/23/81</u>
<u>W. Lazarus, Reactor Inspector</u>	<u>Date signed</u>
<u>E. C. Cerne, Jr., Sr.</u>	<u>7/23/81</u>
<u>P. Swetland, Reactor Inspector</u>	<u>Date signed</u>
<u>E. C. Cerne, Jr., Sr.</u>	<u>7/29/81</u>
<u>A. Cerne, Reactor Inspector</u>	<u>Date signed</u>
<u>E. C. Cerne, Jr., Sr.</u>	<u>7/29/81</u>
<u>R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects</u>	<u>Date signed</u>
<u>Section No. 1A, DRPI</u>	

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on: June 8 - July 13, 1981 (Report No. 50-309/81-14)

Areas Inspected: Routine, Regular and Backshift inspections by three resident and region-based inspectors (155 hours). Areas inspected included the Control Room, Turbine building, Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building, Auxiliary Feed Pump Room, Reactor Containment, and Spent Fuel Pool. Activities/Records inspected included Radiation Protection, Physical Security, Plant Operations, design change and modification, refueling operations, maintenance and surveillance testing, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on previous inspection findings, and followup of licensee events.

Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in seven areas; three items of noncompliance were identified in two areas. (Failure to report inoperable Steam Generator Safety Valves as required by Technical Specifications; Failure of equipment to have battery back-up power supplies as required by the Security Plan; Failure to install safety-related components in accordance with plant design.)

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

R. Arsenault, Operations Department Head  
M. Barnhart, C. N. Flagg QC Supervisor  
R. P. Benson, Plant Engineer  
D. Boynton, Reactor Engineer  
J. Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head  
G. Cochrane, Health Physics Supervisor  
T. M. Gifford, Plant Engineer  
L. E. Grimard, Training Group Supervisor  
D. Hakkila, Administrative Department Head  
J. Hebert, Director, Plant Engineering  
B. Hoyt, Security Supervisor  
R. G. Jutras, Plant Engineer  
R. Lawton, Director, Operational Quality Assurance  
W. Paine, Assistant to the Plant Manager  
R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head  
R. Turcotte, YAEC Engineer  
M. Veilleux, Plant Engineer  
E. Wood, Plant Manager

The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians and members of the engineering and administrative staffs.

### 2. Followup on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (309/79-11-01) Technical Specification 3.19 does not reflect installed plant equipment. The inspector verified the installation of knife-switch disconnects (per plant design change request 80-11 and 12) on safety injection tank and loop isolation valve motor operator power supplies. Amendment 58 to the Maine Yankee license revised Technical Specification 3.19 to be consistent with this new equipment for isolating these valves.
- b. (Closed) Unresolved Item (309/80-16-01) Test containment isolation valves to remain in safeguards position. The inspector observed the satisfactory performance of these surveillance tests on June 29, 1981. Details of this test are contained in paragraph 6.

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PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

- d. (Closed) Followup Item (309/81-05-04) Licensing review of 10 CFR 50 Appendix H report. A review of the results of the Maine Yankee reactor vessel fluence sample has been completed. Amendment 58 to the Maine Yankee license approves the revised pressure/temperature operating limits. The increase vessel fluence has been evaluated and found acceptable pending resolution of the NRC generic concern with reactor vessel weld material embrittlement and with a thermal shock/overpressurization event. The inspector had no further questions at this time.
- e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (309/81-13-02) Licensee to submit LER on steam generator (S/G) safeties. The inspector reviewed the reportability of the failure of four S/G safety valves to lift within the pressure band specified in the surveillance test required by Technical Specification 4.2. Discussions with the Technical Support Department Head on June 2, 1981 revealed the licensee's reluctance to report the results of the lift set point tests conducted on May 8, 1981. The licensee contended that these safety valves were installed in accordance with the ASME Code, Section VIII and that the tolerance for the set-points ( $\pm 10$  psi) required by procedure 5-5, Testing and Setting of Steam Generator Safety Valves was overly restrictive and should correctly be  $\pm 30$  psi. Using the new criteria, only one safety valve would have been inoperable. The inspector verified that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) specified safeties installed in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III. The inspector informed the licensee during a June 8 discussion that the deviation between the FSAR/ASME Code Specification and the licensee's contention must be justified and further that the reporting requirement would be exceeded if the contention was incorrect. On June 16, 1981 the licensee had not yet verified the proper code specification for the safety valves. The licensee subsequently determined that the S/G safety valves were designed and installed in accordance with the FSAR (ASME Section III) and submitted a Licensee Event Report (Ser. No. 81-09) on June 18, 1981.

