U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-010/80-07; 50-237/80-07; 50-249/80-10

Docket No. 50-010, 50-237, 50-249

License No. DPR-02 **DPR-19** DPR-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3

Laspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: March 3 - April 4, 1980

Inspectors: J. L. Barker for

R.L. Apersard T. M. Tongue Zu

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Approved By: R. L. Spessard, Chief Reactor Projects Section 1-1

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 3 - April 4, 1980 (Report No. 50-010/80-07; 50-237/80-07; 50-249/80-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection consisting of monthly surve llance observation, operational safety verification, and monthly maintenance observation. The inspection involved 123 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Resulty: Of the three areas inspected, there were no items of noncompliance identified in two areas. There was one item of noncompliance (Infraction-failure to follow radiation protection procedures - Paragraph 2) identified in one area.

1. Persons Contacted

- *B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- *R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
- *J. Eeingenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- *B. Shelton, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent
- *D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
- C. Sargent, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- J. Wujciga, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
- E. Budzichowski, Unit Support Operating Engineer
- D. Adam, Waste System Engineer
- J. Parry, Rad-Chem Supervisor
- B. Sanders, Station Security Administrator
- *E. Wilmere, QA Coordinator

The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personnel.

*Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on March 6, and 21, 1980 and April 4, 1980.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of March, 1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 1, 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of March, 1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the HPCI, Core Spray and Containment isolation systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling. These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical spicifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

During a routine walk-through on March 6, 1980, of the Unit 2 core spray/LPCI corner rooms and Torus basement, the inspector observed three licensee and contractor personnel in the west corner room wearing only shoe cover rubbers for protective clothing instead of full protective clothing, which was required by the Special Work Permit (SWP) for the west CS/LPCI basement. Additionally, on March 28, 1980, while touring the unit 2/3 refueling floor, the inspector observed an equipment attendent trainee inside an area, which required full protective clothing by the SWP, wearing only shoe cover rubbers for protective clothing. These occurrences are contrary to to Station Radiation Control Procedure 37-1-A-1, which requires compliance with Special Work Permits (SWP's), and, therefore, are in violation of Technical Specification 6.2.B.

The licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence was to admonish the personnel concerned as to the importance of following station procedures. Additionally, the licensee is in the process of revising the station procedure to allow greater flexibility in the use of protective clothing in contaminated areas when personnel are performing observations rather than actual work activities. The inspector has reviewed the proposed procedure change. The necessary training associated with this change to the station procedure will be completed by May 1, 1980. The inspector has no further concerns on this matter, and no response to this item is required.

No additional items of noncompliance were identified.

3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

a. Unit 3 Control Rod Drive System

b. Unit 3 Torus modifications

c. Unit 3 refueling grapple

d. Unit 3 standby liquid control system

e. Unit 3 jet pumps Nos. 2, 5, 9, 11, 13 and 17

Regarding the Unit 3 jet pumps, the inspector observed replacement of the hold down beam and a locator assembly on jet pump number 13. He also observed ultrasonic testing on all jet pump beams and subsequently observed/reviewed replacement of jet pump beam Nos. 2, 5, 9, 11 and 17 after crack indications were found during ultrasonic testing. All beams replaced were machined bar stock incomel X-750 material. and the replacement beams were forged incomel X-750 material. The mode of failure on jet pump beam No. 13 was determined to be inner granular stress corrosion cracking.

Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 3 control rod drive system, the Unit 3 jet pumps and the Unit 3 standby liquid control system, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

No .tems of noncompliance were identified.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the emergency diesel generators and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities: APRM's, Control Rod Drive Systems, LPRM's and ARM's. No items of noncompliance were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection April 4, 1980, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance identified in paragraph 2.