



Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, Illinois 60407
Telephone 815/458-2801

October 20, 1989
BW/89-2022

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) which requires a 30 day written report.

This report is number 89-011-00; Docket No. 50-456.

Very truly yours,

R. E. Querio
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

REQ/AJS/jfe
(7126z)

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 89-011-00

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
CECo Distribution List

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PDR ADUCK 05000456
FDC

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) **Braidwood 1** Docket Number (2) **0 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 6** Page (3) **1 | of | 0 | 3**

Title (4) **Boration Flowpath Valve Inoperable due to Programmatic Deficiency**

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 9	2 0	8 9	8 9	0 1 1	0 0	1 0	2 0	8 9	None	0 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 1

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name: **Jerald D. Wagner, Regulatory Assurance** Ext. **2497**

TELEPHONE NUMBER: **8 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 8 | - | 2 | 8 | 0 | 1**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
				No					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

Expected Submission Date (15) _____

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The 1A Diesel Generator (DG) and the High Head Safety Injection Valve, 1S18801B had been taken Out of Service. The 1S18801B has the 1B DG as an Emergency Power Source. At 0224 on September 20, 1989 Core Alterations for the Refueling Outage were initiated. These alterations continued until 1315. At 1720 the Unit One Boron Injection Flowpath Monthly Surveillance was performed. The acceptance criteria requires one of the redundant High Head Safety Injection Valves to be capable of being powered from an operable Emergency Power Source. The 1S18801B was Out of service. High Head Safety Injection Valve, 1S18801A, was not capable of being powered by an operable Emergency Power Source because the 1A DG was out of service. The cause of this event was a programmatic deficiency. The recently implemented computer Out of Service (OOS) program was not properly structured for OOS: prepared in advance for a major outage. The computer would automatically print the initials of the supervisor on the form. For the Refueling Outage the OOS forms were printed in advance. When the OOS for the 1S18801B was forwarded to the control room, the SCRE initials were already completed. Based on the completed form the SCRE concluded that no additional review was necessary. A policy statement has been issued. The computer OOS program will be revised to provide for printing an OOS without initials on the form.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

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Braidwood 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 0 6	8 9	- 0 1 1	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Braidwood 1; Event Date: September 20, 1989; Event Time: 0224;
 Mode: 6 - Refueling; Rx Power: 0%;
 RCS [A6] Temperature/Pressure: Ambient

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of the event. The 1A Diesel Generator (DG)[EK] had been Out of Service for scheduled maintenance.

On September 14, 1989 High Head Safety Injection Valve (SI)[BQ], 1S1B801B was taken Out of Service for scheduled maintenance. The valve is powered from the Safety-Related Electrical Division which has the 1B Diesel Generator as an Emergency Power Source.

As 0224 on September 20, 1989 Core Alterations for the Unit One Refueling Outage were initiated. These alterations continued until 1315.

At 1720 procedure 1BwOS 1.2.2.b-1, Unit One Boron Injection Flowpath Monthly Surveillance, was performed. The procedure did not meet the acceptance criteria. The acceptance criteria requires one of the redundant High Head Safety Injection Valves to be operable and capable of being powered from an operable Emergency Power Source. Valve 1S1B801B was Out of Service. High Head Safety Injection Valve, 1S1B801A was in service but it was determined that it was not capable of being powered by an operable Emergency Power Source because the 1A DG was out of service. The Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.1.2.1 was entered and complied with.

At 1213 on September 21, 1989 the 1S1B801B was returned to service. The Action Statement was exited.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) - any event or condition prohibited by the plants technical specifications.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of this event was a programmatic deficiency. The recently implemented computer OOS program was not properly structured for Technical Specification Application review of OOS's prepared in advance for a major outage.

The Out of Service system was computerized in May of 1989. The computer program was interlocked to require a SCRE login to print an OOS. The computer would automatically print the initials of that SCRE on the form. This interlock was designed to prevent hanging an OOS without SCRE review. For the current Refueling Outage it was desired to have the OOS forms and cards printed in advance to ensure smooth coordination of work activities. As a result most of the OOSs were processed in August well before the Refueling Outage. The SCREs performing the printouts believed that Technical Specification Application review based on existing plant conditions would be performed when it was time to hang the OOS's.

When the OOS for the 1S1B801B valve was forwarded to the control room the SCRE observed that the LCO's listed for the OOS were not applicable for the current plant mode. The 'SCRE' block had the computer printed initials of the SCRE who had printed the OOS on August 17. Based on the completed form the SCRE concluded that no additional Technical Specification Application review was necessary.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

This event had no effect on the safety of the plant or the public. All systems operated as designed. The Residual Heat Removal (RH)[BP] pumps were available to provide a borated water flowpath from the Refuel Water Storage Tank to the RCS. Manual operation of the 1S1B801A was also available.

Under the worst case condition of a loss of offsite power to Unit One, both divisions of the Unit Two Auxiliary Power were operable, available and capable of being crosstied to Unit One including the 2A and 2B DGs.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A policy statement has been issued requiring that all OOS's prepared in advance for the Unit One Refuel Outage be re-reviewed for Technical Specification Application prior to the equipment being taken OOS.

The computer OOS program, 'Outage Editor' will be revised to provide for printing an OOS without placing the SCRE initials on the form. This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-89-16001. The OOS procedure, BWAP 330-1, will be revised to address these changes. This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-89-16002.

Operating Surveillances 1Bw05 1.2.2.b-1 and 2Bw05 1.2.2.b-1 will be revised to further enhance Table B (Flowpath to RCS Cold Leg) while operating in Modes (4, 5, & 6). This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-84-16003.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

None

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

None