Failure to report the inoperable condition of the four steam generator safeties (which placed the plant in a degraded mode with respect to Technical Specification 3.8) within 30 days is contrary to Technical Specification 5.9.7.b. This represents an item of noncompliance.

### 3. Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections

The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout the reporting period. As noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:

- Maine Yankee Technical Specifications
- Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
- Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
- Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program
- Maine Yankee Tagging Rules
- Administrative and Operating Procedures

a. Instrumentation

Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

b. Annunciator Alarms

The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator response was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision 4, dated June 1979. During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equipment associated with various alarms. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

c. Shift Manning

The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of licenses. Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.

d. Radiation Protection Controls

Radiation protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected. Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personal monitoring devices. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.

e. Plant Housekeeping Controls

Storage of material and components was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was also evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.

f. Fire Protection/Prevention

The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact. Cable trays were clear of debris. The diesel fire pump was inoperable on June 29, 1981 due to failure of a hose in the diesel cooling system. The inspector verified the operability of the redundant electric fire pump during this period. The diesel pump was returned to service on June 30, 1981. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

g. Control of Equipment

During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined. Equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs.

h. Equipment Lineups

The inspector verified that the major valve and switch positions were correct to insure operability of the Shutdown Cooling Systems by observation of the Main Control Board and inspections in the Diesel Generator Rooms, Spray and Turbine Buildings. During preparation for plant start-up the inspector verified system line-ups by observation of selected valve positions in the containment isolation and emergency core cooling systems. The inspector reviewed the completed valve line-ups for Procedures 1-12-5, Establishment of Containment Integrity Rev 11 and 3-1-2A, ECCS, Functional Testing from Cold Shutdown Rev 3. No items of noncompliance were identified.

i. Containment Inspection

The inspector made frequent tours of the containment building during the shutdown. A detailed inspection was conducted on July 6, 1981 during the reactor coolant system pressure/leak test prior to plant start-up. Leakage was identified on a #2 steam generator primary side manway and at the body to bonnet seal of safety injection tank isolation valve, SIA-M-20. The plant was cooled down on July 7 to repair these leaks and subsequent pressure/leak tests were conducted with no further abnormal conditions identified.

4. Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records

During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifications and Administrative Procedure Requirements. Included in the review were:

Control Room Log	- daily during control room surveillance
Jumper and Lifted Leads Log	- all active entries
Maintenance Requests and Job Orders	- all active entries
Safety Tag Log	- all active entries
Plant Recorder Traces	- daily during control room surveillance
Plant Process Computer Printed Output	- daily during control room surveillance
Night Orders	- daily during control room surveillance

The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries are properly made and communicate equipment status/deficiencies; records are being reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Technical Specifications; logs detail no violations of Technical Specification or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accordance with Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure requirements.

Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussion with licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

#### 5. Observation of Physical Security

The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures.

- Maine Yankee Security Plan, dated October 1979
- 15-1, Security Organization and Responsibilities, Revision 6, April 1980
- 15-2, Security Force Duties, Revision 9, February 1981
- 15-3, Plant Personnel Security, Revision 9, February 1981
- 15-7, Access Authorization and Control, Revision 1, April 1981
- 15-8, Protected Area Entry/Exit Control, Revision 1, September 1980

#### a. Physical Protection Security Organization

- Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time member of the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
- Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be as required.

b. Physical Barriers

Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were made.

c. Access Control

Observations of the following items were made:

- Identification, authorization and badging
- Access control searches
- Escorting
- Communications
- Compensatory measures when required

Except as noted in paragraph 2c, no items of noncompliance were identified.

