

APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/89-27  
50-499/89-27

Operating Licenses: NPF-76  
NPF-80

Dockets: 50-498  
50-499

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)  
P.O. Box 1700  
Houston, Texas 77001

Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station, Units 1  
and 2

Inspection At: STP, Wadsworth (Matagorda County), Texas

Inspection Conducted: August 7 through September 8, 1989

Inspectors: *D.R. Hunter* 10/5/89  
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Section, Division of Reactor Safety Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted August 7 through September 8, 1989 (Report 50-498/89-27;  
50-499/89-27)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of facility modifications, training and qualification effectiveness, and followup on previously identified inspection findings.

Results: Within the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The overall program for facility modifications appeared to be acceptable; however, the reviews and evaluations of facility modifications related to nuclear safety by the plant operating review committee and the plant manager may not have been fully completed prior to implementation of the change. No specific examples of inadequate safety reviews were identified. The responsibilities assigned to the plant safety and analysis (P&SA) groups and the staffing level (manager and one engineer) did not appear to be consistent.

In the area of training and qualification effectiveness, the licensee appeared to be ahead of schedule for meeting their INPO accreditation milestones. Adequate training audits were being conducted and, in general, appropriately used for program evaluation with satisfactory resolutions to the findings. Substantial improvements were being made to restore an inadequate chemistry training laboratory to a useful condition. Event review, training, and tracking systems were up-to-date and adequate. Training course objectives were well defined and discussed; the lessons were well organized and effectively presented.

DETAILS

1. Personnel Contacted

- \*G. E. Vaughn, Vice President, Nuclear
- \*R. W. Chewing, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- \*W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- \*M. A. McBurnett, Licensing Manager
- \*A. C. McIntyre, Manager, Support Engineering
- \*T. J. Jordan, Manager, Plant Engineering
- \*B. A. Franta, Manager, Professional and Support Services
- \*S. M. Dew, Manager, Nuclear Plant Mechanical Maintenance
- \*P. T. Appleby, Manager, Training
- \*V. A. Simonis, Manager, Operations Support
- \*J. R. Lovell, Manager, Technical Services
- \*L. G. Welton, Manager, Operations Training
- \*J. D. Green, Manager, Inspection and Surveillance
- M. R. Wisenburg, Chairman, NSRB
- \*W. S. Blair, Manager, Maintenance Support
- M. Powell, Manager, Plant Safety and Analysis
- \*J. H. Kubinka, Manager, Staff Training
- J. A. Constantin, Supervisor, Simulator Training Section
- \*W. H. Humble, Engineer, Plant Engineering Department
- \*D. M. Chamberlain, Configuration Management Coordinator, Plant Engineering Department
- \*A. W. Harrison, Supervising Licensing Engineer
- \*C. A. Ayala, Supervising Licensing Engineer
- \*A. K. Khosla, Senior Licensing Engineer
- P. L. Walker, Senior Licensing Engineer
- \*M. K. Chakravosty, Administrator, NSRB
- J. R. Beers, Modification/Outage Coordinator
- D. P. White, Engineering Modification Coordinator
- R. J. Rehkugler, Senior Engineering Consultant
- J. H. Bartlett, Supervisor, Operator Training
- S. R. Basu, PORC Secretary
- J. H. Hodges, Reactor Operator, Operations Support
- S. B. Patel, Stress Engineer
- U. Starks, Mechanical Engineer
- M. I. Hutcheson, Engineer, Plant Safety and Analysis
- E. Halpin, Engineer, Plant Engineering Department

\*Denotes those attending the management exit meeting on September 8, 1989. Other licensee personnel were contacted during the inspection.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee regarding the following previously identified inspection findings:

- 2.1 (Closed) Deviation (498/8805-01; 499/8805-01) - Emergency Procedure (EOP) Upgrade: The licensee reviewed and evaluated certain previously missed commitments as part of the followup to the Deficiency Report (DR) 89-047, Revision 1, dated June 21, 1989.

The inspector reviewed the two licensee responses to Deficiency DR 89-047, dated July 28, 1989 (ST-HS-HS-11928), and August 18, 1989 (ST-HS-HS-12040). The licensee reviewed 17 identified items and determined the items to be of no significant safety consequence. Additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence included guidance for the issuance of a problem report, if appropriate, when the NRC indicated that a violation or deviation may be issued. The issuance of the problem report will formally evaluate and document the review for safety consequences and reportability of the item.

