



Commonwealth Edison

Zion Generating Station
101 Shiloh Blvd.
Zion, Illinois 60099
Telephone 312/746-2084

October 12, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report number 89-014-00, Docket No. 50-295/DPR-39 from Zion Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), which requires a 30 day written report when any operation or condition is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Krueh
T. P. Joyce
for Station Manager
Zion Generating Station

GJP/sdd

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
INFD Record Center
CECo Distribution List

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PDR ADCK 05000295
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Zion Unit 1	Docket Number (2) 0 15 10 10 10 12 19 15	Page (3) 1 of 0 2
Title (4) Fire Doors to Cable Spreading Rooms Found Open Without a Firewatch Present Due to Personnel Error.		

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 9	1 2	8 9	8 9	0 1 4	0 0	1 0	1 2	8 9	N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9) 5

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Keith Knudtson, Technical Staff Engineer ext. 338	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 2 7 4 6 - 2 0 8 4
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
				N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 9-12-89 at 1115 hours, an operator found the Unit 1 inner cable spreading room fire door propped open and the U-1 outer cable spreading room fire door ajar without a fire watch present. The doors were closed and locked upon discovery.

It was determined that contractors working in the area had opened the doors to facilitate installation of cables. The unit was in mode 5 Cold Shutdown at the start of a refueling outage.

The safety significance was minimal because the unit was in cold shutdown and the fire detectors in both cable spreading rooms were operable. The Halon and Cardex Systems were also operable throughout the event.

Contractor personnel at the foreman and craft level are instructed on the requirements and actions necessary to block open a fire door in a new program called Non-Station Personnel orientation. Engineering and Construction Department provides the training.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Form Rev 2.0

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				Page (3)		
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number				
Zion Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 5	8 9	- 0 1 4	-	0 0	0 2	OF 02	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

MODE 5 - Cold Shutdown RX Power 0% RCS [AB] Temperature/ Pressure - °F/ - psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 9-12-89 at 1115 hours, a "B" Operator found the U-1 inner cable spreading room fire door propped open during routine rounds. The U-1 outer cable spreading room door was found unlocked and ajar. No firewatch was present and no workers could be found in the area. The "B" Operator notified his supervisor and was instructed to close and lock both doors.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT

Contractor personnel were pulling cable in the cable spreading rooms. The doors were apparently opened for their convenience. The contractors were not aware of the significance of blocking open a fire door and ignored a warning posted on each door.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

Zion Station had begun a refueling outage on Unit 1. The unit was in Mode 5, cold shutdown, preparing for Mode 6, refueling. The stairwell, from which the doors lead to the cable spreading rooms, is frequented by the operators during their shift rounds and activities. This would indicate with some certainty that the doors were opened on the same shift that they were discovered. In addition all fire detectors in both cable spreading rooms remained operable. Both cable spreading rooms are protected by an automatic halon suppression system and a manual Cardox suppression system. Upon actuation of the halon system, an alarm in the control room will alert Operating personnel. Upon receiving the alarm, the Shift Supervisor will dispatch an operator to the area. The operator would discover and close the doors. If the halon system was not capable of extinguishing a fire because of the open doors, then the manual Cardox system could be actuated by the operator.

Based on the above conditions, the health and safety of the general public was not compromised.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The fire doors for both cable spreading rooms were closed and locked upon discovery of the event.

Regulatory Assurance verified that contractor personnel are trained via the Nuclear General Employee Training (N-GET) program to properly operate fire doors.

Contractor personnel are now being instructed on the requirements and actions necessary to block open a fire door. The Non-Station Personnel orientation program commenced in early September, 1989. The program provides adequate instructions and information and augments the N-GET program.

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS

There have been several occurrences since 1985 of fire doors being opened without the proper fire watch posted. The corrective actions taken for those events would not have prevented this personnel error event.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

None