6. Followup on IE Bulletins

Licensee action concerning the following IE Bulletin was reviewed:

IEB 80-06, Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls

## References:

- a. Maine Yankee letter to NRC (WMY 79-150) dated 12/28/79
- b. Maine Yankee letter to NRC (WMY 80-94) dated 6/13/80
- c. Maine Yankee letter to NRC (WMY 80-117) dated 7/29/80
- d. Maine Yankee letter to NRC (FMY 81-34) dated 3/9/81
- e. IE Inspection Report 50-309/80-14
- f. Engineering Design Change Requests 79-21, 80-58 and 80-59
- g. Procedure 3.1.14 A & B, EDG/ECCS Cold Shutdown Test, Revision 11
- h. Procedure 3.1.15.1 A & B, Containment Isolation Test, Revision 3
- i. Procedure 3.1.15.2, ECCS Operational Test, Recirculation Actuation System, Revision 4
- j. Maintenance Requests 1202-81 and 1203-81



The licensee's response to this issue committed to the system modifications and testing described in references a, b, c and d. The modifications were designed and installed in accordance with reference f. The inspector reviewed the test procedures (references g, h and i) on June 26, 1981 to verify that these tests satisfied the requirements of the licensee's commitment. Several minor errors were identified and brought to the attention of the Operations Supervisor. The procedures were revised as necessary prior to the tests. On June 29, 1981, the inspector observed the performance of procedure 3.1.15.1A and 3.1.14A. Review of the completed test procedures indicated that the below listed components failed to function properly:

- Valves PCC-A-254 and BD-T-32 failed to close on CIS/SIAS actuation
- Fan FN 44 A and B failed to start on SIAS actuation
- Valves SCC-T-227, SCC-T-257 and SCC-T-315 failed to close on CSAS actuation

Subsequent repair and retesting of these components in accordance with reference j indicated satisfactory completion of the bulletin commitments. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

#### 7. Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing

The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; appropriate personnel qualifications; proper radiological controls for worker protection; adequate fire protection; and appropriate retest requirements. The inspector also ascertained reportability as required by Technical Specifications.

The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the surveillance test procedure was properly approved and in use; test instrumentation required by the procedure was properly calibrated and in use; technical specifications were satisfied prior to removal of the system from service; test was performed by qualified personnel; the procedure was adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; and, test results satisfied the procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly dispositioned.

The following documents were reviewed:

- EDCR 81-21 Vessel Head Vent
  - EDCR 80-37 Hot Leg Injection Modification
  - EDCR 81-16 Safety Injection Header Modification
  - EDCR 81-3 HPSI Header Recirc Lines
  - EDCR 80-3 Containment High Range Monitor
  - 10 CFR Part 21 Report General Atomic Company to V. Stallo (NRC) re: Rockbestos cable, dated 5/15/81
  - Procedure 3.17.4, Containment Penetration Testing, Revision 6
  - Procedure 3.17.4.24, Containment Particulate and Gas Monitor Return Line Leak Test, Revision 3
  - Procedure 3.60.5, Fire Pump Capacity Test, Revision 0
  - Procedure 4-118 PORV Block Valve Closure with Flow, Revision 2
  - Procedure 4-121, Temporary Leak Test for HSI-61,62 and 63; Revision 0
- a. A reactor vessel head penetration flange was modified in accordance with Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 81-21. On July 3, 1981 the licensee determined that the partial socket weld between the flange and the pipe passing through it was not in accordance with the design. An unacceptable stress riser existed due to insufficient weld material and top fillet circumference. The weld was repaired on July 7, 1981, however local metal temperature (140 - 200°F) exceeded the manufacturer's specification during the performance of the liquid dye penetrant examination. The inspector verified that the licensee's procedure for penetrant testing was requalified on July 8, 1981 to a local temperature of 250°F in accordance with the ASME Code Section V. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
- b. During installation of EDCR 80-37, Hot Leg Recirc Modification, two holes were bored in a re-enforced concrete wall housing vital equipment. The seismic design assumed no re-enforcement bars (re-bar) would be cut since the holes would be placed between the re-bar. The inspector observed that one of the concrete cores had severed one vertical re-bar. The inspector informed the cognizant engineer of this discrepancy on June 18, 1981. The licensee indicated that their seismic engineer would evaluate the severed re-bar and that the results would be incorporated into the modification package. Review of the final analysis will be conducted in a subsequent inspection. (309/81-14-01)
- c. On May 15, 1981, General Atomic Company notified the NRC in accordance with Part 21 that the Rockbestos cable (RSS-6-104) supplied to Maine Yankee and others may not be environmentally qualified to 340°F as specified but would survive 300°F. The licensee used this cable for the installation of high range containment radiation

monitors (EDCR 80-3). The inspector determined that not all Rockbestos cable was subject to this failure. Maine Yankee's cable had an extra insulating covering designed to prevent the subject shorts. Further, the licensee stated that the highest temperature environment that this cable would be subjected to would be 286°F. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