The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter, and this item is considered closed.

- 2.2 (Open) Violation (498/8868-02) - Example C: This example of the violation involved the failure to include an "OR" in Substeps 14.1 and 14.2 of EOP Unit 1/2 Procedure POP05-E0-EC31, Revision 3/0, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture With Loss of Reactor Coolant Subcooled Recovery Desired."

The inspector reviewed the procedures and verified that the change (addition of the "OR") had been incorporated into the EOPs.

The inspector had no further questions regarding this specific item; however, Examples A and B of the violation, remain open pending the completion of the EOP upgrade program and NRC review of the program and its implementation.

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

### 3. Facility Modifications (37701)

The inspector reviewed selected facility modifications made by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and provided to the NRC in the routine annual report of changes to the facility (ST-HL-AE-2809), dated October 21, 1988.

The changes were reviewed to verify that they were completed in accordance with the requirements and licensee commitments, including the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.59.

No facility or procedure changes, other than amendments to the Technical Specifications requiring prior NRC approval were noted to have been reported to the NRC by the licensee.

### 3.1 Procedures

The review included selected design program, administrative directives, and implementing procedures listed in the attachment. The inspector identified a number of questions and provided comments regarding several of the procedures reviewed, as discussed below.

#### 3.1.1 Procedure NGP-760, "Uniformity of Safety Evaluations and 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations"

This procedure assigned a number of responsibilities to the PS&A group, including the initial review and approval of screening and safety evaluations performed for modifications, the initial approval of safety analyses conducted for nonconformance reports, providing assistance to other groups, and the initial training of the appropriate plant staff members regarding safety and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations.

Document reviews and interviews revealed that the assignments made to the PS&A group (manager, one engineer, and two vacancies) were extremely ambitious, considering the apparent importance and content of this activity. The PS&A group had recently commenced the review of the safety evaluations for all new and existing temporary modifications. The PS&A was also planning a sample review of previously completed 10 CFR 50.59 applicability screening and unreviewed safety question evaluations.

#### 3.1.2 Procedure IP-3.24Q, "Engineering Change Notice Package (Minor Modification)"

Step 6.4.8 of this procedure required that the Nuclear Plant Operations Department (NPOD) cognizant engineer coordinate an impact assessment of NPOD programs and procedures in accordance with Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0031, "Design Change Implementation After Turnover." The inspector noted that the activities required by the design change checklist (OPGP03-ZE-0031-1) for minor modifications, and the activities required for major plant modifications in accordance with Procedure IP-3.1Q, "Plant Modifications," were not consistent. Procedure IP-3.1Q required (for major modifications) that the following questions be addressed:

". . . will the design change:

"4. Be consistent with existing operations, maintenance, or testing procedures . . .

"5. Be compatible with existing temporary modifications and alterations, and not require that any temporary modifications and alterations be restored, revised, or incorporated as part of the design change . . . ."

Procedure IP-3.240 did not address these two items. Licensee representatives stated that the questions regarding procedure consistency and the compatibility of the change with existing temporary modifications were addressed during the performance of the Return-to-Service Checklist OPGP03-ZE-0031-4 by the cognizant engineer prior to declaring the system to be operable.

These procedure weaknesses were discussed with licensee representatives, who agreed to consider possible revisions to the procedures. This is an inspector followup item (498/8927-01; 499/8927-01) that will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

- 3.1.3 Procedure OPGP03-Z0-0003, "Temporary Modifications and Alterations," addressed the update of key drawings, as appropriate, in the control room and the equipment clearance office.

Document reviews and discussions revealed that the similar controlled drawings in the records management system were not updated when a temporary modification was installed. Further, key engineering groups were not provided copies of the temporary modifications in order to have current documentation to utilize during ongoing design activities. The licensee provided a status of the temporary modifications monthly; however, the inspector noted that a number of temporary modifications were longstanding (1987). This apparent program weakness was brought to the licensee's attention for consideration.

The temporary modification procedure addressed both temporary modifications and alterations; however, alterations were no longer utilized. Interviews revealed that the procedure was presently under consideration for revision and the alteration process would be eliminated.

### 3.2 Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluations (USQE)

The inspector reviewed selected USQEs submitted to the NRC in the annual report. The inspector also reviewed a number of the more recent USQEs. The USQEs reviewed are listed in the report attachment. The review of the USQEs revealed that the independent nuclear safety review board (NSRB) had returned certain modification/safety evaluation packages to the plant for additional information. The information appeared to have been provided as requested.

The USQEs written as input to the 1989 annual report to the NRC appeared to have improved, in that the information being provided to licensing was more comprehensive. It was also noted that the safety evaluations for the changes performed after mid-1989 routinely received a review and approval of the plant safety and analysis groups as required by the nuclear policy.

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

#### 4. Temporary Modifications (37701)

The inspector reviewed selected temporary modifications that were still active to ensure that the review, approval, installation, and testing were performed in accordance with the license and procedure requirements. The temporary modifications reviewed are listed in the attachment to the report. The inspector identified the following issues and provided comments regarding the modifications.

- 4.1 The licensee's compliance review for certain temporary modifications was performed in accordance with Procedure OPGP03-Z0-0003; however, it was noted that for the three temporary modifications selected for review, the licensee had determined that the review of the screening and safety evaluations by the plant operations review committee (PORC) and the approval of the plant manager was not required. The temporary modifications (T1-NI-89-09, T1-PH-89-035, and T1-PH-89-038) were associated with items which may affect nuclear safety. The installed temporary modifications had not been formally reviewed by the PORC and approved by the PM prior to installation to ensure that no unreviewed safety question was involved. Although this did not appear to constitute a violation of a regulatory requirement, it was not apparent when or how the independent nuclear safety review board (NSRB) would review the screening and safety evaluation for the modification to verify that no unreviewed safety question was involved.

This apparent program weakness was discussed with the licensee and provided for consideration. This is considered to be an inspector followup item (498/2701-02; 499/2701-02).

- 4.2 A temporary modification (T1-PH-89-035) had been issued regarding the removal of two blind flanges from spare containment electrical penetrations (3E261EEP0003 and 0004) and the installation of modified flanges to allow cables to be routed into the reactor containment building during the refueling outage via sealed penetrations. The modified flanges were installed during Mode 5 on August 9, 1989, prior to entering Mode 6, requiring containment integrity.

The adequacy of the installation and testing of the flanges was questioned by the inspector. Subsequent review by NRC inspectors during NRC Inspection Report 50-498/89-28; 50-499/89-28 resolved this issue.

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

#### 5. Training and Qualification Effectiveness (41500)

##### 5.1 INPO Accreditation Status

The inspectors discussed INPO accreditation with the licensee and reviewed their INPO accreditation status. The licensee representatives stated that they were on schedule to meet all their accreditation milestones. The

licensee had completed the job/task analysis and design phase activities. They had recently submitted their accreditation self evaluation reports and were scheduled for their first INPO accreditation visit in January 1990. Other milestones included:

- to have materials 50 percent developed by December 31, 1989, and
- to have materials 100 percent developed by December 31, 1990.

The inspectors reviewed the program development status from January through August 1989. The program development status was on or ahead of schedule in all areas. Through August 1989, the average program status was at 73 percent, which is 17 percent ahead of their 56 percent schedule. Of the 8 program areas being developed, 7 were between 62 percent and 95 percent complete and 8 at 47 percent. The licensee appeared to be ahead of schedule for meeting all of their INPO accreditation milestones.

## 5.2 Review and Followup of Training Audit

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Nuclear Assurance Audit 89-21 (B2), "Personnel Training and Qualifications." This audit was conducted April 18 through May 9, 1989. The audit identified five concerns and one deficiency, which was corrected during the audit. The inspectors also reviewed the training department responses to the various concerns addressed in the audit. The inspectors followed up extensively on a concern in the chemical operations and analysis area identified in the audit. This concern dealt with:

- Technicians needing improvement when performing analysis under nonroutine conditions;
- Inadequate laboratory facilities and the lack of equipment was limiting the effectiveness of the training program; and
- Additional hands-on training was needed and could be obtained in laboratory conditions.

The training department's response to the above concern was that:

- Equipment previously used in the laboratory was used by the plant to support startup of both units;
- The decision to use the laboratory equipment in the plant had been mutually agreed to by nuclear training and chemical operations and analysis; and
- The existing method of training personnel, using in-plant equipment, had not adversely affected the quality or quantity of training.