- d. The inspector followed the performance of Containment Leak Rate (Type B/C) Testing throughout the refueling outage. Several penetrations exceeded the licensee's administrative leak rate criteria and four penetrations exceeded the measuring capacity of the test rig. The valves were repaired and retested prior to establishing containment integrity. The inspector had no further questions in this area pending receipt of a Licensee Event Report.

## 8. Design Changes and Modifications

### a. Installation

The inspector reviewed the Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) packages listed below. He verified licensee evaluations for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability and approval for each modification by the responsible authority in accordance with procedural requirements.

#### EDCRs:

79-20	79-56
79-33	80-01
79-42	80-45
79-43	81-16

The responsible Plant Cognizant Engineers for the modifications were interviewed as were personnel in the operations, surveillance, and training departments. The inspector examined a sample of as-built drawings and verified that current revisions to the official plant drawing file reflect the as-built conditions.

The inspector also spot-checked the results of tests confirming modified system operability and reviewed the inspection criteria designated to verify the acceptability of completed modifications. He discussed the applicability of the independent inspection program and the completeness of the design change packages with plant engineer and management personnel. In-process controls over field changes to original modification design criteria were evaluated. While the approval of field changes appears to have been authorized by the original design engineers in accordance

with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the inspector indicated to the licensee that the documentation of such charge approval merits greater emphasis on a programmatic basis.

Review of the EDCR packages included examination of the following typical documents:

- Project Status Sheet
- Maine Yankee Maintenance Request
- Inspection and Documentation Sheet
- Plant Document Status and Review Form
- YAEC QA "Audit of Completed Engineering Design Change Documentation Package"

All above areas and inspection items were evaluated with regard to criteria delineated in the following documents:

- Maine Yankee Operational QA Manual, YOQAP-I-A
  - Section II (Revision 0)
  - Section III (Revision 1)
  - Section X (Revision 1)
- Maine Yankee QA Manual Administrative Procedures
  - No. 0-00-7 (Revision 4)
  - No. 0-01-1 (Revision 6)

For certain EDCRs being implemented during the current plant outage, the inspector checked various special process controls and completed plant components. Specifically for EDCR 81-16, the Welding Procedure Specification (CN Flagg WPS 8-1) and its Procedure Qualification Record for the installation of some safety injection header check valves were evaluated with regard to the general and qualified wall thickness welding requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.

For EDCR 80-45, the inspector examined the installed condition of two new pipe supports in the 16" SCC piping runs. Approved sketches EDCR 80-45-12, 13 and 14, as modified by revised sketches for CN Flagg dated 5/22/81, were reviewed and utilized to inspect the as-built conditions of the supports. On the vertical support the following nonconforming conditions were noted:

- two clip angle fillet welds, each 2½" long, were missing.
- a one inch diameter bolt of material designation other than the specified A-325 was installed.

- a jam nut specified for lock-nutting this bolted connection was missing.
- a specified gap for clearance on one side of the pipe was blocked by a temporary shim taped in place.

The inspector discussed these conditions with the design and plant cognizant engineers, and a CN Flagg QC Supervisor. No records documenting either the acceptability of these deviations or the nonconforming status of this support were available. While a final inspection of the entire 80-45 modification had not yet been accomplished, the inspector's review of the CN Flagg QA procedure for "Final Inspection" (SQAP 10.3) revealed no inspection criteria which could be expected to identify such nonconforming conditions.