The inspector toured the chemistry training laboratory and talked with an instructor about its past, present, and future status and plans. The laboratory was in the process of being restored to use for training with

the recent purchase of new equipment. Its previous lack of use had been attributed to a lack of equipment as identified above. Under the present budget, the licensee had made several purchases, and future budget plans provided for substantial additional purchases. The inspector reviewed the present and proposed training budgets. The present budget and proposed budget both supported the above improvements in the laboratory. The inspector also noted that the proposed budget also supported substantial additions of training equipment for the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation and control training labs.

The licensee's audit of training appeared to be adequate. The resolutions to each finding appeared to be satisfactory and had been appropriately used for program evaluation.

### 5.3 Training on LERs, Events, and Notices

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methods of identification and tracking of training needs based on LERs, industry events, notices, and other areas that might warrant training. The licensee had a system in effect for processing, reviewing, and assigning the responsibility to training in these areas. The management action tracking system (MATS) was utilized to keep track of responsibilities and due dates. In addition to the MATS system, the training department had the option to add items not specifically assigned to them through the information routing system. These items were then added to a lessons learned lesson plan. The inspectors reviewed the recently closed and the open training department commitments on the MATS system. There were no overdue items from training, and it was noted that several items that were not specifically assigned to training had been covered in lessons learned.

The licensee appeared to have an effective, systematic system for identifying significant items that required training. They also had a tracking system that supported these deadlines.

### 5.4 Chemical Operations and Analysis Training

The inspector monitored a portion of two training classes. The classes were CFT 100.36, "Non-Class 13.8/4.16/480V AC Power Distribution" and CTT 253.01, "Ion Chromatography." The lessons were presented within the allotted time and the students were given ample time for questions. The instructors remained aware of time and allotted for, a planned, controlled break. The trainees were provided with a meaningful and complete instructional context for the lessons with reference to the overall course objectives. The lessons were outlined prior to the presentations and the structure was explained in detail. The instructors kept to the outline of instructions, departing only to satisfy questions. All subject areas were covered at a level commensurate with the data presented in the instruction guides and with the objectives of the lessons. The instructors were poised and professional and kept the interest of the class throughout the session. They gained and maintained the confidence and trust of the class. The instructors were in control of the class and did not allow tangential discussions to disrupt the pursuit of the subject at hand. The

respect of the class for the instructors allowed the successful completion of the lesson without undue distraction. The instructors exhibited a complete and thorough grasp of the subject matter and were confident enough in this knowledge to be able to relate it in an understandable fashion. Questions within the scope of the course were answered correctly and completely. There were no technical errors in the presentations and a complete picture was presented of the functions and systems including relating the lesson to the overall performance of the functions and systems. The instructor for CTT 253.01, "Ion Chromatography," presented laboratory and study requirements and schedule for completion.

The Ion Chromatography laboratory requirements included cleaning, calibration, preparation of fittings, and troubleshooting of the equipment. These extensive laboratory requirements supported the need for the licensee to have a fully operational training laboratory as addressed in paragraph 5.2.

The inspector discussed the training program with several students of the Ion Chromatography class. The students supported the quality of training and the need for continued improvement for the chemical training lab.

The inspector reviewed several lesson plans related to chemical operations and analysis training. Lesson plans reviewed included:

- CPO - Chemical Plant Operator Training
- CPO 100.26, Verbal Communications
- CPO 100.27, Closure Requirements For Electrical and I&C Equipment
- CPO 100.28, Water Hammer
- CPO 100.29, Valve Packing Gland Adjustment
  
- CAT - Chemical Analysis Technical Training
- CAT 300.18, Liquid Waste Processing System
- CAT 300.26, Regulations, Permits, TS, and Surveillance
- CAT 300.27, Performance of Procedure
  
- CFT - Chemical Foreman Training
- CFT 100.36, Non-Class 13.8/4.16/48V AC Power Test
  
- CPR - Chemical Plant Operators Requal
- CPR 700.1, Lessons Learned

The lessons learned lesson plan was reviewed just prior to a training session. The lesson covered two station problem reports and one significant event report. The instructors had reviewed the reports and prepared a lesson plan for each, which addressed all the course objectives of Lesson Plan CPR 700.01, "Lessons Learned."

The course objectives were well defined and discussed. The lesson plans appeared to be well organized and efficiently presented.