The inspector notified plant management and QA personnel during an exit interview on June 12, 1981 that the failure to install the subject pipe support in accordance with the approved drawings represented a noncompliance with regard to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (309/81-14-02)

b. Procedure Review

The inspector reviewed Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) packages for several design changes which would be completed during the current refueling outage to determine what plant procedure changes were required to reflect the system modifications. Following this review, plant procedures were reviewed to verify that necessary changes had been made. The following EDCRs and procedures were included in this review:

EDCRs

79-43	Aux. Feedwater Indication Control Grade
79-54	Reactor Vessel Vent
80-3	Containment High Range Radiation Monitor
80-13	Containment Water Level Indication
80-35	Auto Initiation of Aux. Feedwater System Safety Grade
80-37	Hot Leg Injection Modification
80-38	Main F.W.P. Train Trip
80-40	Auxiliary Panels for TMI Items
80-45	SCCW & PCCW Piping Mods.
80-51	Primary Component Cooling Isolation
80-57	Feedwater Valve Mod.
80-58	Replacement of Solenoids
80-59	ESF Reset Mod.
81-3	HPSI Header Recirc. Lines
81-6	Vital Buses

81-10 Pressure Taps & Root Valves for Primary Inventory  
Trend System  
81-16 Safety Injection Header Modification  
79-18 PCF Trip Valves  
81-21 Vessel Head Vent

### Procedures

1-15-1, Primary Component Cooling System, Rev. 6  
1-15-2, Secondary Component Cooling System, Rev. 6  
CP-2-6, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater, Rev. 7  
1-1, Reactor Startup, Rev. 11  
1-3, Plant Startup, Rev. 4  
1-7, Plant Cooldown, Rev. 18  
1-11-6, Chemical and Volume Control System Operation, Rev. 12  
1-11-7, Safety Injection Tanks - Fill, Drain, Pressurize,  
and Vent, Rev. 10  
1-11-9, High Pressure Safety Injection Lines Recirculation,  
Rev. 2  
1-13-1, Residual Heat Removal Startup and Operation, Rev. 14  
1-13-2, RHR System Shutdown, Rev. 11  
1-14-1, Quench Tank Operation, Rev. 9  
3.1.2, ECCS Routine Testing (Hot) Monthly, Rev. 19  
3.1.2A, ECCS Functional Testing from Cold Shutdown, Rev. 2  
EP-2-14, Long Term Core Cooling Realignment, Rev. 4  
CP-2-6, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater, Rev. 7  
EP-2-36, Safeguards Annunciators, Rev. 3  
3.1.20, Safeguards Valve Testing, Rev. 10  
1-104-1, Feed Pump Operation, Rev. 4  
1-104-2, Feedwater System, Rev. 3

The following discrepancies were identified:

- 1-15-1: Valve numbers for PCC to EDG-1A were not listed.
- 1-15-2: SCC valves to EDG-1A not deleted.
- CP-2-6: Doesn't reflect auto initiation feature of Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS).
- 3.1.2 and 3.1.2A: Did not reflect AFWS testing, PCC/ SCC piping modifications, installation of manual SIT recirculation isolation valves, SI header modifications, and hot leg injection modifications.
- EP-2-14: Did not reflect modification that bypasses valves CH-32, 33, 34, 36, 66, 67 and 85.

The inspector brought the above discrepancies to the attention of the Operations Department Head and the Plant Manager on July 2, 1981. The inspector was informed that these items had already been noted and that procedure revisions were in progress. The inspector reviewed selected procedures used during plant start-up following the Cycle 6 refueling to verify that the above required changes had been incorporated in procedure revisions. No items of non-compliance were identified.

9. In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed the following LERs received in the RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector also determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on site followup. The following LERs were reviewed:

- \*-- 81-08 Loss of Shutdown Cooling
- 81-09 Steam Generator Code Safety Setpoint Drift
- 81-10 Failure of Pressurizer Safety Valve Acoustic Monitor

\* = Reports selected for onsite followup.

10. On-Site Followup of LERs

During on site followup, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included discussions with licensee personnel and review of applicable logs. The following LER was reviewed.

- 81-08, Loss of Shutdown Cooling

On June 10, 1981, with the plant in a cold shutdown condition, shutdown cooling was lost for about 5 minutes when motor operated valve RH-M-2 (residual heat removal pump suction valve) was inadvertently shut. A contractor working inside the main control board accidentally disconnected the connector for the overpressure isolation circuit controlling this valve. The operators quickly identified the failure and re-established the flow path. Contractors were cautioned to be more careful while working near operable circuitry. Since the event was quickly corrected and reported, and the licensee could not have been expected to have

prevented the occurrence, no item of noncompliance was deemed to exist.

11. Exit Interviews

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.