## 5.5 Licensed Operator Training

The inspector examined training records, requalification training schedules, event reports, and interviewed training department personnel to determine the effectiveness and control of the following:

- Active and inactive operator licenses
- The feedback of industry events into the training program
- Operator requalification training
- The tracking and resolution of identified events that did or could have impact on the plant operation

The inspector also reviewed the latest licensee audit of personnel training and qualifications.

### 5.5.1 Control of Active and Inactive Operator Licenses

The inspector selected the names of two licensed personnel who had been moved from inactive to active license status. A review of their training records indicated that the requirements for active license status had been met. During this time frame, the licensee documented the changes in status via an office memorandum. The memorandum listed the requirements for activation of the license and was signed by the certifying officer; however, this memorandum process was no longer being used. The licensee had proceduralized the process with the issuance of Procedure OPOP01-ZA-0014, "Licensed Operator License Maintenance." This procedure, in addition to covering license activation, also covered operator transfer between units and active license maintenance.

### 5.5.2 Operator Requalification Cycle - 88-07

During this portion of the inspection, the inspector reviewed a 12-month segment of the 2-year requalification cycle. Class schedules were reviewed for lesson plan content, inclusion of industry operating experience and simulator schedules, including proposed training scenarios. This 12-month period included a requalification exam conducted on the simulator. The final results were reviewed to determine if there were any failures. Of the 84 operators examined, there was one failure noted. The operator was reexamined and posted a passing grade.

The requalification training cycle schedules reviewed contained comprehensive subject matter. In addition, the inspector selected a sample of site and industry events from the licensee's management action tracking system to determine if these were included in the operator requalification where applicable. The inspector noted that the events were included either as separate classroom instruction

covered by lesson plans or were included in the required reading assignments of the individual weekly schedules. The inspector also noted that events not included on the management action tracking system were also included in lesson plans and schedules. The licensee explained that all LERs, NRC Notices, Bulletins, Generic Letters, and other informative documents plus industry events and information were sent to the training department and screened to determine their relevance to the operation of the facility. The material, if relevant to the operation of the facility and if it had not been previously addressed, was included in the training curriculum.

5.5.3 Audit of Training - Audit Report 89-21

There were several concerns identified in the audit report. The inspector noted that concerns number two and three identified computer modeling deficiencies associated with the simulator. Concern number two was related to the lack of modeling of the emergency response facility data acquisition display system (ERFDADS), and concern number three identified several other modeling deficiencies. The overall concern of the audit team was that the modeling did not reflect the actual control room. The nuclear training department responded that there was currently an existing Modification Request (MR-404) on the simulator to correct several modeling deficiencies, including ERFDADS and radiation monitoring. The radiation monitoring was scheduled for completion in 1989 and the remainder of the modeling deficiencies by the end of 1990. The completion of this modification should enhance the training received by the operators, especially in emergency response training.

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

6. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on September 8, 1989. The inspectors summarized the inspection purpose, scope, and findings. The licensee acknowledged the comments and did not identify any specific proprietary information to the inspectors.

## ATTACHMENT

### Documents Reviewed

#### Programs, Policies, and Procedures

- FSAR 17.2.3, "Design Control"
- OQA Plan, Section 6.0, "Design and Modification Control," Revision 4 (June 1, 1989)
- NGP-610, "Licensing Commitments," Revision 4 (April 6, 1989)
- NGP-760, "Uniformity of Safety Evaluations and 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," Revision C (July 18, 1988)
- IP-3.10, "Plant Modifications," Revision 6 (July 28, 1989)
- IP-3.19Q, "Design Control," Revision 1 (May 21, 1988)
- IP-3.20Q, "10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," Revision 1 (November 20, 1987)
- IP-3.24Q, "Engineering Change Notice Package," Revision 3, (July 28, 1989)
- IP-1.36Q, "Engineering Responsibilities," Revision 1 (February 2, 1988)
- OPGP03-ZE-0031, "Design Change Implementation," Revision 6 (May 2, 1989)
- OPGP03-ZO-0003, "Temporary Modifications and Alterations," Revision 9 (June 15, 1988)
- OPGP03-ZA-0003, "License Compliance Review," Revision 8 (March 18, 1988)
- OPGP03-ZA-0004, "Plant Operations Review Committee," Revision 11 (August 14, 1989)
- OPGP03-ZA-0090, "Work Process Program," Revision 0 (April 10, 1989)
- OPGP03-ZE-0034, "Contractor Work Request Program," Revision 0 (November 16, 1988)
- OPOP01-ZA-0014, "Licensed Operator License Maintenance," Revision 0

#### Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluations

- 87-007, "Temporary Modification to Allow the Automatic Addition of Sodium Bromide Into the Essential Cooling Water System" (TO-SH-87-126, dated June 27, 1987)
- 87-008, 87-009, and 87-010, "Temporary Modification to Provide for Hydraulically Blocking Certain Essential Cooling Water Valves in the Fully Open Position" (TI-EW-87-174, TI-EW-87-175, and TI-EW-87-176, dated June 27, 1987)

- 87-012, "Temporary Modification to Allow Instrument Air System Operation During Cooling Water Outage" (T1-OC-87-182, dated July 10, 1987)
- 87-018, "Replacing of 150 HP Supply Fan Motors With 190 HP Motors" (CCP 1-E-EM-0826)
- 87-023, "Indeterminate Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Key Material in Safety-Related MOVs" (NCR 87-121, SPR 87-0342, dated September 17, 1987)
- 88-024, "Modification to the Containment Personnel Air Lock Air Supply Solenoid Valves Controls and Test Connections Upgrade" (CCP-1J-FST-0614; SPR-88-0047, dated February 11, 1988; LER 88-017, dated March 11, 1988)
- 88-047, "Procedure Change Regarding the 4.1KV Class 1E Undervoltage Relay Calibration" (1PSP06-PK-0001, Revision 0)
- 87-061, "FSAR Change Addressing the Leak Testing of Safety Injection System Accumulator Check Valves"
- 88-057, "Modification to Provide the Control Power to the Instrument Air Compressor From the Balance of Plant Emergency Diesel Generator" (CCP-1E-FST-0868)
- 87-042, "FSAR Change Addressing the Pressure in the Electrical Penetration Areas During Normal and Accident Conditions" (NCR HN 03348, dated July 21, 1987)
- 87-053, "Modifications to Steam Generator Blowdown Piping to Remove Interference" (NCR 87-0252, dated November 3, 1987)
- 89-088, "Modification to Replace the Steam Generator Blowdown Filter Element with 'Dummy' Elements" (reference temporary modification, T1-SB-88-081, and USQE 88-0131, dated August 31, 1988; MD-312, MD-313, and MD-437)
- 89-110, "Engineering Change Notice Package to Add an Alarm For Core Exit Temperature for Midloop Operations" (ECNP-89-J-0099, Unit 1 and ECNP-89-J-0100, Unit 2)
- 89-115, "Modification to Disposition Unit 1 and 2 Common Alarms," dated June 18, 1989
- 89-116, "Combustible Loads Attributable to Electrical Cables in Conduit, Metal Panels, and Enclosures," dated June 20, 1989
- 89-117, "Approval of ASME Code Case U-460 for STP," dated June 20, 1989

### Temporary Modifications

- T1-PH-89-038, Routed video cable from the 10 foot elevation of EAB to the 41 foot and 60 foot elevations of the MAB (approved on August 3, 1989, and installed on August 8, 1989)
- T1-NI-89-09, Removal (electronically) of one of the two fission chambers from service on extended range Channel C1-N1-NE-0046 due to a short circuit (approved and installed on March 8, 1989) (reference NCR 89-1-067 and conditional release, dated March 3, 1989)
- T1-PH-89-035, Removed blind flanges from two spare containment penetrations and replaced with two modified flanges to provide cable penetrations to the reactor containment building (approved on July 21, 1989, and installed on August 4, 1989)
- T1-PH-89-028, Residual heat removal pump motor current remote indication on the control board (reviewed and approved on August 2, 1989, and installed on August 4, 1989)

### Modifications

- Modification Design Package 89074, "Relocate Loose Parts Monitor System Channels 3 and 4 Sensors to Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Studs" (plant manager approval on July 3, 1989)
- Engineering Change Notice Package 88-J-0215, "Containment Surge Isolation Valves Alarms and Bypass/Inop Indication" (plant manager approval on August 22, 1989)

### Training Documents

- Status of NTD MATS Items
- Training Schedule for Requalification Cycle 88-07
- Audit Report 89-21, "Personnel Training and Qualification"
- NTD-890684, NDT Response to Audit Report 89-21
- MTD-871176, Certification of Active License Status
- Documentation of Requalification Course Completion
- STPEAS Individual Training Record Information